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VII1 Einleitung
Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation behandelt das Thema der sozialen In-
teraktion auf Finanzm￿rkten. Unter dem sehr weit gefassten Begri￿ der sozia-
len Interaktion wird im Folgenden die aufeinander bezogene Wechselwirkung
von Individuen verstanden. Dies beinhaltet die ￿bertragung von Informatio-
nen im Rahmen der direkten Kommunikation. Dar￿ber hinaus schlie￿t soziale
Interaktion aber auch das Empfangen von Informationen bzw. Informationssi-
gnalen ein, die aus der Beobachtung des Handels anderer Individuen abgeleitet
werden. Soziale Interaktion umfasst jedoch nicht indirekte Mechanismen wie
zum Beispiel die Entwicklung der makro￿konomischen Lage oder die Entste-
hung von Marktpreisen, von denen gleicherma￿en eine Wechselwirkung ausge-
hen kann.
Im ￿nanztheoretischen Kontext ist die Ber￿cksichtung von sozialen E￿ekten
relativ neu und steht in starkem Widerspruch zur klassischen Finanztheorie,
der Modern Finance. Diese Lehre, die zu Beginn der zweiten H￿lfte des letz-
ten Jahrhunderts entstand, besteht im Wesentlichen aus den folgenden drei
S￿ulen: der Kapitalstrukturtheorie (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), dem Capital
Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965), welches auf der Portfolio-
theorie von Markowitz (1952) fu￿t, sowie der Optionspreistheorie (Black and
Scholes, 1973). ￿ber allem steht die Hypothese von e￿zienten Finanzm￿rkten
(Fama, 1970). Diese beinhaltet die Annahme, dass unter allen oder zumindest
innerhalb eines Gro￿teils der Finanzmarktteilnehmer Einigkeit in Bezug auf
den fairen Wert eines Wertpapiers besteht und der Marktpreis diesen funda-
mentalen Wert jederzeit widerspiegelt.
12
Die E￿zienzmarkthypothese erm￿glich zwar die Beschreibung von Finanz-
m￿rkten auf Basis einfacher mathematischer Modelle, jedoch fu￿t die star-
ke Simpli￿zierung auf teils sehr unrealistischen Annahmen, allen voran die
Homogenit￿t der Marktteilnehmer. W￿re diese gegeben, so g￿be es beispiels-
weise keinen oder nur sehr geringen Wertpapierhandel, welches nicht in Ein-
klang mit den t￿glich beobachteten Handelsvolumina st￿nde ( Milgrom and
Stokey, 1982). Zur Widerlegung der Existenz e￿zienter Finanzm￿rkte zeig-
te Shiller (1981) Anfang der achtziger Jahre, dass Aktienkurse nicht jederzeit
den fundamentalen Wert widerspiegeln k￿nnen, da sie deutlich volatiler als die
zugrunde liegenden fundamentalen Informationen sind. Auf ￿hnliche Thema-
tik abzielend enth￿llte 1985 die empirische Untersuchung von de Bondt and
Thaler (1985) eine deutliche ￿berreaktion von Marktteilnehmern auf negative
fundamentale Informationen und l￿utete damit einen Paradigmenwechsel ein.
Seitdem wurde eine Vielzahl von empirischen Studien ver￿￿entlicht, die An-
omalien im Sinne der klassischen Finanztheorie aufdeckten. 1 Diese zu erkl￿ren
entstand eine neue, als Behavioural Finance bekannte Finanztheorie, die von
der Annahme des homo oeconomicus abweicht und mathematische Modelle
der klassischen Finanztheorie um psychologische und soziologische Verhaltens-
muster der Marktteilnehmer erg￿nzt. Wesentliche Beitr￿ge stammen von den
Psychologen Daniel Kahneman und Amos Tversky, die bereits 1979 mit der
Vorstellung einer neuen Erwartungstheorie, der Prospect Theory, ein Funda-
ment der neuen Lehre schufen (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).2 Wenngleich
die Ber￿cksichtigung von kognitiven Verzerrungen und die damit einherge-
hende Annahme von heterogenen Investoren ein getreueres Bild der Realit￿t
zeichnen, so k￿nnte es doch vorkommen, dass sich die E￿ekte bei einer gro￿en
Anzahl von Marktteilnehmern ausgleichen (Friedman, 1953). Besondere Be-
deutung wird daher der Ber￿cksichtigung von Aspekten der Soziologie zuteil.
Diese beschreiben die gegenseitige Beein￿ussung von Marktteilnehmern, die
1F￿r einen umfassenden ￿berblick siehe beispielsweise Barberis and Thaler (2003).
2Eine ausf￿hrliche Aufbereitung psychologischer Aspekte ￿ndet sich zum Beispiel in dem
Buch von Shefrin (2000).3
aus der sozialen Interaktion erw￿chst, und je nach Konstellation der Bezie-
hungen daf￿r sorgt, dass das Gesetz der gro￿en Zahlen nicht mehr greift und
Marktpreise erheblich verzerrt werden k￿nnen ( Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani
et al., 1992).
Die Gr￿nde f￿r eine wechselseitige Beein￿ussung durch soziale Interaktion sind
vielf￿ltig und h￿ngen davon ab, ob Marktteilnehmer sich nur gegenseitig be-
obachten oder ob sie auch direkt miteinander kommunizieren. Im Falle des
reinen Beobachtens k￿nnen allen voran irrationale, mit der Psychologie der
Marktteilnehmer erkl￿rbare Motive zum Tragen kommen. So kann zum Bei-
spiel das Handeln anderer adaptiert werden, wenn diese in der ￿berzahl sind,
da dies durch die Annahme, dass ￿sich die Masse nicht irrt￿, eine Art Sicher-
heitsgef￿hl erzeugt (Keynes, 1936). Gleicherma￿en besteht die Angst vor einem
starken Bedauern, wenn man sich f￿r eine unpopul￿re Handlungsalternative
entscheidet und diese sich als falsch erweist (Bell, 1982). Generell werden Fehl-
entscheidungen als weniger schlimm angesehen, wenn sie von einer Vielzahl
anderer Marktteilnehmer ebenfalls getro￿en wurden ( Scharfstein and Stein,
1990). Nicht zuletzt k￿nnte auch ein Konformit￿tsstreben Antrieb f￿r das
Nachahmen anderer Marktteilnehmer sein (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Gleich-
wohl gibt es aber auch durchaus rationale Beweggr￿nde, die das Beobachten
und Imitieren des Handelns anderer Marktteilnehmer rechtfertigen. Letztere
k￿nnten beispielsweise, zumindest subjektiv wahrgenommen, bessere Informa-
tionen zur Verf￿gung haben (Welch, 1992, Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995,
Avery and Zemsky, 1998, Bala and Goyal, 1998, Bikhchandani et al., 1998).
Gleicherma￿en k￿nnte es auch sein, dass andere Marktteilnehmer eine besse-
re F￿higkeit haben, ￿￿entliche Informationen zu verarbeiten ( Banerjee, 1992,
Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Im Bereich der institutionellen Investoren haben
zudem Fehlentscheidungen geringere Konsequenzen, wenn sie auch von Markt-
teilnehmern mit einer h￿heren Reputation getro￿en wurden ( Scharfstein and
Stein, 1990, Dasgupta and Prat, 2008). Ferner sind in diesem Zusammenhang
bei einem Verg￿tungssystem, welches auf die relative Leistung im Vergleich
zur Konkurrenz ausgerichtet ist, geringere Gehaltseinbu￿en zu erwarten, wenn4
man die eigenen Investitionseinscheidungen an denen anderer ausrichtet ( Maug
and Naik, 1996).
Der Ein￿uss durch die direkte Kommunikation zwischen Marktteilnehmern ba-
siert ebenfalls zun￿chst auf irrationalen Komponenten. So mag zum Beispiel
der Meinungsaustausch mit anderen Marktteilnehmern bereits bekannte Ar-
gumente bekr￿ftigen und somit die wahrgenommene Unsicherheit reduzieren
(DeMarzo et al., 2003). Aber auch ganz rational betrachtet kann der einzelne
Marktteilnehmer durch den Austausch von Meinungen bzgl. Investitionsop-
portunit￿ten und Bewertungsans￿tzen pro￿tieren. Dies gilt im ￿brigen auch
f￿r institutionelle Investoren, f￿r die, obwohl sie als Konkurrenten auftreten,
ein Ideenaustausch lohnend sein kann (Eren and Ozsoylev, 2006, Stein, 2008,
Gray, 2010).
Internationale Finanzm￿rkte sind in den zur￿ckliegenden Jahren von starken
Verwerfungen gekennzeichnet. Nach einer vorangegangenen weltweit ausge-
pr￿gten Boomphase sorgte 2007 das Platzen der Immobilienblase in den USA
f￿r den Beginn einer globalen Finanzkrise. Diese gri￿ 2008 nach dem Zusam-
menbruch der Investmentbank Lehman Brothers auf die Realwirtschaft ￿ber
und f￿hrte zu einer weltweiten Rezession. Zur Bek￿mpfung der negativen Aus-
wirkungen setzten viele Staaten stabilisierende Ma￿nahmen ein und erh￿hten
dadurch die eigene Finanzverschuldung, was wiederum die aktuell noch andau-
ernde Staatschuldenkrise hervorrief. Vor dem Hintergrund der zahlreichen Mo-
tive f￿r eine gegenseitige Beein￿ussung von Finanzmarktteilnehmern und den
m￿glichen Auswirkungen auf die Preisbildungsprozesse, stellt sich die Frage,
wie diese E￿ekte in den Kontext der skizzierten Geschehnisse auf internatio-
nalen Finanzm￿rkten einzuordnen sind.
1.1 Forschungsschwerpunkte der Dissertation
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist die empirische Analyse von Auswirkungen der sozia-
len Interaktion zwischen Akteuren auf Finanzm￿rkten. Der Fokus liegt dabei
auf Aktienm￿rkten.5
In meinem ersten Aufsatz mit dem Titel ￿Does Social Interaction destabilise
Financial Markets?￿ stelle ich ein Marktpreismodell vor, welches dem Ein￿uss
durch soziale Interaktion Rechnung tr￿gt. Mit Hilfe dieses Modells gehe ich
der Fragestellung nach, ob soziale Interaktion zwischen Marktteilnehmern, un-
abh￿ngig davon, ob es sich um Privatpersonen oder institutionelle Investoren
handelt, eine stabilisierende oder eine destabilisierende Wirkung auf Finanz-
m￿rkte hat.
W￿hrend der erste Aufsatz eine Betrachtung der Makroebene darstellt, steige
ich mit meinem zweiten Aufsatz mit dem Titel ￿Analyst Behaviour: the Geo-
graphy of Social Interaction￿ in die Analyse der Mikroebene einzelner Finanz-
marktteilnehmer ein. Dazu untersuche ich das Verhalten von Aktienanalysten,
die als wesentlicher Impulsgeber f￿r Finanzm￿rkte gelten. Konkret untersu-
che ich, ob Analysten st￿rker von anderen Analysten beein￿usst werden, wenn
diese im gleichen Land arbeiten oder wenn sogar ein regelm￿￿iger Informations-
austausch erfolgt. Beides setzte ich ins Verh￿ltnis zum jeweiligen Marktumfeld.
Hierf￿r vergleiche ich das Verhalten im Zeitraum vor und w￿hrend der j￿ngs-
ten Wirtschaftskrise.
In meinem dritten Aufsatz mit dem Titel ￿Fluctuations of Social In￿uence:
Evidence from the Behaviour of Mutual Fund Managers during the Econo-
mic Crisis 2008/09￿ besch￿ftige ich mich mit der sozialen Interaktion zwischen
institutionellen Investoren, im Speziellen zwischen Fondsmanagern. Diese ver-
walten in etwa ein Drittel des frei handelbaren Aktienverm￿gens und haben
folglich einen nennenswerten Ein￿uss auf Finanzm￿rkte. Mit Hilfe einer neu-
artigen Sch￿tzmethode3 bestimme ich die Gr￿￿e des sozialen Ein￿usses und
untersuche auch hier temporale Variationen im Verh￿ltnis zum zu Grunde lie-
genden Marktumfeld. Des Weiteren di￿erenziere ich die zwei Arten der sozialen
Interaktion, das hei￿t reine Beobachtung zum einen und Kommunikation zum
anderen und untersuche getrennt deren Bedeutung vor und w￿hrend der Wirt-
schaftskrise 2008/09.
3Siehe Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Lee (2003) und BramoullØ et al. (2009).6
1.2 Methodik
Alle empirischen Untersuchungen dieser Dissertation basieren auf dem linea-
ren Modell der ￿konometrischen Literatur ￿ber soziale Interaktion. In einer
richtungweisenden Arbeit formulierte Manski (1993) dieses wie folgt:
ai = xiβ +
X
j
γijxjν + δ
X
j
γijaj + i. (1.1)
Dabei steht ai f￿r die mathematisch stetige Aktion eines Individuums. Der
Zeilenvektor xi beinhaltet exogene Variablen, die ein Individuum ohne den
Ein￿uss anderer zu einer bestimmten Handlung veranlassen. Der entsprechen-
de lineare Zusammenhang wird durch den Koe￿zienten β ausgedr￿ckt. Da-
neben gibt es noch zwei Komponenten, die den sozialen Ein￿uss modellieren.
Zum einen wird angenommen, dass ein Individuum auch durch die exogenen
Variablen anderer Individuen beein￿usst wird. Dies wird durch den zweiten
Term in Gleichung 1.1 ausgedr￿ckt und als exogener sozialer Ein￿uss bezeich-
net. Zum anderen wird davon ausgegangen, dass eine direkte Beein￿ussung
durch die gew￿hlte Aktion anderer erfolgt. Dieser dritte Term in Gleichung
1.1 ber￿cksichtigt den sogenannten endogenen sozialen Ein￿uss. Der lineare
Zusammenhang beider Komponenten in Bezug auf die Handlung eines Indi-
viduums wird durch die Koe￿zienten ν und δ dargestellt. W￿hrend β und ν
Vektoren sind, so handelt es sich bei δ um ein Skalar. Die Ber￿cksichtigung des
endogenen sozialen Ein￿usses sollte mit den vorangegangenen Beschreibungen
im Hinblick auf die Motive und Beweggr￿nde einer gegenseitigen Beein￿us-
sung plausibel erscheinen. Die Einbeziehung eines exogenen sozialen Ein￿usses
hingegen bedarf einer gesonderten Erkl￿rung. Der Ursprung liegt in der Litera-
tur, die das Verhalten von Jugendlichen erforscht. 4 In diesem Zusammenhang
ist es beispielsweise durchaus denkbar, dass ein Jugendlicher nicht nur durch
das Bildungsniveau seiner Eltern, sondern auch durch das Bildungsniveau der
Eltern seiner Freunde gepr￿gt wird. Im ￿nanztheoretischen Kontext hingegen,
4Ein aktuelles Beispiel repr￿sentiert die Arbeit von BramoullØ et al. (2009).7
in welchem sich exogene Variablen eher auf vorhandene Informationen und
bestehende Portfolien beziehen, erscheint die Ber￿cksichtung eines exogenen
sozialen Ein￿usses wenig sinnvoll. Folglich kommt diese Komponente in mei-
nen empirischen Analysen nicht zum Tragen.
Die Koe￿zienten γij in Gleichung 1.1 geben an, wie stark der Ein￿uss des
Individuums j auf i im Vergleich zu anderen Individuen gewichtet wird. Um
sicherzustellen, dass ν und δ den gesamten Betrag des sozialen Ein￿usses mes-
sen, gilt folgende Normierung:
X
j
γij
! = 1. (1.2)
In seinem Artikel geht Manski (1993) davon aus, dass sich alle Individuen in
gleicher Art und Weise beein￿ussen. Folglich setzt er γij = 1
N, wobei N die
Anzahl der Individuen ist, von denen sozialer Ein￿uss ausgeht (Referenzgrup-
pe). Da dies die implizite Annahme beinhaltet, dass sich ein Individuum auch
selbst beein￿usst, nimmt Mo￿tt (2001) in einer Weiterentwicklung des Mo-
dells an, dass γii = 0. Mit der Normierungsbedingung aus Gleichung 1.2 ergibt
sich hieraus γij = 1
N−1. In Anlehnung an die Modelle der r￿umlichen ￿kono-
metrie, spatial econometrics,5 ber￿cksichtigen BramoullØ et al. (2009) und Lee
et al. (2010) eine v￿llig freie Netzwerkstruktur, in der nicht jedes Individuum
den Ein￿uss anderer in gleicher Art und Weise gewichtet.
W￿hrend ich in meinem ersten Aufsatz aufgrund der Analyse auf der Ma-
kroebene die Annahme tre￿e, dass alle Marktteilnehmer den Ein￿uss anderer
gleich gewichten, so gilt beim zweiten Aufsatz die Pr￿misse, dass eine gleich-
f￿rmige Beein￿ussung nur innerhalb von de￿nierten Referenzgruppen erfolgt.
Im dritten Aufsatz wird zun￿chst das zu Grunde liegende inhomogene Netz-
werk des sozialen Ein￿usses ermittelt und anschlie￿end die empirische Analyse
hierauf aufgesetzt.
5Siehe hierzu unter anderem Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Lee (2002), Lee (2003), Lee
(2007), Kapoor et al. (2007) und Kelejian and Prucha (2010). Einen umfassenden Literatur-
￿berblick gibt Anselin (2010).8
Das Modell aus Gleichung 1.1 kann wie folgt in die Vektorschreibweise ￿ber-
f￿hrt werden:6
a = Xβ + δΓa + . (1.3)
L￿st man Gleichung 1.5 nach dem Vektor der Aktionen einzelner Individuen a
auf, so ergibt sich:
a = (I − δΓ)
−1(Xβ + ), (1.4)
wobei I die Einheitsmatrix ist. Es zeigt sich, dass der Ein￿uss der exogenen
Variablen mit (I−δΓ)−1 multipliziert wird. Dies repr￿sentiert den sogenannten
sozialen Multiplikator (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001, Glaeser et al., 2003).
Geht man davon aus, dass sozialer Ein￿uss gleichgerichtet ist, das hei￿t, dass
eine Erh￿hung (Verringerung) des Wertes der Handlung anderer Individuen
auch zu einer Erh￿hung (Verringerung) des Wertes der Aktion eines einzelnen
Individuums f￿hrt, so gilt δ ≥ 0. Mit dieser Voraussetzung ist der soziale Mul-
tiplikator positiv und der Wert der durchschnittlichen Aktion immer gr￿￿er als
er es ohne den Ein￿uss soziale Interaktion w￿re. Diese Annahme ist sinnvoll,
wenn es beispielsweise darum geht Herdenverhalten bei Kauf- und Verkaufs-
entscheidungen zu modellieren. In diesem Falle w￿rde ein erh￿hter sozialer
Ein￿uss dazu f￿hren, dass bestimmte Wertpapiere st￿rker ge- oder verkauft
werden, als dies bei reiner Betrachtung der exogenen Variablen der Fall w￿re.
Wenn es allerdings darum geht, den Ein￿uss sozialer Interaktion im Rahmen
des Preisbildungsprozesses zu ber￿cksichtigen, so erscheint das Vorhandensein
eines sozialen Multiplikators wenig angemessen, da dies bedeuten w￿rde, dass
Wertpapiere durch soziale Beein￿ussung permanent ￿berbewertet werden. Je-
doch kann in Bezug auf Krisenzeiten durchaus angenommen werden, dass so-
zialer Ein￿uss auch zu einer Unterbewertung von Wertpapieren f￿hrt. Da der
erste Aufsatz soziale Interaktion im Rahmen eines Marktpreismodells ber￿ck-
sichtigt, wird das Standardmodell in der folgender Art und Weise modi￿ziert:
6Hier erfolgt aus genannten Gr￿nden keine Ber￿cksichtigung des exogenen sozialen Ein-
￿usses.9
a = Xβ + δ (Γa − Xβ) + , (1.5)
wodurch das Entstehen eines sozialen Multiplikators verhindert wird. 7 Im zwei-
ten Aufsatz stellt sich diese Thematik nicht, da die Analyse ohne Einbeziehung
von exogenen Variablen durchgef￿hrt wird. Im dritten Aufsatz repr￿sentiert die
Handlung eines Individuums das Portfoliogewicht, welches ein institutioneller
Investor einem bestimmten Wertpapier zuordnet. Hier wiederum ist die Be-
r￿cksichtigung eines sozialen Multiplikators ad￿quat, da ein Fondsmanager im
Falle der sozialen Beein￿ussung geneigt ist, das Portfoliogewicht zu erh￿hen,
wenn andere Fondsmanager ihre Portfolien ebenfalls mit einem bestimmten
Wertpapier aufstocken.
1.3 Daten
Zur Analyse der speziellen Fragestellungen in den einzelnen Aufs￿tzen der
Dissertation sind sehr unterschiedliche Daten erforderlich. Nachfolgend soll
beschrieben werden, wie die einzelnen Datens￿tze zusammengestellt wurden
und aus welchen Quellen die Daten stammen.
In meinem ersten Aufsatz untersuche ich, ob der Ein￿uss durch soziale Inter-
aktion eine stabilisierende oder destabilisierende Wirkung auf Finanzm￿rkte
hervorruft. Dazu analysiere ich die t￿glichen Kursverl￿ufe der Aktien, die per
Dezember 2010 im DAX30 Index vertreten waren und betrachte jeweils die Dif-
ferenz zwischen Marktpreis und fundamentalem Wert. Letzterer l￿sst sich aus
der Analystenkonsensussch￿tzung f￿r Kursziele herleiten. Diese entstammen
der Analystendatenbank I/B/E/S, die von dem Datenbankanbieter Thomson
Reuters betrieben wird. Um einen konsistenten Datensatz zu erhalten, in dem
beispielsweise Aktiensplits in gleicher Art und Weise ber￿cksichtigt sind, ent-
stammen die Kursdaten ebenfalls der I/B/E/S Datenbank. Der gew￿hlte Un-
7F￿r die entsprechende mathematische Herleitung wird auf den Anhang A.2 des ersten
Aufsatzes verwiesen.10
tersuchungszeitraum vom 1. Januar 2004 bis zum 31. Dezember 2010 ber￿ck-
sichtigt sowohl die Boomphase vor der j￿ngsten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise,
als auch die Krise an sich.
Zur Erforschung des sozialen Ein￿usses zwischen Aktienanalysten im zweiten
Aufsatz verwende ich die Kurszielsch￿tzungen der einzelnen Analysten. Das
Kursziel re￿ektiert den Wert, den ein Analyst einer Aktie beimisst und repr￿-
sentiert somit auch die Meinung und Erwartung eines Analysten. F￿r die em-
pirische Untersuchung werden Sch￿tzungen bez￿glich der Aktien, die per Mai
2010 im DAX30 Index beinhaltet waren verwendet. Diese entstammen wieder-
um der I/B/E/S Datenbank. Dar￿ber hinaus habe ich den Datensatz noch um
Kurszielsch￿tzungen erg￿nzt, die auf der Internetseite www.aktiencheck.de ver-
￿￿entlich werden. W￿hrend die I/B/E/S Datenbank prim￿r auf gro￿e Invest-
mentbanken fokussiert ist, so konnte durch die Daten von www.aktiencheck.de
auch eine Ber￿cksichtung kleinerer Researchboutiquen und Investmentnewslet-
ter erreicht werden, die gleicherma￿en auf den Meinungsbildungsprozess von
Investoren einwirken. Zum Abruf der Daten von der Internetseite habe ich
ein Tool entwickelt, das den Abruf und die automatische Auswertung von ins-
gesamt rund 27.000 Analystenberichten erm￿glichte. Hieraus konnten knapp
17.000 Kurszielsch￿tzungen gewonnen werden. Der gew￿hlte Beobachtungs-
zeitraum vom 1. Januar 2005 bis zum 31. Mai 2010 erm￿glicht auch hier eine
Verhaltensanalyse in Bezug auf die unterschiedlichen vorherrschenden Markt-
gegebenheiten. Zur Erforschung des Ein￿usses, der aus der Kommunikation
und dem damit zusammenh￿ngenden Meinungsaustausch erw￿chst, habe ich
zudem eine Umfrage unter den Analysten in meiner Datenbank durchgef￿hrt.
Die Intention war es herauszu￿nden, welche Analysten miteinander kommu-
nizieren. Um nicht die R￿cklaufquote zu gef￿hrden, die letztlich bei zufrie-
denstellenden knapp 30% lag, wurden Analysten allerdings nicht direkt nach
Namen gefragt, sondern ￿ber diverse Kriterien versucht, das zugrunde liegende
Kommunikationsnetzwerk zu rekonstruieren. Je nach Beobachtungszeitpunkt
ist dies mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 60%-80% f￿r jene knapp 200 Analys-
ten m￿glich, die an der Umfrage teilgenommen haben.11
Der dritte Aufsatz behandelt das Investitionsverhalten von Fondsmanagern,
welches sich in den Portfoliogewichten ￿u￿ert, die sie bestimmten Aktien zu-
ordnen. Daten ￿ber diese Gewichtungen werden von dem Datenbankanbieter
Thomson Reuters gesammelt und in einer sogenannten Eigent￿merdatenbank
(Ownership Database ) abgelegt. Zum Abruf dieser Daten ist entweder ein Un-
ternehmen auszuw￿hlen, so dass alle (bekannten) Eigent￿mer ausgegeben wer-
den k￿nnen oder aber es erfolgt die Selektion eines bestimmten Fonds, f￿r
welchen dann alle im Portfolio be￿ndlichen Aktien mit den dazugeh￿rigen Ge-
wichten angezeigt werden. Da ein f￿r die empirische Analyse erforderlicher
Abruf aller Daten nicht m￿glich war, habe ich auch hier ein Tool entwickelt,
￿ber welches ich automatisiert die Daten f￿r alle rund 2.000 Fonds erhalten
habe, die mindestens 10 Mio. US$ in jene Aktien investiert hatten, die per
Dezember 2010 im DAX30 Index enthalten waren. Um wiederum einen Zu-
sammenhang zum jeweiligen Marktumfeld herstellen zu k￿nnen, reicht der ge-
w￿hlte Betrachtungszeitraum vom 1. Januar 2002 bis zum 31. Dezember 2010.
Die daraus resultierende Datenbank umfasst f￿r alle Fonds zu den unterschied-
lichen Zeitpunkten insgesamt rund 6 Mio. Portfoliogewichte. Zur Identi￿kation
des sozialen Ein￿usses habe ich diese vorhandene Datenbasis um diverse exoge-
ne Variablen, die die einzelnen Aktien betre￿en, erg￿nzt. Diese umfassen den
Durchschnitt historischer Renditen, die historische Volatilit￿t sowie Analys-
tenkonsensussch￿tzungen in Bezug auf das Kursziel, den erwarteten Gewinn
und das Kursgewinnverh￿ltnis. Dar￿ber hinaus wurden auch die Gewichtung
einer Aktie in nationalen und internationalen Aktienindices sowie die Stadt
und das Land des Firmensitzes ber￿cksichtigt. Die zuerst genannten funda-
mentalen Daten entstammen dem professionellen Informationsdienst Bloom-
berg. Indexgewichte konnten ￿ber passive Fonds in der Eigent￿merdatenbank
von Thomson Reuters bestimmt werden. Geogra￿sche Information bez￿glich
der Aktiengesellschaften sind in der Standarddatenbank von Thomson Reu-
ters enthalten. Um m￿glichst aussagekr￿ftige und repr￿sentative Ergebnisse
zu erhalten untersuche ich den Ein￿uss durch soziale Interaktion im dritten
Aufsatz nicht nur in Bezug auf DAX30-Werte, sondern hinsichtlich jeweils al-12
ler im Portfolio eines Fondsmanagers enthaltenen Aktien. Vor diesem Hinter-
grund war ein Abruf der exogenen Variablen f￿r alle Aktien, die zumindest zu
einem Zeitpunkt in dem Portfolio von mindestens einem Fondsmanager enthal-
ten waren, erforderlich. Zum Abruf dieser Datenmengen aus Bloomberg kam
ebenfalls wieder ein selbstentwickeltes Tool zu Einsatz. Insgesamt wurden so
die Fundamentaldaten von knapp 17.000 Unternehmen gesammelt.
Die Beschreibungen zeigen, dass zumindest im zweiten und dritten Aufsatz
sehr individuelle und im Vergleich zu bestehenden Studien neuartige Daten-
s￿tze verwendet werden. Bisherige Untersuchungen des Verhaltens von Ana-
lysten basieren ￿berwiegend8 nur auf Daten aus der, haupts￿chlich auf gro￿e
Investmentbanken ausgerichteten I/B/E/S Datenbank bzw. im Falle von Gra-
ham (1999) ausschlie￿lich auf Empfehlungen von Investmentnewslettern. Eine
ganzheitliche Betrachtung ist meines Wissens nach bislang noch nicht erfolgt.
Bei Analysen des Verhaltens von institutionellen Investoren wurde zwar bislang
auf vergleichbare Quellen wie die Eigent￿merdatenbank von Thomson Reuters
abgestellt,9 allerdings wurde nach meinem Kenntnisstand bisher in keiner Stu-
die eine Ber￿cksichtigung exogener Kontrollvariablen vorgenommen. Dar￿ber
hinaus wurden Untersuchungen bez￿glich deutscher Fondsmanager bislang nur
auf Basis kleiner manuell zusammengestellter Datenbanken durchgef￿hrt. 10
1.4 Ausf￿hrliche Beschreibung der Aufs￿tze die-
ser Dissertation
Nach dem vorangegangenen ￿berblick soll nun eine detaillierte Beschreibung
der einzelnen Aufs￿tze folgen. Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Einordnung
der Fragestellungen in die bestehende Literatur, der Erl￿uterung der empiri-
schen Methodik sowie der Pr￿sentation der Ergebnisse.
8Siehe beispielsweise Hong et al. (2000), Cooper et al. (2001), Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt
et al. (2006), Krishnan et al. (2006), Kim and Zapatero (2009), Naujoks et al. (2009) und
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010).
9Siehe unter anderem Lakonishok et al. (1992), Hong et al. (2005) und Pareek (2011).
10Siehe Walter and Weber (2006) und Oehler and Wendt (2009).13
1.4.1 Does Social Interaction destabilise Financial Mar-
kets?
Problemstellung. Mit diesem Aufsatz soll herausgestellt werden, welche Wir-
kung von einer gegenseitigen Beein￿ussung durch soziale Interaktion zwischen
Marktteilnehmern in Bezug auf die Stabilit￿t von Finanzm￿rkten ausgeht.
Motivation und Einordnung. Vor dem Hintergrund der zuvor dargelegten Mo-
tive f￿r eine soziale Interaktion zwischen Marktteilnehmern belegen bereits di-
verse empirische Studien das Vorhandensein einer gegenseitigen Beein￿ussung.
Im Bereich der institutionellen Investoren sind hier exemplarisch die Arbeiten
von Shiller and Pound (1989), Lakonishok et al. (1992), Arnswald (2001), Hong
et al. (2005), Pareek (2011) und Kremer and Nautz (2012) zu nennen. Hinsicht-
lich des Verhaltens von Privatinvestoren kommen Hong et al. (2004), Ivkovic
and Weisbenner (2007), Massa and Simonov (2005a) und Massa and Simonov
(2005b) zu vergleichbaren Ergebnissen. Die resultierende Wirkung auf die Bil-
dung von Marktpreisen wurde unter anderem von Lakonishok et al. (1992),
Jones et al. (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Sias (2004),
Walter and Weber (2006), San (2007), Puckett and Yan (2008), Hsieh (2012)
und Kremer and Nautz (2012) untersucht. Die Ergebnisse sind teils sehr un-
terschiedlich und h￿ngen davon ab, wie das Vorhandensein einer gegenseitigen
Beein￿ussung, zumeist getrennt nach institutionellen und privaten Investoren,
bestimmt wird. Allen Studien ist allerdings gemeinsam, dass die Wirkung auf
Finanzm￿rkte anhand der Entwicklung des Marktpreises abgeleitet wird, der
sich ergibt, nachdem eine gegenseitige Beein￿ussung stattgefunden hat. Eine
Renditeumkehr wird dabei als Indiz f￿r eine destabilisierende Wirkung inter-
pretiert.
Gang der Untersuchung. Da Marktpreisentwicklungen von vielen verschiede-
nen Faktoren getrieben werden k￿nnen, benutze ich, anders als vorangegangene
Studien, ein Marktpreismodell aus der Behavioural Finance, um den E￿ekt der14
sozialen Interaktion genauer identi￿zieren zu k￿nnen. Dazu verwende ich das
Modell von Brock and Hommes (1997) und Brock and Hommes (1998), welches
ich um die lineare Komponente des sozialen Ein￿usses erg￿nze. Unabh￿ngig
davon, ob es sich um Privatpersonen oder institutionelle Investoren handelt
wird angenommen, dass es zwei Typen von Investoren gibt: Fundamentalisten
und Chartisten. W￿hrend Erstere nur auf den fundamentalen Wert einer Aktie
abstellen und davon ausgehen, dass B￿rsenkurse diese Marke immer wieder er-
reichen werden, so extrapolieren Chartisten Preisbewegungen aus der Vergan-
genheit und projizieren diese auf die Zukunft. Folglich haben Fundamentalisten
eine stabilisierende Wirkung, w￿hrend Gegenteiliges von Chartisten ausgeht.
Ein einzelner Investor kann seinen Typ ￿ndern, je nachdem wie erfolgreich sich
eine bestimmte Strategie in der Vergangenheit erwiesen hat. Zus￿tzlich nehme
ich an, dass sich Investoren gegenseitig beein￿ussen. Wenn Chartisten st￿rker
von Fundamentalisten beein￿usst werden als umgekehrt, so kann daraus ge-
schlossen werden, dass soziale Interaktion eine stabilisierende Wirkung hat. Ist
der soziale Ein￿uss hingegen in die andere Richtung st￿rker, so deutet dies auf
einen destabilisierenden E￿ekt hin.
Die zu sch￿tzende Modellgleichung gestaltet sich als Funktion der einzelnen
Parameter wie folgt:
xt = F
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Dabei ist xt die Di￿erenz zwischen Kurs und fundamentalem Wert einer Aktie
zum Zeitpunkt t. Zur Erwartungsbildung bez￿glich zuk￿nftiger Preisentwick-
lungen gewichten Fundamentalisten die Abweichung aus der Vorperiode xt−1
mit ΦF < 1, w￿hrend Chartisten eine Extrapolation mit dem Faktor ΦC > 1
vornehmen. Der Anteil von Fundamentalisten im Markt nFt (sowie der Char-
tisten 1−nFt) variiert je nach Pro￿tabilit￿t einer bestimmten Strategie in der
Vorperiode. Die H￿he des sozialen Ein￿usses, der auf Fundamentalisten re-
spektive Chartisten wirkt, wird durch δF und δC gemessen. Die Di￿erenz aus
beidem ergibt ∆δ = δF − δC.15
Die Vorzeichen unter den Variablen geben an, ob ein h￿herer Wert stabilisie-
rend oder destabilisierend wirkt. Bei Variablen mit positiven Vorzeichen f￿hren
h￿here Werte zu gr￿￿eren Abweichungen vom fundamentalen Wert. Die Wir-
kung ist folglich destabilisierend. Gegenteiliges gilt f￿r Variablen mit negativem
Vorzeichen.
Aufgrund der Nichtlinearit￿t des Modells erfolgt die Sch￿tzung im Rahmen der
empirischen Analyse mittels eines nichtlinearen Kleinste-Quadrate-Sch￿tzers.
Ergebnisse. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass soziale Interaktion ten-
denziell eher eine destabilisierende Wirkung hat. Zumindest kann man zu dem
Schluss kommen, dass von sozialer Interaktion kein stabilisierender E￿ekt aus-
geht. Die Ergebnisse deuten des Weiteren darauf hin, dass die Einbeziehung
des sozialen Ein￿usses in ein Marktpreismodell dazu beitr￿gt, Preisbewegun-
gen besser zu erkl￿ren. Folglich bildet der Aufsatz auch einen wissenschaftli-
chen Beitrag zur Literatur der Modellierung und Sch￿tzung von Preisen auf
Finanzm￿rkten.11
1.4.2 Analyst Behaviour: the Geography of Social Inter-
action
Problemstellung. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es zu untersuchen, welche Rolle die
geogra￿sche N￿he und der Meinungsaustausch zwischen Aktienanalysten in
Bezug auf eine gegenseitige Beein￿ussung spielen.
Motivation und Einordnung. Aktienanalysten haben als Informationsinterme-
di￿re gro￿en Ein￿uss auf Kursentwicklungen. Aufgrund der Vielzahl von Inves-
titionsopportunit￿ten sind Marktteilnehmer auf die Sch￿tzungen und Vorher-
sagen von Analysten angewiesen und nutzen diese als Basis f￿r ihre Investiti-
11Siehe beispielsweise Shiller (1984), Vigfusson (1997), Gilli and Winker (2003), Westerho￿
and Reitz (2003), Alfarano et al. (2005), Boswijk et al. (2007), Amilon (2008), ap Gwilym
(2008), Franke (2008), Franke (2009) und Lux (2012).16
onsentscheidungen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es interessant herauszustellen,
in wie weit Prognosen durch den Ein￿uss sozialer Interaktion zwischen Ana-
lysten verzerrt sind. Bereits diverse empirische Studien zeigen, dass eine ge-
genseitige Beein￿ussung statt￿ndet (siehe Graham (1999), Hong et al. (2000),
Welch (2000), Cooper et al. (2001), Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006),
Krishnan et al. (2006), Kim and Zapatero (2009), Naujoks et al. (2009) und
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)). In den meisten F￿llen wird dabei aber nur die
Konsensussch￿tzung als Quelle einer sozialen Beein￿ussung ber￿cksichtigt. 12
Dies entspricht einer Gleichgewichtung des Ein￿usses aller Analysten.
Gang der Untersuchung. Im Gegensatz zu vielen der vorangegangenen Unter-
suchungen analysiere ich die Heterogenit￿t einer gegenseitigen Beein￿ussung.
Das hei￿t, ich nehme nicht an, dass sich alle Analysten in gleicher Art und Wei-
se beein￿ussen, sondern untersuche, in wie weit Analysten st￿rker von jenen
Analysten beein￿usst werden, die geogra￿sch n￿her sind oder mit denen ein
regelm￿￿iger Meinungsaustausch erfolgt. Dar￿ber hinaus setze ich diese hete-
rogene Beein￿ussung noch ins Verh￿ltnis zum jeweiligen Marktumfeld. F￿r die
Analyse verwende ich eine vergleichweise einfache empirische Methode, indem
ich die Korrelation von Analystensch￿tzungen innerhalb und au￿erhalb einer
bestimmten Referenzgruppe vergleiche. Hierzu sch￿tze ich folgende Regressi-
onsgleichung:
Pict = αP
(g1)
ct + βP
(g2)
ct + ict. (1.7)
Dabei ist Pict das Kursziel bez￿glich einer bestimmten Aktie c, welches ein ein-
zelner Analyst zum Zeitpunkt t ver￿￿entlicht hat. P
(g1)
ct ist der Mittelwert der
Kursziele einer Referenzgruppe, die sich, je nach durchgef￿hrter Untersuchung,
aus Analysten, die in der gleichen Stadt oder dem gleichen Land arbeiten,
oder aber aus Analysten, die regelm￿￿ig ihre Meinungen austauschen zusam-
mensetzt. P
(g2)
ct repr￿sentiert den Mittelwert der Kursziele der verbleibenden
Analysten. Aus der Sch￿tzgleichung 1.7 folgt, dass nicht die absolute H￿he
12Einzige Ausnahmen sind Graham (1999), Welch (2000) und Cooper et al. (2001).17
des sozialen Ein￿usses, sondern nur die relative Beein￿ussung, die von einer
bestimmten Referenzgruppe ausgeht, gesch￿tzt wird. Dieser relative Ein￿uss
ergibt sich aus der Di￿erenz zwischen den Koe￿zienten α und β. Vorteil der
beschriebenen Herangehensweise ist das fehlende Erfordernis exogener Kon-
trollvariablen.
Wie bereits zuvor geschildert entstammen die Informationen ￿ber einen regel-
m￿￿igen Meinungsaustausch zwischen Analysten einer Umfrage. Zur Wahrung
einer ordentlichen R￿cklaufquote konnten jedoch nicht direkt die Namen der
Analysten abgefragt werden, mit denen ein Meinungsaustausch erfolgt. Des-
wegen habe ich stattdessen nach der Zahl der Analysten gefragt, mit denen
sich ein bestimmter Analyst regelm￿￿ig bzgl. bestimmter Aktien austauscht
und die entweder in der gleichen Stadt, im gleichen Land oder im Ausland
arbeiten. Je nach Konstellation der unterschiedlichen Antworten ergibt sich
dann eine bestimmte Wahrscheinlichkeit (im vorliegenden Fall ca. 70%), das
richtige zugrundeliegende Kommunikationsnetzwerk rekonstruieren zu k￿nnen.
Dies kann mit Hilfe eines Beispiels wie folgt beschrieben werden: Angenommen
es g￿be vier Analysten (A, B, C, D) in D￿sseldorf, die Prognosen bzgl. der Sie-
mensaktie ver￿￿entlichen und einer dieser Analysten (A) h￿tte in der Umfrage
geantwortet, dass er seine Meinung mit zwei anderen Analysten austauscht, die
in der gleichen Stadt arbeiten und das gleiche Unternehmen analysieren (also
zwei aus B, C, D), dann k￿nnte aus Sicht des betrachteten Analysten (A) mit
einer 100%-tigen Wahrscheinlichkeit mindestens einer der ￿brigen drei Ana-
lysten (B, C, D) der richtigen Referenzgruppe zugeordnet werden. Die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit zwei Analysten korrekterweise der Referenzgruppe zuzuordnen,
von welcher ein sozialer Ein￿uss auf erstgenannten Analyst (A) ausgeht, w￿r-
de 33% betragen. Sollte nun noch einer der letztgenannten drei Analysten (B,
C, D) angegeben haben, dass er mit keinem anderen Analyst seine Meinung
austauscht, so k￿nnte das Kommunikationsnetzwerk bez￿glich dieser vier Ana-
lysten mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 100% korrekt rekonstruiert werden.18
Ergebnisse. Hinsichtlich der geogra￿schen N￿he belegen die empirischen Er-
gebnisse, dass in Deutschland t￿tige Analysten st￿rker von anderen Analys-
ten beein￿usst werden, die ebenfalls in Deutschland ihren Arbeitsplatz haben.
Dies gilt unabh￿ngig von vorherrschenden Marktgegebenheiten. Was den Mei-
nungsaustausch anbelangt, so f￿hrt dieser nur in einer Boomphase zu einer
st￿rken Beein￿ussung. In Krisenzeiten hingegen erfolgt eine st￿rkere Ausrich-
tung an der Konsensussch￿tzung, das hei￿t die gegenseitige Beein￿ussung ist
homogener, was zum Beispiel mit der Angst vor einem Reputations- oder gar
Arbeitsplatzverlust begr￿ndet werden kann.
1.4.3 Fluctuations of Social In￿uence: Evidence from the
Behaviour of Mutual Fund Managers during the
Economic Crisis 2008/09
Problemstellung. Intention dieses Aufsatzes ist es, die Gr￿￿e des gegenseitigen
Ein￿usses zwischen Fondsmanagern zu bestimmen. Es soll untersucht werden,
ob diese von den Gegebenheiten des jeweils vorherrschenden Marktumfelds ab-
h￿ngt und welche Bedeutung dabei den zwei Arten der sozialen Interaktion,
das hei￿t Beobachtung und Kommunikation, zuteil wird.
Motivation und Einordnung. Fondsmanager haben aufgrund der Gr￿￿e des von
Ihnen verwalteten Aktienverm￿gens einen wesentlichen Ein￿uss auf die Ent-
wicklungen an Finanzm￿rkten. Zahlreiche Untersuchungen des sozialen Ver-
haltens dieser institutionellen Investoren wurden daher bereits durchgef￿hrt.
Analysen wurden dabei allerdings stets getrennt nach der Art der sozialen In-
teraktion und des daraus resultierenden Ein￿usses vorgenommen. Im Bereich
des reinen Beobachtens ist hier die richtungweisende Arbeit von Lakonishok
et al. (1992) zu nennen, die ein empirisches Ma￿ entwickelten, welches anschlie-
￿end in vielen empirischen Studien Ber￿cksichtigung gefunden hat. 13 Das Ma￿
13Siehe Frey et al. (2006) f￿r einen ￿berblick der Studien, welche die Methodik von La-
konishok et al. (1992) verwendet haben.19
basiert auf der Annahme, dass sich alle Investoren in gleicher Art und Weise
beein￿ussen. Hinsichtlich der Kommunikation und des Meinungsaustausches
sind die Studien von Shiller and Pound (1989), Arnswald (2001), Hong et al.
(2005) und Pareek (2011) anzuf￿hren.
Gang der Untersuchung. Im Gegensatz zu vorherigen Arbeiten, sch￿tze ich in
diesem Aufsatz die Gesamtgr￿￿e des sozialen Ein￿usses. Erst im Anschluss
daran di￿erenziere ich die beiden Arten der sozialen Interaktion, Beobach-
tung und Kommunikation. Um keine Annahmen bzgl. der zugrundeliegenden
Netzwerkstruktur tre￿en zu m￿ssen, bestimme ich diese zun￿chst durch eine
paarweise Betrachtung von Fondsmanagern. Anschlie￿end sch￿tze ich halb-
jahresweise die H￿he des sozialen Ein￿usses, um Aufschluss ￿ber temporale
Variationen zu erhalten. Die dazugeh￿rige Sch￿tzgleichung sieht wie folgt aus:
wict = δt
X
j6=i
γijtwjct + xictβt + ict. (1.8)
Das Portfoliogewicht, welches ein einzelner Fondsmanager einer bestimmten
Aktie c zum Zeitpunkt t zuordnet, ist durch wict gegeben. Der Zeilenvektor
xict enth￿lt exogene Kontrollvariablen. Die Gesamtgr￿￿e des sozialen Ein￿us-
ses wird durch δt gemessen. Dabei erfolgt eine Gewichtung des Ein￿usses an-
derer Fondsmanager anhand der Koe￿zienten γijt.
Die Koe￿zienten in Gleichung 1.8 lassen sich nicht unverzerrt mittels eines
Kleinste-Quadrate-Sch￿tzers bestimmen. Das liegt daran, dass der Fehlerterm
ict mit
P
j6=i γijtwjct korreliert. Dies l￿sst sich wie folgt erkl￿ren: Regressiert
man die Portfoliogewichte eines Fondsmanagers auf die eines anderen, so ent-
h￿lt der resultierende Regressionskoe￿zient δt auch den Ein￿uss, der in die
umgekehrte Richtung wirkt.14 Diesen Umstand ber￿cksichtigend verwende ich
ein Verfahren aus der r￿umlichen ￿konometrie (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998,
Lee, 2003, BramoullØ et al., 2009), welches aus zwei Schritten besteht, in de-
14Lee (2002) hat gezeigt, dass dies vernachl￿ssigbar ist, wenn der Ein￿uss eines Einzelnen
sehr gering ist. Das tri￿t im vorliegenden Fall allerdings nicht zu.20
nen jeweils eine Instrumentenvariablensch￿tzung vorgenommen wird.
Die Di￿erenzierung nach der Art der sozialen Interaktion nehme ich anhand
von geogra￿schen Gegebenheiten vor. Fondsmanager, die in der gleichen Stadt
arbeiten, k￿nnen sich regelm￿￿ig tre￿en und sich insbesondere informell ￿ber
Portfoliothemen austauschen. Dies geht nicht bei Fondsmanagern, die auf un-
terschiedlichen Kontinenten arbeiten. Folglich trenne ich sozialen Ein￿uss in
Beein￿ussung auf dem Wege der Kommunikation, wenn es sich um Fondsma-
nager handelt, die in der gleichen Stadt arbeiten und in Beein￿ussung nach
vorheriger Beobachtung in den ￿brigen F￿llen.
Ergebnisse. Die empirischen Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass sich Fonds-
manager bei der Zusammenstellung ihrer Portfolien gegenseitig beein￿ussen.
Dieser Ein￿uss ist besonders zu Krisenzeiten stark. ˜hnlich wie bei der Be-
trachtung des Verhaltens von Analysten deutet dies auf die Angst vor einem
Reputations- oder Arbeitsplatzverlust hin. Auch bef￿rchtete Gehaltseinbu￿en
k￿nnen Treiber des beschriebenen Verhaltens sein. Diese Argumentation wird
dadurch bekr￿ftigt, dass in Krisenzeiten lediglich die Beein￿ussung auf dem
Wege des reinen Beobachtens stark zunimmt, w￿hrend sich der Ein￿uss durch
Kommunikation und Meinungsaustausch unabh￿ngig vom jeweiligen Mark-
tumfeld als relativ konstant erweist.21
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Financial Markets?
With this paper, I propose a simple asset pricing model that ac-
counts for the in￿uence from social interaction. Investors are assumed
to make up their mind about an asset’s price based on a forecasting
strategy and its past pro￿tability as well as on the contemporaneous
expectations of other market participants. Empirically analysing stocks
in the DAX30 index, I provide evidence that social interaction rather
destabilises ￿nancial markets. At least, it does not have a stabilising
e￿ect.
2.1 Introduction
In 2008, the DAX30 index fell by more than 40%. The market capitalisation
of the underlying companies declined by 380 bln e. In the subsequent year,
however, the DAX30 index caught up roughly 25% although the economy still
was in a severe crisis. Stock price ￿uctuations with exaggerations like these
make it hard to believe that market prices only re￿ect fundamental valuations
as postulated by the e￿cient market hypothesis ( Fama, 1970).
Therefore, the literature of behavioural ￿nance proposed a variety of asset pric-
3132
ing models considering bounded rationally acting investors. 1 All these models
have in common that they deviate from the rather unrealistic statement that
all investors have homogeneous beliefs about the asset price. Rejecting the as-
sumption of homogeneous beliefs allows describing those asset price variations
that are not related to an underlying process of fundamental information.
The interaction among investors with heterogeneous beliefs generally transmits
via the market pricing mechanism. However, it is also reasonable to consider a
direct in￿uence through observation or communication. There is already large
empirical evidence that con￿rms the existence and in￿uence of such social
interaction in ￿nancial markets. A general herding tendency of institutional
investors has ￿rst been found by Lakonishok et al. (1992). Their seminal
empirical herding measure has thereafter been applied in many studies pro-
viding similar evidence.2 Regarding the communication among institutional
investors, positive evidence of in￿uential e￿ects has been provided by Shiller
and Pound (1989), Arnswald (2001), Hong et al. (2005) and Pareek (2011). In
the domain of retail investors, analogous behaviour has been revealed by Hong
et al. (2004), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007), Massa and Simonov (2005a) and
Massa and Simonov (2005b).
With this paper, I intend to answer the question whether social interaction
among investors causes large deviations from the fundamental benchmark and
thereby destabilises ￿nancial markets. There are situations where social inter-
action does not have any e￿ect, irrespective of its intensity. If for instance,
investors a priori all have homogeneous beliefs about an asset’s price, then
social in￿uence would not a￿ect their behaviour at all. Moreover, even if be-
1Examples include Beja and Goldman (1980), Kyle (1985), Day and Huang (1990),
Long et al. (1990), Chiarella (1992), F￿llmer and Schweizer (1993), Lux (1995), Brock and
Hommes (1998), Kurz (1998), Iori (2002), Chiarella et al. (2003), de Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2004), Horst (2005), F￿llmer et al. (2005), Dieci et al. (2006), Cipriani and Guarino (2008)
and Huang et al. (2010). Extensive surveys are provided by Hommes (2006) and LeBaron
(2006).
2See Frey et al. (2006) for a brief survey of studies that used the measure of Lakonishok
et al. (1992).33
liefs are heterogeneous, social interaction can still be without e￿ect, if the
in￿uence is symmetric. This can be explained as follows. Symmetric social
in￿uence refers to the situation where every investor in￿uences every other
investor with equal intensity. This makes investors’ beliefs more homogeneous
and reduces the variance of opinions. However, the average opinion remains
unchanged. In a su￿ciently liquid market, where the asset price more or less
re￿ects the average opinion about an asset’s value, social in￿uence thus has
no e￿ect. Given these facts, I propose an asset pricing model where investors
have heterogeneous beliefs and the in￿uence from social interaction among
these investors is allowed to be asymmetric. Particularly, I make use of the
well-known adaptive beliefs model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and Brock
and Hommes (1998) and enrich it by the inclusion of social in￿uence. In order
to empirically analyse the impact of social interaction, I presume the existence
of two investor types, fundamentalists and chartists, who a priori either have
a stabilising or a destabilising e￿ect on ￿nancial markets. 3 I then contrast the
original model of Brock and Hommes (1998) with my extended version that
accounts for asymmetric social in￿uence. If the null hypothesis of symmetric
social in￿uence can be rejected, then it can be concluded that social interaction
has an impact. The sign of the estimated di￿erence between social in￿uence
on fundamentalists and chartists indicates whether this impact rather is sta-
bilising or destabilising.
With this paper, I contribute to the literature that empirically analyses price
impacts of social interaction, particularly herding behaviour among investors.
On the basis of quarterly stock holdings, Lakonishok et al. (1992), Jones et al.
(1999), Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004) provide empirical evidence that the
herding behaviour of institutional investors is information driven and thus
3Note that e.g. Huang et al. (2010) proposes a framework where chartists might have
both a destabilising as well as a stabilising e￿ect. The de￿nitions of fundamentalists and
chartists in this paper, however, are chosen in a way such that fundamentalists always drive
stock prices towards the fundamental benchmark, whereas chartists always drive the stock
price away from it.34
rather stabilises the market. This is in line with the results of Nofsinger and
Sias (1999), who raise the same conclusion on the basis of institutional in-
vestors’ annually stock holdings. On a semi-annually basis, Walter and Weber
(2006) show that for the German market institutional herding at least does not
have a destabilising e￿ect. However, di￿erentiating between herding on buy
and sell decisions, San (2007) on a quarterly basis ￿nds a destabilising ten-
dency for institutional sell herding. Analysing shorter time intervals, Puckett
and Yan (2008) similarly show that institutional herding on stock sales, which
is inferred on weekly portfolio changes, indeed may destabilise markets and
thereby causes short-term ￿uctuations. Considering intra-day trades, Hsieh
(2012) concludes for the Taiwan stock market that herding behaviour of insti-
tutional investors rather stabilises while the same behaviour of retail investors
rather destabilises the market. All afore cited papers have in common that
the e￿ect on stock prices is inferred from subsequent stock returns. A stock
return reversal is interpreted as a destabilising e￿ect. Contrarily, my approach
o￿ers the possibility to directly infer the e￿ect of social interaction from the
estimates of the model parameters. Moreover, I do not classify investors into
institutional and retail investors as I state that there might be investors of
both categories, who either stabilise or destabilise market prices. Therefore, I
follow the literature about heterogeneous agents on ￿nancial markets and as-
sume the existence of two representative investor types: fundamentalists, who
believe that stock prices revert to a fundamental benchmark and chartists,
who extrapolate trends that move the stock price away from its fundamental
value.
My paper is further related to the upcoming literature that is engaged in
the empirical investigation of non linear asset pricing models. An early con-
tribution has been provided by Shiller (1984), who by linear regression esti-
mates a stock pricing model with two heterogeneous investor types, namely
smart money investors with rational expectations and ordinary investors. Vig-
fusson (1997) uses a Markov regime-switching technique to estimate the ex-
change rate model of Frankel and Froot (1988) with two representative investor35
types, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Westerho￿ and Reitz (2003) and
ap Gwilym (2008) use non linear estimation techniques to estimate exchange
rate models with the same representative investor types. Using the method of
simulated moments, Franke (2009) estimates the exchange rate model of Man-
zan and Westerho￿ (2005) for both stock indices and exchanges rates. Con-
sidering social interaction, Gilli and Winker (2003) and Alfarano et al. (2005)
estimate Kirman’s herding model (Kirman, 1993) again with afore mentioned
two representative investor types. Although, Alfarano et al. (2005) account
for an asymmetric autonomous switching tendency for an individual investor
to change his type, both Gilli and Winker (2003) and Alfarano et al. (2005)
consider symmetric in￿uence from social interaction. Franke (2008) and Lux
(2012) also take the in￿uence from social interaction into account. Therefore,
they estimate the relation between stock price returns and an underlying opin-
ion index. My paper is most strongly related to Boswijk et al. (2007) and
Amilon (2008), who estimate the model of Brock and Hommes (1998), how-
ever, in its original form, i.e. without the inclusion of social interaction.
In this paper, I analyse the price evolution of the stocks that were included in
the DAX30 index as of Dec 31st 2010. For 16 out of 30 stocks, the null hypoth-
esis of the suitability of the original model can be rejected. This suggests the
presence of asymmetric in￿uence from social interaction. The parameter esti-
mates indicate that fundamentalists are more prone to be socially in￿uenced
by other market participants than chartists. This means fundamentalists skew
their beliefs more strongly to those of the chartist than past performance of
the strategy would suggest. Therefore, I conclude that if social interaction
has an in￿uence on stock prices, then this in￿uence represents a destabilising
impact.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2.2, I review
the literature about asset pricing models that consider the in￿uence from so-
cial interaction. I present my asset pricing model, derive conditions for the
existence of equilibria and explain the strategy for empirical identi￿cation of
the model parameters in chapter 2.3. In chapter 2.4, I empirically estimate the36
model and contrast it with the original model of Brock and Hommes (1998).
Chapter 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
The literature of behavioural ￿nance brought out a variety of theoretical asset
pricing models that take the in￿uence from social interaction into account.
There are two general types of models which have evolved. On the one hand,
authors of so called heterogeneous agent models assume a small amount of
groups that are formed by investors with representative investment behaviour.
On the other hand, the computationally more challenging agent based models
account for every investor’s individual behaviour. While the latter type o￿ers
the possibility to model asset price ￿uctuation based on the very micro level,
the advantage of the former type is the mathematical tractability such that in
most cases closed form solutions can be derived. Hommes (2006) and LeBaron
(2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the two concepts. Surveys of asset
pricing models that take the in￿uence from social interaction into account have
been provided by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2008) and Lux (2009).
An early example of heterogeneous agent models considering social in￿uence
is represented by Lux (1995), who proposes a framework that is based on the
￿ant￿-model of Kirman (1993). He assumes that there are two types of in-
vestors in the market, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Chartists are
either optimistic and expect price increases or they are pessimistic and expect
the asset price to decrease. The probability that a chartist changes his belief
from optimistic to pessimistic or vice versa on the one hand depends on an
idiosyncratic component and on the other hand is related to the portion of
chartists in the market that have a particular either optimistic or pessimistic
expectation. By the second factor a direct in￿uence from social interaction is
introduced. Simulation results of Lux (1995) show that the model is capable
to reproduce stylised facts which can be observed in ￿nancial markets. In Lux
(1998), the model is extended by a learning mechanism to switch between the37
fundamental and chartist strategy. The work of Alfarano et al. (2008) is closely
related to the two afore cited papers. Contrarily, Alfarano et al. (2008) assume
that social in￿uence does not only depend on the relative portion of market
participants following a particular strategy, but on the explicit group sizes and
therefore also on the absolute number of market participants.
Providing an alternative model, Chiarella et al. (2003) assume that investors
follow either a fundamentalist strategy or are herding agents. The latter infer
their beliefs from past excess demand in the market and therefore are a￿ected
by a direct social in￿uence from other market participants.
Horst (2005), Wu (2007) and Horst and Rothe (2008) state that investors
choose between a fundamentalist and chartist strategy depending on which
strategy they expect that the majority of the whole market will adopt (￿mar-
ket mood￿). Horst (2005) moreover takes the in￿uence from the observable
choice of the nearest neighbours into account. Working with fundamental-
ists and noise trades, Pakkanen (2009) proposes an asset pricing model where
investors either trade the asset or revise their belief, i.e. change their type.
When an investor trades the asset, the decision whether to buy or sell it de-
pends on his own prior belief and the general market mood, which represents
a compound measure of all individual investors’ beliefs.
Most closely related to this paper, Chang (2007) uses the model of Brock and
Hommes (1998) and introduces the in￿uence from social interaction into the
mechanism of investor’s switching between a fundamental and a chartist strat-
egy. The social in￿uence is modelled by the framework of Brock and Durlauf
(2001b) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a). Di￿erent to Chang (2007), I account
for an asymmetric social in￿uence while switching from one strategy to an-
other. Moreover, I assume that social in￿uence induces an investor to bias his
beliefs towards the beliefs of other investors without completely rejecting the
own and adopting an alternative strategy.
In the domain of agent based models, one of the ￿rst contributions in the con-
text of social interaction has been provided by Baker and Iyer (1992). They
assume that investors randomly receive exogenous buy or sell signals and trans-38
mit them via a communication network. If an investor by inter-investor trans-
mission receives an equal number of buy and sell signals, these signals cancel
out each other, such that the particular investor does not trade at all. Simu-
lation results show that the topology of this network has a considerable e￿ect
on asset price volatility and trading volume.
Cont and Bouchaud (2000) propose a framework where investors within the
same neighbourhood always make the same trading decisions. All neighbour-
hoods are isolated. The size of these clusters is obtained by a random graph.
Iori (2002) also states that investors are in￿uenced by the trades of neighbour-
ing investors. However, an individual investor’s choice does not necessarily
coincide with those of his neighbours. Instead, an individual decision is made
based on the weighted average decision of neighbouring investors within a lat-
tice network as well as on an idiosyncratic component.
Proposing an explicit function for the process of investors’ information elabo-
ration, Sch￿tz et al. (2009) construct a theoretical framework where investors
build up exogenous sell or buy signals based on the di￿erence between their
own fundamental valuation of the asset and the current market price. An in-
vestor’s decision whether to buy or to sell an asset then depends on the own
signal and the weighted average of neighbouring investors’ demands.
While afore cited authors, only assumed that an individual investor is in￿u-
enced by other investors’ actions, i.e. trading decisions, Ozsoylev (2006) and
Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) state that social networks permit the transmission
of information such that better connected investors have more precise infor-
mation. Social in￿uence in this case is not based on other investors’ outcomes,
but on their original information signals.
In the same vein, Panchenko et al. (2010) state that well connected investors
are better o￿. Particularly, like in this paper, they consider the heterogeneous
agent model of Brock and Hommes (1998). However, in their framework, in-
vestors can only observe the past pro￿tability of a strategy, if there are investors
in the neighbourhood who adopted this strategy in the past. This means for
instance, an investor is unable to get to know the pro￿tability of the chartist39
strategy if he is only surrounded by fundamentalists. The di￿erence to my
approach is that I assume that real markets o￿er a minimum of transparency
that makes it possible to observe the past pro￿tability of all strategies. Social
in￿uence in my framework thus only a￿ects the elaboration of the information
that is available to every market participant.
Also based on the assumption of information transmission within a social net-
work, Colla and Mele (2010) propose a framework where trades are positively
correlated if investors are located nearby because of the exchange of informa-
tion and trades are negatively correlated if investors are further away acting
as counterparties in the market clearing mechanism.
The approach of Kaizoji (2000) originally stems from the domain of agent
based models. For the sake of an empirical analysis however, the underlying
social network is simpli￿ed such that analytical tractability as in heterogeneous
agent models is obtained. Investors are supposed to be either willing to buy or
willing to sell the asset. An investor bases his decision on the general market
environment and furthermore is directly in￿uenced by the contemporaneous
asset demand of other investors in the market.
With my approach, I set up on a heterogeneous agent model that trough the
inclusion of social in￿uence becomes an agent based model o￿ering the possi-
bility to account for every individual investor’s behaviour. However, in order
to ensure analytical tractability, which is needed for the empirical analysis,
I simplify the structure of the underlying social network and thereby again
obtain a heterogeneous agent model.
2.3 Asset pricing in the presence of social inter-
action
In the following, I present the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) and enrich
it by an in￿uential component based on social interaction among investors.40
2.3.1 Market price mechanism
Considering a market with one risky and one riskless asset, investors are con-
fronted to the decision how to allocate their present wealth in order to maximise
next period’s wealth, which is given by
Wi,t+1 = (1 + r)Wi,t + (pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt)zit, (2.1)
where pt and pt+1 are this period’s and next period’s market price of the risky
asset that pays an uncertain dividend yt+1. The return of the risk free asset
with perfectly elastic supply is given by r. An investor’s individual demand for
the risky asset equals zit. Investors are assumed to be myopic mean-variance
optimisers, such that zit results from
max
zit
Eit[Wi,t+1] −
ait
2
Varit[Wi,t+1], (2.2)
where Eit and Varit are an investor’s conditional expectation and variance at
time t and ait stands for an investor’s constant average risk aversion. In order
to keep the model analytically tractable, Brock and Hommes (1998) introduced
the following assumptions:
Varit[Wi,t+1] := σ
2 (2.3)
ait := a. (2.4)
This means that the conditional variance about next period’s wealth and the
coe￿cient of risk aversion are presumed to be constant among investors as well
as in time. The resulting demand of an individual investor is hence given by
zit =
Eit[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
aσ2 . (2.5)
The model is closed by the following market clearing equation
X
i
zit = Lt, (2.6)41
where Lt is the contemporaneous net supply of the risky asset. Plugging
equation 2.5 into equation 2.6 and solving for pt yields
pt =
1
1 + r
 
X
i
1
N
Eit[pt+1 + yt+1] −
aσ2Lt
N
!
, (2.7)
with N being the total number of investors in the market. It is possible
to derive the fundamental equilibrium, which arises when all investors have
homogeneous beliefs, i.e. have the same conditional expectation about the
risky asset:
p
∗
t =
1
1 + r

Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] −
aσ2Lt
N

. (2.8)
The fundamental price is indicated by a star. Subtracting equation 2.8 from
equation 2.7 o￿ers the possibility to express the price equation as deviations
from the fundamental price:
xt =
1
1 + r
X
i
1
N
Eit[xt+1], (2.9)
with xt = pt −p∗
t. Please note that equation 2.9 contains the implicit assump-
tion that dividends follow a stochastic process with constant temporal mean.
For notational convenience, an investor’s beliefs about next period’s deviation
from the fundamental value are henceforth denoted by fit, i.e.
fit = Eit[xt+1]. (2.10)
2.3.2 Heterogeneous beliefs and social interaction
An investor is assumed to make up his beliefs about future deviations of the
market price from the fundamental benchmark based on two sources. On the
one hand, he considers his own a priori expectation. On the other hand and
additionally to the original model of Brock and Hommes (1998), I assume
that he also takes into account the beliefs of other market participants. In
order to consider the in￿uence from this social interaction, I make use of the42
linear model from the social interaction literature (e.g. Manski (1993), Mo￿tt
(2001), BramoullØ et al. (2009), Blume et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2010)):4
fit = θit + δi
 
X
j6=i
γijfjt − θit
!
, (2.11)
where θit represents the expectation of the future deviation from the funda-
mental benchmark that an investor makes up on his own. The coe￿cient δi
measures the magnitude of social in￿uence. Every other investor’s in￿uence
is weighted with γij ≥ 0. Ensuring that δi captures the total magnitude of
in￿uence, the following constraint shall be imposed:
X
j6=i
γij
! = 1. (2.12)
In the social interaction literature, stronger social in￿uence generally leads
to higher (absolute) outcomes (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001, Glaeser et al.,
2003). Such a social multiplier is however not reasonable in this context, as
social in￿uence can be assumed to drive asset prices towards to or away from
the fundamental benchmark. Hence, social interaction could induce investors
to believe that next period’s asset price will move further away from the fun-
damental benchmark (in either direction) or could make investors to suppose
that the di￿erence between the asset price and the fundamental benchmark
will be reduced. In order to take this into account, I considered the di￿erence
between the weighted average of other investor’s beliefs and an investor’s own
a priori expectation in equation 2.11. In the appendix A.2, it is shown, that
thereby no social multiplier can arise.
The values of the coe￿cient of social interaction δi can be interpreted as fol-
lows. If 0 < δi < 1, then an investor skews his initial expectation towards the
expectation of other investors. The resulting expectation then represents a
4Contrary to the social interaction literature, I do not consider contextual e￿ects, i.e.
the in￿uence of an individual’s characteristics on the outcome of an other individual, as it
is relatively unlikely that an investor’s beliefs are in￿uenced by the background of another
investors.43
weighted average of the own initial and other investors’ beliefs. This situation
shall be henceforth referred as moderate social in￿uence. For δi = 0, an in-
vestor is not in￿uenced by other investors at all, whereas for δi = 1, an investor
completely rejects his own a priori expectation and adapts the weighted beliefs
of other investors. It is also possible that an investor is such strongly in￿uenced
that he skews his own expectation even beyond those of other investors. In this
case, henceforth denoted extreme social in￿uence, δi can take values greater
than one. Values below zero are not considered for δi as this would represent
a negative in￿uence from social interaction. Indeed, arbitrageurs might act
as contrarians and therefore have opposite beliefs. This however represents a
form of in￿uence which translates through the market price mechanism and
hence cannot be understood as a direct in￿uence from social interaction.
The integration of social in￿uence into the original model of Brock and Hommes
(1998) could lead to infeasible solutions for the asset price depending on the
values of δi. The following propositions state, under which conditions the ex-
istence of exactly one equilibrium price is ensured.
Proposition 1: If all investors are only moderately in￿uenced by other investors
(δi < 1), then exactly one feasible market equilibrium arises from equation 2.9.
The proof is given in the appendix A.4. Proposition 1 shows that for an
arbitrary structure of the underlying social network, there exists always an
equilibrium, if social in￿uence is moderate. Having a closer look at the par-
ticular network structure where every investor equally weights other investors’
beliefs, proposition 2 and 3 state under which conditions the presence of ex-
treme social in￿uence still leads to feasible model solutions. The structure of
equal weights is very convenient as it ensures analytical tractability, which is
needed for the empirical analysis later in this paper.
Proposition 2: Suppose that there are N investors who all equally weight other
investors’ beliefs (γij = 1
N−1) and that at least two investors are only mod-44
erately in￿uenced by other investors ( δi < 1). If for all investors that are
extremely in￿uenced (δi > 1), the magnitude of in￿uence does not reach or
exceed an upper bound given by δi < N−1 P
j6=i min{δj,1}, then exactly one feasible
market equilibrium arises from equation 2.9.
Appendix A.5 provides the proof of this proposition. In order to restrict the
number of degrees of freedom in the empirical analysis, only two representative
investor types and a large number of investors are considered. The following
proposition derives the equilibrium condition for this constellation still assum-
ing a network structure with equal weights.
Proposition 3: Assume that there are two representative investor types in a
market with a large number of investors ( N → ∞). Investors of one type shall
be in￿uenced by investors of both types with a particular type-speci￿c magnitude
(δ1 and δ2). Suppose further that all investors equally weight other investors’
beliefs (γij = 1
N−1). Equation 2.9 yields exactly one feasible market equilib-
rium, if the following inequality is ful￿lled: nδ1 +(1−n)δ2 6= 1, where n is the
portion of investors of a particular type.
See appendix A.6 for the proof of proposition 3.
2.3.3 Fundamentalists vs. chartists and adaptive beliefs
Brock and Hommes (1998) assume that an investor infers his a priori expecta-
tion from past observations, i.e.
θit = Φi +
X
k
Φikxt−k. (2.13)
Φi represents an investor’s constant bias compared to the fundamental bench-
mark. The coe￿cients Φik are individual weights of past observations and
de￿ne whether an investors rather has a stabilising or a destabilising e￿ect
on the market price. If Φik < 1, then investor i expects that the deviation45
of the asset price from its fundamental value will decrease during the next
period. Therefore, he is willing to buy (sell) the asset, if its market price is
below (above) the fundamental benchmark and thereby stabilises the market.
Contrarily, investor i believes that the market price further divagates from the
fundamental equilibrium, if Φik > 1. He thereby destabilises the market.
In order to keep the model analytically tractable and to make an empirical
analysis possible, I hereafter assume that there are only two types of investors
in the market, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Mathematically, the
fundamental strategy shall be de￿ned by
Φi = 0 (2.14)
Φik =
(
ΦF < 1 if k = 1
0 if k 6= 1
(2.15)
δi = δF (2.16)
γij =
1
N − 1
, (2.17)
with N being the total number of investors in the market. Analogously the
chartist strategy shall be given by
Φi = 0 (2.18)
Φik =
(
ΦC > 1 if k = 1
0 if k 6= 1
(2.19)
δi = δC (2.20)
γij =
1
N − 1
. (2.21)
With these de￿nitions and assuming a large number of investors ( N → ∞),
investors’ beliefs turn out to be
fFt = (1 − δF)ΦFxt−1 + δF (nFtfFt + nCtfCt) (2.22)
and
fCt = (1 − δC)ΦCxt−1 + δC (nFtfFt + nCtfCt), (2.23)46
where nFt and nCt are the portions of investors in the market who either
follow the fundamental or the chartist strategy. As only two investor types are
assumed, the portion of chartists can be expressed by nCt = 1−nFt. Equations
2.24 and 2.25 can be written as
fFt =
(1 − δF)(1 − δC(1 − nFt))ΦFxt−1 + δF(1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
(2.24)
and
fCt =
(1 − δC)(1 − δFnFt)ΦCxt−1 + δC(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
. (2.25)
Plugging equations 2.24 and 2.25 into equation 2.9 yields
xt =
1
1 + r

nFt
(1 − δF)(1 − δC(1 − nFt))ΦFxt−1 + δF(1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
+(1 − nFt)
(1 − δC)(1 − δFnFt)ΦCxt−1 + δC(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)

=
1
1 + r
(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
. (2.26)
Investors are assumed to choose a strategy based on its past pro￿tability
(￿adaptive beliefs￿). In this context, however, they do not consider e￿ects
of social interaction in the past. Hence, I presume that they do not take into
account that they would have been in￿uenced by other investors while choos-
ing a particular strategy. The pro￿tability πt−1 of a strategy in the last period
is obtained by the multiplication of the return Rt−1 which would have been
realised in the last period t−1, with the corresponding hypothetical quantity
zt−2 being bought or sold at t − 2, if this particular strategy had been chosen
at t − 2, i.e.
πt−1 = Rt−1zt−2. (2.27)
The pro￿tability of the fundamental strategy is given by
πF,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
EF,t−2[xt−1] − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2
= (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
ΦFxt−3 − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 . (2.28)47
Analogously the pro￿tability of the chartist strategy turns out to be
πC,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
ΦCxt−3 − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 . (2.29)
An investor’s utility as a function of the realised pro￿tability shall be given by
Uit = πt−1 + it, (2.30)
where it is an individual investor’s identically independently distributed error
when perceiving the pro￿tability of a particular strategy. This noise term is
assumed to be drawn from a double exponential distribution (Gumbel distri-
bution).5 As the number of investors goes to in￿nity, the portion of investors
in the market that follow the fundamental strategy turns out to be
nFt =
eβπF,t−1
eβπF,t−1 + eβπC,t−1
=
1
1 + e−β(πF,t−1−πC,t−1), (2.31)
where β is the intensity of choice measuring investors’ tendency to choose the
strategy which has better performed in the past. For β = 0, investors do not
take into account past pro￿tability at all. As β goes towards in￿nity, investors
always choose the strategy with the highest past pro￿tability. Please note that
the switching mechanism is symmetric. Hence, the probability for choosing a
particular strategy only depends on the strategy’s past pro￿tability and not
on the strategy itself.
Plugging equations 2.28 and 2.29 into equation 2.31 yields
nFt =
1
1 + e
−β((xt−1−(1+r)xt−2)
(ΦF −ΦC)xt−3−(1+r)xt−2
aσ2 )
. (2.32)
5Brock and Hommes (1998) chose a double exponential distribution (logit model) instead
of e.g. a normal distribution (probit model) in order to be able to provide a closed form
solution for the adaptive beliefs system. The mean value and the standard deviation of
the double exponential distribution equal
γ
β and π
β
√
6, respectively, where γ is the Euler-
Mascheroni constant and β the intensity of choice being explained later in the text.2.3.4 Empirical identi￿cation
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate, whether the in￿uence of
social interaction has a stabilising or a destabilising e￿ect on ￿nancial markets.
The estimation equations of the non linear adaptive beliefs model presented
above are given by
xt =
1
1 + r
(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
+ t (2.33)
nFt =
1
1 + e−β∗(xt−1−(1+r)xt−2)(ΦF−ΦC)xt−3−(1+r)xt−2, (2.34)
with β∗ =
β
aσ2. Reformulating equation 2.33 yields
xt =
1
1 + r
nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1 − ∆δ
1−δCnFtΦFxt−1
1 − ∆δ
1−δCnFt
+ t, (2.35)
with ∆δ = δF−δC. Thereof, it follows that only the value of ∆δ∗ = ∆δ
1−δC can be
estimated, such that the absolute values of the coe￿cients of social interaction
δF and δC are not directly identi￿able. However, this doesn’t matter, because
only the di￿erence between δF and δC is of interest, as solely asymmetric social
in￿uence, i.e. ∆δ 6= 0 irrespective of the absolute values of δF and δC, can have
an impact on asset prices. Indeed, for ∆δ = 0 equation 2.35 reduces to the
original model of Brock and Hommes (1998) without the inclusion of social
in￿uence.
If the estimate of ∆δ∗ turns out to be signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, it can
be concluded that social interaction has an impact on the asset price. Stated
di￿erently, if ∆δ∗ 6= 0, the model ￿t is better, if social in￿uence is taken into
account, because there are deviations from the fundamental benchmark which
are caused by the in￿uence of social interaction.
Regarding the implications of di￿erent values for ∆δ∗, ￿gure 2.1 shows that
for ∆δ∗ > 1 either δF > 1 and δC < 1 or δF < 1 and δC > 1. Hence, if
∆δ∗ is greater than one, then either fundamentalists or chartists are extremely
in￿uenced by social interaction. If ∆δ∗ < 1, then it follows that δF < 1 and49
Figure 2.1: Figure 2.1: Relationship between δF and δC
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The ￿gure displays the relationship between δF and δC for di￿erent values of ∆δ∗ = ∆δ
1−δC .
δC < 1, because the case where δF > 1 and δC > 1 shall be excluded, as it
would imply that all investors are extremely in￿uenced by social interaction.
This doesn’t make sense, because in such a situation, fundamentalists would
just become chartists and vice versa. Hence, if ∆δ∗ is smaller than one, all
investors are only moderately in￿uenced by social interaction.
In order to disentangle, whether social interaction has a stabilising or desta-
bilising e￿ect on ￿nancial markets, one has to look at the sign of the estimated
coe￿cient ∆δ∗. Figure 2.1 con￿rms that as long as ∆δ∗ is smaller than one,
the sign of ∆δ corresponds to the sign of ∆δ∗. For ∆δ∗ being greater than one,
the sign of ∆δ remains unclear.
Fundamentalists have a stabilising impact on the market price, as they (through
market price mechanism) always push it back to its fundamental benchmark.
The higher the fraction of fundamentalists in the market nFt and the closer the
extrapolation coe￿cient ΦF to zero, the smaller is the market price deviation
from the fundamental benchmark. Contrarily, chartists have a destabilising
e￿ect on the market price, since they (through market price mechanism) drive
it away from its fundamental benchmark. The higher the fraction of chartists
in the market nCt = 1−nFt and the higher the (absolute) value of the extrap-
olation coe￿cient ΦC, the greater is the deviation of the market price from
the fundamental benchmark. The fraction of fundamentalists and chartists50
evolve by the strategies’ past pro￿tabilities. The extrapolation coe￿cients are
￿xed. However, they get biased through the in￿uence of social interaction. If
fundamentalists get more strongly in￿uenced by chartists and hence skew their
opinion further towards the opinion of chartists than vice versa, i.e. δF > δC,
then ΦF gets more upward biased than ΦC gets downward biased. Hence,
∆δ > 0 indicates that social interaction has a destabilising e￿ect. If however
chartists get more strongly in￿uenced by fundamentalists and therefore skew
their opinion further towards the opinion of fundamentalists than vice versa,
i.e. δC > δF, then ΦC gets more downward biased than ΦF gets upward biased,
wherefore ∆δ < 0 indicates that social interaction has a stabilising e￿ect.
Summarising the theoretical chapter, the estimation equation 2.35 can be writ-
ten in a simpli￿ed functional from in order to provide an overview of the vari-
ables that drive the (in-)stability of a ￿nancial market:
xt = F
 
nFt
(−)
,ΦF
(+)
,ΦC
(+)
,∆δ
(+)
!
+ t (2.36)
A positive sign indicates that a higher value of the relevant variable has a
destabilising impact enlarging the deviation of the market price from its fun-
damental benchmark on the left hand side of equation 2.36 and vice versa for
a negative sign.
2.4 Empirical results
In order to determine the impact of social interaction, I estimate the model
presented in the previous chapter by non linear least squares regression for all
stocks that were included in the DAX30 as of Dec 31st 2010. For the preceding
seven years time period, i.e. from Jan 1st 2004 to Dec 31st 2010, I retrieved
daily closing prices from Thomson Reuters. The choice of the time window is
very convenient, as it captures the economic upturn until 2006 as well as the
￿nancial and economic crisis starting in 2007. In order to have a fundamental
benchmark, I furthermore collected analysts’ consensus price targets from the51
Table 2.1: Table 2.1: Estimation results
∆δ∗ β∗ ΦF ΦC R2
adj
ADIDAS AG 0.6501*** 35.7675*** 0.9246*** 1.0387*** 0.9967
(0.020919) (142.444405) (0.000042) (0.000024)
ALLIANZ SE 0.3044 5.3527** 0.9607*** 1.0383*** 0.9977
(0.099270) (4.945269) (0.000019) (0.000020)
BASF SE 0.5899*** 10.4456*** 0.9094*** 1.0461*** 0.9965
(0.013401) (12.166114) (0.000123) (0.000041)
BAY. MOTOREN WERKE AG (c.s.) 0.2086 4.7428** 0.8892*** 1.0845*** 0.9949
(0.044880) (3.734100) (0.000352) (0.000294)
BAYER AG 0.1175 47.9942** 0.9443*** 1.0411*** 0.9960
(0.136659) (449.717985) (0.000039) (0.000033)
BEIERSDORF AG 0.7784*** 109.9968 0.9367*** 1.0313*** 0.9950
(0.056343) (5,040.095470) (0.000050) (0.000027)
COMMERZBANK AG 0.4967** 0.3305 0.6845*** 1.1596*** 0.9980
(0.043702) (0.243851) (0.045003) (0.017597)
DAIMLER AG -0.2164 43.3092* 0.9636*** 1.0299*** 0.9974
(0.482772) (627.623548) (0.000019) (0.000020)
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 0.2543 1.8519*** 0.9350*** 1.0495*** 0.9979
(0.038774) (0.432202) (0.000086) (0.000075)
DEUTSCHE BOERSE AG 0.7329*** 1.1790*** 0.9240*** 1.0287*** 0.9978
(0.008016) (0.154737) (0.000083) (0.000024)
DEUTSCHE POST AG 0.7952*** 527.5659 0.9425*** 1.0300*** 0.9956
(0.072417) (125,357.996408) (0.000040) (0.000024)
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG -0.0862 317.0287*** 0.9618*** 1.0386*** 0.9984
(0.098133) (12,538.620584) (0.000026) (0.000029)
E.ON AG 0.5056*** 32.8602*** 0.9500*** 1.0312*** 0.9978
(0.033217) (136.342429) (0.000039) (0.000023)
FRESEN.MED.CARE KGAA (c.s.) 0.0697 6.0591* 0.8986*** 1.0858*** 0.9888
(0.148020) (10.476852) (0.000752) (0.000529)
FRESENIUS SE (p.s.) 0.1779 11.0349*** 0.9432*** 1.0440*** 0.9975
(0.053081) (14.114374) (0.000048) (0.000048)
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 0.6028*** 0.5679** 0.8850*** 1.0481*** 0.9970
(0.024636) (0.081493) (0.000430) (0.000276)
HENKEL AG &CO KGAA (p.s.) 0.4634** 42.2867*** 0.9257*** 1.0432*** 0.9958
(0.035872) (253.485100) (0.000069) (0.000042)
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG 0.4763*** 41.2219*** 0.9003*** 1.0529*** 0.9969
(0.021067) (198.262469) (0.000162) (0.000120)
K+S AG 0.6789 100.0079 0.9722*** 1.0217*** 0.9978
(0.181356) (9,472.241923) (0.000014) (0.000014)
LINDE AG 0.4901** 13.5113** 0.9409*** 1.0349*** 0.9968
(0.041666) (27.600937) (0.000040) (0.000025)52
∆δ∗ β∗ ΦF ΦC R2
adj
LUFTHANSA AG 0.4188** 58.6607** 0.9354*** 1.0451*** 0.9964
(0.044752) (638.065119) (0.000123) (0.000085)
MAN SE (c.s.) 0.6584*** 7.2738** 0.9535*** 1.0287*** 0.9979
(0.031407) (8.080573) (0.000027) (0.000015)
MERCK KGAA 0.4801*** 1.1107** 0.9076*** 1.0509*** 0.9973
(0.025386) (0.237078) (0.000290) (0.000152)
METRO AG (c.s.) 0.3575 41.5839** 0.9508*** 1.0395*** 0.9969
(0.088946) (316.530440) (0.000028) (0.000023)
MUENCH. RUECKVERS. AG 0.5550*** 3.3960*** 0.9074*** 1.0446*** 0.9943
(0.028974) (1.571806) (0.000108) (0.000067)
RWE AG (c.s.) 0.5002*** 13.4324*** 0.9456*** 1.0374*** 0.9975
(0.032854) (23.153506) (0.000029) (0.000020)
SAP AG -0.5612 185.2925* 0.9535*** 1.0487*** 0.9951
(0.893932) (10,647.624583) (0.000033) (0.000039)
SIEMENS AG 0.3759 5.7225** 0.9463*** 1.0356*** 0.9966
(0.066923) (5.873838) (0.000041) (0.000033)
THYSSENKRUPP AG -2.4694 332.5254 0.9598*** 1.0290*** 0.9970
(20.374941) (89,305.542038) (0.000021) (0.000017)
VOLKSWAGEN AG (p.s.) 0.1959 17.4221 0.9854*** 1.0155*** 0.9988
(0.513363) (221.431663) (0.000009) (0.000009)
The table provides the estimated coe￿cients of the non linear least squares regression for
the stocks that were included in the DAX30 as of Dec 31st 2010. Common stocks are marked
with ￿c.p.￿, preferred stocks are indicated by ￿p.s.￿. The di￿erence between the magnitude
of social in￿uence of fundamentalists δF and chartists δC results from ∆δ∗ = δF−δC
1−δC . The
intensity of choice, measuring investors’ tendency to choose the strategy which has better
performed in the past, divided by investors’ constant rate of risk aversion and the expected
price volatility is given by β∗ =
β
aσ2. The coe￿cients ΦF and ΦC are the factors that
fundamentalists and chartists use to form their expectations based on the past deviation of
the asset price from its fundamental benchmark. The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated
by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding standard deviations are
reported in parenthesis.
I/B/E/S database also provided by Thomson Reuters. The di￿erence between
the stock price and analysts’ opinions about a stock’s fair value represents the
deviation from the fundamental benchmark, denoted by xt in the model. For
several reasons, analysts’ predictions are biased. 6 In order to account for this
fact, I demeaned the stocks’ time series of deviations. Moreover, I considered
weekly averages in order to suppress very short-term ￿uctuations. The weekly
6See for instance Graham (1999), Hong et al. (2000), Welch (2000), Cooper et al. (2001),
Hong and Kubik (2003), Bernhardt et al. (2006), Chen and Jiang (2006), Clarke and Sub-
ramanian (2006), Naujoks et al. (2009), Jegadeesh and Kim (2010).53
risk-free rate r is obtained from the yield curve of German government bonds
as published on the homepage of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 7
The results for all 30 stocks are given in table 2.1. It can be seen that without
imposing any restriction on ΦF and ΦC, the estimate of ΦF is smaller than
one and the estimate of ΦC is greater than one for all 30 stocks, such that the
de￿nitions of fundamentalists and chartists are met. Also remarkably, all esti-
mates of ∆δ∗ are smaller than one. This implies that no investor is extremely
in￿uenced by social interaction. Moreover, the model always yields a feasible
market equilibrium price as stated by the propositions in chapter 2.3.2. For
16 out of 30 stocks, the estimate of ∆δ∗ is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
Hence, for more than half of the stocks, the in￿uence from social interaction
explains a part of the stock price ￿uctuations around its fundamental bench-
mark. Interestingly, in all of these cases, the estimates of ∆δ∗ are greater than
zero, which indicates that δF is greater than δC. Hence, fundamentalists skew
their beliefs more strongly into the direction of chartists than chartists do into
the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be concluded that social interaction
rather has a destabilising impact on ￿nancial markets. Overall, one can state
that social in￿uence at least does not have a stabilising e￿ect.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I introduced an asset pricing model that takes the in￿uence
from social interaction into account. The framework is based on the adaptive
beliefs system of Brock and Hommes (1997) and Brock and Hommes (1998).
Empirically analysing all stocks in the DAX30 index as of Dec 31 st 2010, I found
that social in￿uence has an impact on prices of more than half of the stocks.
Results show that social interaction enlarges the deviations from fundamental
benchmarks and thereby destabilises stock prices. Hence, one can at least state
that social interaction does not have a stabilising e￿ect.
7See www.bundesbank.de54
Appendix
A.1 Vectorial representation of equation 2.11
For notational convenience in the chapters of the appendix, equation 2.11 is
henceforth written in the vectorial form:
ft = θt + D(Γft − θt), (2.37)
where ft = (f1t,f2t,...,fit,...,fNt)T and θt = (θ1t,θ2t,...,θit,...,θNt)T. The
matrices D and Γ are given by
D =

    
    

δ1 0 ... 0 ... 0
0 δ2 ... 0 ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
0 0 ... δi ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
0 0 ... 0 ... δN

   
     

(2.38)
and
Γ =

  
     


0 γ12 ... γ1j ... γ1N
γ21 0 ... γ2j ... γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
γi1 γi2 ... 0 ... γiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
γN1 γN2 ... γNj ... 0

   
    


. (2.39)
Solving equation 2.37 for ft ones obtains
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt, (2.40)55
where I is the identity matrix and M is given by
M = I − DΓ =

  
     


1 −δ1γ12 ... −δ1γ1j ... −δ1γ1N
−δ2γ21 1 ... −δ2γ2j ... −δ2γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−δiγi1 −δiγi2 ... 1 ... −δiγiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−δNγN1 −δNγN2 ... −δNγNj ... 1

  
     


. (2.41)
A.2 Avoidance of a social multiplier
In order to show that equation 2.11 does not produce a social multiplier, the
vectorial form as being outlined in appendix A.1 is used:
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt. (2.42)
Also transforming constraint 2.12 into the vectorial form, where ι represents a
column vector of ones, and rearranging yields
Γι = ι
⇔ DΓι = Dι
⇔ (I − DΓ)ι = (I − D)ι
⇔ (I − DΓ)
−1 (I − D)ι = ι
⇔ M
−1 (I − D)ι = ι. (2.43)
Hence, the elements of ft always represent a weighted average of the values
of θt. Irrespective of the values of the matrix D, i.e. the magnitude of social
in￿uence, the average value of ft cannot be higher than the greatest value of
θt and cannot be smaller that the lowest value of θt.
If one did not consider the subtraction of an investor’s own a priori expectation
θit in equation 2.11, then the vectorial form would be given by
ft = M
−1θt. (2.44)56
Rearranging constraint 2.12 in the vectorial form yields
(I − DΓ)
−1 (I − D)ι = ι
⇔
 
(I − DΓ)
−1 − (I − DΓ)
−1 D

ι = ι
⇔ (I − DΓ)
−1 ι = ι + (I − DΓ)
−1 Dι
⇔ M
−1ι = ι +
 
D
−1 − Γ
−1 ι
⇔ M
−1ι = ι + G
−1ι, (2.45)
with
G = D
−1 − Γ =

 
     
 

1
δ1 −γ12 ... −γ1j ... −γ1N
−γ21
1
δ2 ... −γ2j ... −γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−γi1 −γi2 ... 1
δi ... −γiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−γN1 −γN2 ... −γNj ... 1
δN

  
    
 

. (2.46)
If for instance 0 ≤ δi < 1, then G is diagonally dominant and has negative
o￿-diagonal entries, wherefore all elements of G−1 are non negative (see e.g.
Berman and Plemmons (1979)). In this case a social multiplier arises and
causes the (absolute) mean value of the elements of ft always being greater
than a weighted average of the values of θt.
A.3 Equilibrium condition
All propositions in chapter 2.3.2 refer to conditions that if ful￿lled lead to ex-
actly one equilibrium market price given by equation 2.9. Such an equilibrium
is obtained, if equation 2.11 has exactly one feasible solution for the vector of
investors’ beliefs ft = (f1t,f2t,...,fit,...,fNt)T. Using the vectorial form as
being outlined in appendix A.1 and solving for ft, equation 2.11 becomes
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt. (2.47)57
Equation 2.47 yields exactly one solution for ft, if the following condition is
met:
Det(M) 6= 0. (2.48)
Hence, if the determinant of M is unequal to zero, equation 2.9 leads to exactly
one equilibrium market price.
A.4 Proof of proposition 1
In order to give the proof of proposition 1, it has to be shown that the deter-
minant of M is always unequal to zero (see appendix A.3), if all δi are smaller
than one. If δi < 1, then M has a dominant diagonal, because constraint 2.12
ensures that for each row
1 >
X
j6=i
|−δiγij| (2.49)
is ful￿lled. Therefore, the determinant of M is unequal to zero (Taussky,
1949).
A.5 Proof of proposition 2
If one allows δi to be greater than one for some investors, then the matrix M
no longer has a dominant diagonal as stated in the proof of proposition 1. If
however additionally a network structure with equal weights ( γij = 1
N−1) is
presumed, then M can be reformulated, such that still a dominant diagonal is
obtained. Multiplying the rows of a matrix with a factor unequal to zero only
scales the determinant by this factor, but never induces the determinant to
become equal or unequal to zero. Therefore, the rows of the matrix M where
δi > 1 are multiplied by 1
δi. In order to demonstrate this, assume a market with
four investors where δ1 > 1, δ2 < 1, δ3 > 1 and δ4 < 1. After multiplication,58
the matrix M is given by
M =

   

1
δ1 − 1
N−1 − 1
N−1 − 1
N−1
−δ2
1
N−1 1 −δ2
1
N−1 −δ2
1
N−1
− 1
N−1 − 1
N−1
1
δ3 − 1
N−1
−δ4
1
N−1 −δ4
1
N−1 −δ4
1
N−1 1

   

. (2.50)
Looking at the rows 1 and 3, where δi > 1, it can be seen that the conditions
for a dominant diagonal are not ful￿lled, because
1
δi
<
X
j6=i
  
−
1
N − 1
 
  = 1 for δi > 1. (2.51)
However, regarding the columns of the resulting matrix, there are two kinds
of conditions that if ful￿lled ensure a dominant diagonal. For those investors
where δi < 1 the diagonal element still is one as those rows remained unchanged
by the multiplication. The conditions for the columns where the diagonal
element is one is given by
1 >
X
j6=i

  −min{δj,1}
1
N − 1

  . (2.52)
This is always ful￿lled, if there are at least two investors who are only mod-
erately in￿uenced (δi < 1). The condition for investors where δi > 1 is given
by
1
δi
>
X
j6=i
   −min{δj,1}
1
N − 1
   
δi <
1
P
j6=i
 −min{δj,1} 1
N−1
  (2.53)
If this is met for all investors with δi > 1, then a dominant diagonal is en-
sured and hence the determinant of M is unequal to zero, which is a su￿cient
condition for exactly one equilibrium market price given by equation 2.9 (see
appendix A.3).59
A.6 Proof of proposition 3
If there are only two investor types with speci￿c values for the magnitude of
social in￿uence (δ1 and δ2) and the network structure still consists of equal
weights (γij = 1
N−1), then the equilibrium conditions of proposition 2 can be
stated more precisely. Particularly, the matrix M is then given by
M =


     
  

1 ... −δ1γ1j −δ1γ1(j+1) ... −δ1γ1N
. . . ... . . .
. . . ... . . .
−δ1γK1 ... 1 −δ1γK(j+1) ... −δ1γKN
−δ2γ(K+1)1 ... −δ2γ(K+1)j 1 ... −δ2γ(K+1)N
. . . ... . . .
. . . ... . . .
−δ2γN1 ... −δ2γNj −δ2γN(j+1) ... 1

     
   

,
(2.54)
where K is number of ￿rst type investors. The determinant of M turns out to
be
Det(M) = (−1)
(N−1)

δ1
N − 1
+ 1
(K−1) 
δ2
N − 1
+ 1
(N−K−1)

−1 +
Kδ1
N − 1
+
(N − K)δ2
N − 1
−
δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2
N − 1

. (2.55)
As δi ≥ 0, the determinant of M is always unequal to zero, if the last term of
equation 2.55 is unequal to zero:
−1 +
Kδ1
N − 1
+
(N − K)δ2
N − 1
−
δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2
N − 1
6= 0. (2.56)
As N tends towards in￿nity, inequality 2.56 becomes
nδ1 + (n − 1)δ2 6= 1, (2.57)
with n = K
N. Hence, if inequality 2.57 is ful￿lled, the su￿cient condition for
exactly one equilibrium market price given by equation 2.9 is met (see appendix
A.3).60
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Master University.3 Analyst Behaviour: the Geog-
raphy of Social Interaction
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that an analyst working
in Germany is more likely to publish a high (low) price target regarding
a DAX30 stock when other Germany based analysts are also optimistic
(pessimistic) about the same stock. This e￿ect of geographical proximity
is not biased by the fact that DAX30 companies are headquartered in
Germany. Shedding light on how in￿uence takes place, I show that in-
￿uence through communication and the exchange of opinion within small
groups of analysts plays a vital role. This mainly applies during a bullish
market environment. When markets are bearish, analysts’ incentives in-
duce them not to deviate too much from the overall average, such that
then observational learning has a greater impact.
3.1 Introduction
On June 30th 2011, there have been roughly 42,000 actively traded stocks world
wide.1 Although ￿nancial markets are rather e￿cient regarding the availability
of information nowadays, this quantity of investment opportunities makes it
1This number has been published by the World Federation of Exchanges members on
www.world-exchanges.org and refers to the stocks that are traded on the 54 major stock
exchanges in the world. Double counting has tried to be eliminated by only considering
domestic stocks from the perspective of each stock exchange.
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impossible for market participants to access and elaborate every piece of infor-
mation. In this context, ￿nancial market analysts play a central role. Each of
them focuses on a few investment opportunities, uses his sector expertise and
tracking experience to provide forecasts of ￿nancial ￿gures and thereof derives
investment recommendations. The resulting impact analysts have on invest-
ment behaviour and market outcomes has led to a stream of literature that is
concerned with how analysts derive their forecasts and recommendations and
to what extend they are in￿uenced by other analysts.
Empirical works of Hong et al. (2000) and Krishnan et al. (2006) show that
equity sell-side analysts2 herd while providing earnings forecasts. Zitzewitz
(2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006) and Naujoks et al. (2009) ￿nd an anti-herding
behaviour in the same context. Kim and Zapatero (2009) and Jegadeesh and
Kim (2010) among others use analysts’ investment recommendation to provide
empirical evidence for herding behaviour.
All authors cited above assume that individual analysts are homogeneously in-
￿uenced by all other analysts. Only few authors have considered heterogeneous
in￿uence among analysts so far. Graham (1999) ￿nds that analysts are more
strongly in￿uenced by a lead analyst who is de￿ned by his reputation. Cooper
et al. (2001) consider several lead analysts who are determined by past per-
formance and market recognition. Welch (2000) postulates that an analyst’s
investment recommendation is in￿uenced by the consensus recommendation
and the two most recently published recommendations of other analysts.
With this paper, I contribute to the literature on heterogeneous in￿uence by
providing a detailed analysis of the geographical structure of social interaction
and relating it to the prevailing market environment. This represents a fur-
ther step into the direction of understanding how analysts deviate from their
own estimates and how analysts’ forecasts thus have to be interpreted in or-
2Hereafter, the term analyst always refers to an equity analyst. Due to empirical data
availability, the term analyst furthermore always refers to a sell-side analyst. See for instance
Groysberg et al. (2007) for a detailed comparative analysis between buy-side and sell-side
analysts.72
der to get valuable investment recommendations. My ￿rst hypothesis is that
analysts are more strongly in￿uenced by analysts that are geographically prox-
imate. The theoretical foundation for this hypothesis is derived from recent
evidence in the psychological literature. Reis et al. (2011) found that indi-
viduals are more strongly attracted by individuals with whom they are more
familiar. Translating this into the ￿nancial context, this means that forecasts
and recommendations of analysts working in the same country could appear
more reliable, as these analysts might be perceived to be more familiar due to
the same language or a similar background. Analysts who work in the same
city have a higher probability to know each other personally, which might am-
plify this e￿ect. The hypothesis of familiarity is also motivated by the evidence
that has already been provided in the context of portfolio selection (see e.g.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Huberman (2001)).
In the analyst literature, authors so far have always postulated that in￿uence
among analysts only takes place via ￿observation￿ (i.e. observational learn-
ing). It has mainly been argued that this is due to the fact that analysts work
for di￿erent ￿rms and thus are competitors. However, there are various theo-
retical settings that show that communication among competing participants
on ￿nancial markets can be bene￿cial (Eren and Ozsoylev, 2006, Stein, 2008,
Gray, 2010). The reason for this lies in the fact that through the exchange
of opinion, also known as word-of-mouth 3, information and potential research
advantage is not only given away. An analyst can also collect new pieces of
information and learns about other analysts’ views which helps to validate the
own results.4 Based on these theoretical considerations, my second hypothe-
sis is that analysts are more strongly in￿uenced by analysts with whom they
3I use the term ￿exchange of opinion￿ in order to emphasise that information is not only
transmitted, but also discussed.
4One could also think of the situation where information is only given away, however,
with the intention to in￿uence other analysts such that they skew their valuation results
into a desired direction, which makes the own already published result more credible for
investors.73
exchange their opinions. This hypothesis is related to the ￿rst one, because
the likelihood that two analysts know each other and exchange their opinions
is higher, if they are geographically proximate. Evidence in favour of this
hypothesis has already been provided in the context of institutional investors
(see e.g. Shiller and Pound (1989) and Hong et al. (2005)) as well as retail
investors (see e.g. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007)).
With my third hypothesis, I state that e￿ects of geographical proximity or the
exchange of opinion are more strongly pronounced during an economic upturn
compared to an economic downturn. I base this hypothesis on the incentive
structure of analysts who are judged by their relative performance ( Hong et al.,
2000, Hong and Kubik, 2003, Chen and Jiang, 2006). This means that in times
of a bull market they try to stand up from the crowd in order to distinguish
themselves from their competitors (Zwiebel, 1995). Therefore, they seek to
obtain research advantages from few other analysts who are familiar due to
geographical proximity or with whom they exchange their opinions. However,
during an economic downturn which generally induces a high uncertainty, they
try not to deviate too much from the overall average in order to limit the po-
tential loss (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Clarke and Subramanian, 2006).
My database consists of price targets regarding the stocks of DAX30 compa-
nies that have been published by sell-side analysts in the period from 2005 to
mid 2010. A price target refers to the value of a stock an analyst considers
to be fair and therefore expects to be reached by the market price within a
prede￿ned horizon that usually equals one year. Hence, price targets represent
investment recommendations and thus might have a direct impact on market
participants. In an empirical setting, the advantage of the price target com-
pared to the verbal investment recommendation (buy, hold, sell) lies in the fact
that it is a continuous variable that quanti￿es how optimistic or pessimistic
an analyst is about a stock. The choice of DAX30 stocks is motivated by
the high analyst coverage. Moreover, it allows the analysis of a homogenous
group of international analysts who have an indirect impact on one of the
major European indices. Such a focus has not been considered in the ana-74
lyst literature so far. The database is unique to the extent that it represents
a merger of the commonly used commercial database I/B/E/S provided by
Thomson Reuters and the data of analyst reports that are publicly available
on the webpage www.aktiencheck.de. While I/B/E/S is rather focussed on
analyst reports of great brokerage houses and investment banks, the reports
on www.aktiencheck.de include investment newsletters of research houses and
daily newspapers that also have in￿uence on market participants. The pe-
riod of the database allows a very up-to-date analysis of analysts’ behaviour
before and during the recent ￿nancial and economic crisis that has not been
conducted in the analyst literature yet. In order to examine the in￿uence that
results from the exchange of opinion, one has to identify the individual ana-
lysts who actually exchange their opinions with each other. In the context of
institutional investors, Hong et al. (2005) assume that the exchange of opinion
only or at least primarily takes place on the city level. In the context of retail
investors, Massa and Simonov (2005) state that there are further important
characteristics that indicate the exchange of opinion, namely the profession
and the former university attendance. In order to go beyond relying on as-
sumptions, I conducted a representative survey among DAX30 analysts to ￿nd
out with whom analysts actually exchange their opinions.
Within the empirical analysis, I ￿nd that when German analysts on average
increase their price targets by 1 EUR (1%), an individual German analyst
increases his price target by 0.32 EUR (0.15%) more than he does when an-
alysts working outside Germany on average increase their price targets by 1
EUR (1%). This corroborates the hypothesis of geographical proximity for
German analysts. I show that this result is not related to the fact that DAX30
companies are headquartered in Germany, which one might think to be an
informational advantage. Regarding the exchange of opinion, I discover that
before the economic crisis an individual analyst’s price target is more similar
to the price targets of analysts with whom he exchanges his opinion compared
to other analysts. Hence, my second hypothesis is a￿rmed at least for the
period before the economic crisis. It is not approved for the period during the75
economic crisis which in turn however is consistent with my third hypothesis
that analysts strongly align their price targets with the consensus and are less
in￿uenced by the exchange of opinion within small groups of analysts in times
of a great uncertainty which is generally given during a crisis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In chapter 3.2, I present
the dataset as well as the survey results. Chapter 3.3 serves to outline how
this data is used for the empirical analysis. The results are provided in chapter
3.4. An alternative explanation for these empirical results is o￿ered in chapter
3.5. Chapter 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Price Target Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the price targets regarding
the stocks of the thirty German companies included in the index DAX30 as of
May 31st 2010. In order to avoid confusions in the following, the term com-
pany shall always refer to the organisation having issued a stock, whereas ￿rm
denotes the organisation an analyst is employed by. The period of analysis
comprises the almost ￿ve and a half year time window from January 1 st 2005
to May 31st 2010 and thus includes the stock market peak preceding the ￿nan-
cial crisis in 2007/08 as well as the crisis itself. The price targets are primarily
extracted from I/B/E/S, the common database of analysts’ estimates provided
by Thomson Reuters. This yielded 10,972 values for the period of analysis.
Further price targets were collected from analyst reports being published on
www.aktiencheck.de5. For the same period of time 27,175 reports have been
evaluated and 16,821 price targets extracted. Both databases have then been
merged as follows. The I/B/E/S database has been used as a basis. Price
targets from analysts employed by ￿rms that are not included in I/B/E/S
5aktiencheck.de AG is an independent research ￿rm that collects analysts reports and
publishes them together with own reports on its webpage.76
have directly been added. For those ￿rms that appeared in both databases,
the publication dates regarding a speci￿c company have been compared. In
the case they were equal, only the I/B/E/S data has been taken. 6 Other-
wise, the price target from the analyst report on www.aktiencheck.de has been
added. In order to avoid double entries due to di￿ering publication dates, a
time window of plus minus ￿ve days has been applied. Thereby, a bu￿er of
ten days was generated cancelling out unreal price target updates. Moreover,
￿rms’ names instead of analysts’ names have been used for this comparison
in order to avoid double entries that result from the fact that two analysts
of a research team who published one common price target appear with one
analyst’s name in the ￿rst database and with the other analyst’s name in the
second. Note that data of I/B/E/S is adjusted by stock splits. As the analyst
reports published on www.aktiencheck.de represent the original reports as be-
ing published at the time, the extracted price targets also had to be adjusted
by stock splits to be consistent with the I/B/E/S data. The merger of both
databases yielded 25,534 price targets. Dropping all ￿rms that published less
than 30 price targets during the whole period of analysis reduced the number
of ￿rms by one half and led to a database of 24,893 price targets. The ￿nal
database resulted by eliminating all entries where only the ￿rm but not the
corresponding analyst was known and consists of 17,898 price targets. This
database is unique regarding to the following fact: While I/B/E/S primarily
contains estimates of investment banks, reports on www.aktiencheck.de also
comprise estimates from independent research ￿rms and investment letters.
The merger of both databases hence represents a broader spectrum of ana-
lysts’ price targets. Table 3.1 gives an overview of ￿rms included in the new
database. Moreover, the original database and the corresponding number of
price target publications are indicated.
In order to analyse the geographic structure of in￿uence, an analyst’s work-
6Ljungqvist et al. (2009) reported systematic errors in the historical I/B/E/S recommen-
dation database. The comparison of price targets that appear in both databases, however,
did not reveal remarkable deviations.77
Table 3.1: Table 3.1: Overview of the ￿rms included in the new price target
database
Firm I/B/E/S aktiencheck
ABN AMRO - 7
AC Research - 38
Actien-B￿rse - 82
Ahorro Corporaci￿n Financiera S.V., S.A. 17 -
Banc of America Securities-Merrill Lynch Research 3 302
Banco Sabadell 42 -
Bankhaus Lampe 104 198
Bankhaus Metzler 335 -
Barclays Capital 34 3
Bear Stearns 15 2
Berenberg Bank 46 -
BHF-BANK 359 28
Cheuvreux 595 222
Citigroup - 625
Collins Stewart 32 2
Commerzbank Corporates & Markets 268 196
Credit Suisse 219 169
Daiwa Securities SMBC Europe Limited 26 -
Der Aktion￿r - 189
Der Aktion￿rsbrief - 58
Deutsche Bank 269 139
Dexia Securities 5 37
DZ BANK 236 -
equinet AG 163 238
EURO am Sonntag - 172
Evolution Securities 31 -
Exane BNP Paribas - 84
FOCUS-MONEY - 59
Fox Pitt & Kelton 14 -
Frankfurter B￿rsenbrief - 84
Fuchsbriefe - 37
Goldman Sachs - 281
Helvea 43 20
HSBC - 106
HypoVereinsbank - 802
IIR Group 16 16
Independent Research - 1,507
ING 1 78
J.P. Morgan Securities - 324
Je￿eries & Co 52 7
Jyske Bank 44 22
Keefe Bruyette & Woods 36 9
Kepler Capital Markets 201 64
Landesbank Baden-W￿rttemberg 257 30
Lehman Brothers 53 25
LRP Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz 217 898
M.M. Warburg & CO 448 143
Macquarie 59 4
Merck Finck & Co. - 156
Morgan Stanley - 206
National-Bank AG - 159
Natixis Securities 143 -
Nomura Equity Research 171 19
Nord LB 112 583
Oddo Securities 117 -
Piper Ja￿ray 32 7
Prior B￿rse - 48
Raymond James 39 14
Sal. Oppenheim 665 108
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co 157 34
Santander 37 -
SEB - 1,171
SES Research 10 83
SociØtØ GØnØrale 235 374
SRH AlsterResearch 20 21
Stockstreet.de - 30
UBS - 261
UniCredit Markets & Investment Banking 374 516
WestLB 280 169
6,632 11,266
17,898
The table displays the ￿rms’ names and the number of published price targets originating
from the two di￿erent sources.78
ing location has to be known. Although the city is indicated on the analyst
reports on www.aktiencheck.de, the data could not be used as it usually only
referred to the headquarter of the particular ￿rm and not to the actual place
of work of an analyst. Hence, for each analyst in the database the city and the
corresponding country have been searched by hand on the internet. Table 3.2
shows the distribution of ￿rms, analysts and published price targets by coun-
try and city. Hereafter, an analyst’s nationality is used interchangeably with
the country where he works. This means for instance that a ￿German￿ analyst
refers to an analyst who works in Germany although there might be German
analysts who work abroad. Most of the ￿rms are Germany based, however,
closely followed by UK. London is the city where most of the analysts work and
is followed by Frankfurt where less than a half of London based analysts work.
German analysts published about 70% of all price targets. The portion of UK
based analysts who all work in London equals approximately 20%. Analysts
working in Frankfurt published about one third of all price targets.
3.2.2 Survey Evidence
In order to determine the in￿uence resulting from the exchange of opinion
among analysts, it has to be known which analysts exchange their opinions
with each other. Aiming to get this information, a survey of DAX30 analysts
has been conducted. In the period from June 15 th to July 8th 2010, all analysts
in the price target database have been contacted by email and asked to ￿ll in
a questionnaire. Out of 858 analysts in the database 718 could be reached 7
and 195 replied. This corresponds to a response rate of 27.2%, which ensures
the representativeness of the survey. The questionnaire consisting of eleven
questions is shown in table 3.3.
Concerning analysts’ interaction and reciprocal in￿uence from the exchange
7The remaining analysts could not be contacted, as they either left their ￿rm or because
no or not a valid email address could be found.79
Table 3.2: Table 3.2: Distribution of ￿rms, analysts and price targets of
DAX30 analysts by country and city
country city number of ￿rms number of analysts number of targets
Belgium Brussels 2 5 61
China Hong Kong 1 1 1
Denmark Silkeborg 1 5 66
Germany Berlin 1 1 37
Detmold 1 1 84
D￿sseldorf 6 34 815
Essen 1 5 159
Frankfurt 16 153 6,174
Hamburg 4 25 739
Hanover 1 17 695
Cologne 2 4 303
Kulmbach 1 1 189
Mainz 2 12 1,152
Munich 5 32 1,989
Stuttgart 1 24 250
Westerburg 1 3 38
France Paris 13 80 882
India Bangalore 1 1 3
Bombay 1 12 32
the Netherlands Amsterdam 3 5 44
Austria Vienna 1 1 9
Sweden Stockholm 1 1 1
Switzerland Geneva 1 2 27
Zurich 5 11 120
Spain Madrid 4 18 94
South Korea Seoul 1 1 22
UK London 33 388 3,781
USA New York 5 13 120
San Francisco 2 2 11
117 858 17,898
The table displays the number of di￿erent ￿rms, analysts and price targets on the country
and the city level. Please note that ￿rms that are based at di￿erent locations are double
counted. The same applies for analysts who changed their working location during the
period of analysis.80
Table 3.3: Table 3.3: Questionnaire of the survey
#1 How long have you been working at your ￿rm?
#2 In which city do you work?
#3 Where have you been employed before?
#4 Which university did you attend?
#5 With about how many analysts who cover at least one of the DAX30
companies covered by you, did you already have personal contact?
#6 In which way do you most likely have contact with other analysts
(e.g. telephone, meetings, events, lunch dates)?
#7 With how many analysts of question #5 do you exchange your
opinion regarding forecasts?
#8 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same country as you?
#9 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same city as you?
#10 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same ￿rm as you?
#11 How many analysts of question #7 attended the same university as you?
of opinions, the most important questions are #5 and #7 asking for the num-
ber of analysts, an analyst had already social contact with and an analyst
regularly exchanges forecast results with, respectively. The ￿gures 3.1 and
3.3 show the answers of these two questions. From the data, it can be seen
that social contacts are quite numerous. Only 14.0% answered not personally
knowing at least one other analyst who covers a common company. Additional
comments of the respondents con￿rm that there is a community of analysts
covering a stock wherein the members know each other and most often already
had a personal contact. Question #6 asking for the most regular way of con-
tact with other analysts provides the answer to this phenomenon. Analysts
meet frequently on events like investors’ days or analysts conferences and hence
communicate with each other often. The results of question #6 are shown in
￿gure 3.2.
Despite this regular contact, forecast results are not the main topic of con-
versation. Following question #7, only 34.6% 8 of the analysts exchange their
8The results of the question #7 to #9 and #11 are adjusted by the number of intra-
￿rm exchanges as being asked by question #10. This is done for two reasons. Analysts in
the same ￿rm act as one unity and only publish one result. Furthermore, the exchange of
opinion in a research team takes place by de￿nition and does not provide any insight.81
Figure 3.1: Figure 3.1: Histogram of the answers to survey question #5
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￿With about how many analysts who cover at least one of the DAX30 companies covered
by you, did you already have personal contact?￿
Figure 3.2: Figure 3.2: Histogram of the answers to survey question #6
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￿In which way do you most likely have contact with other analysts (e.g. telephone, meetings,
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Figure 3.3: Figure 3.3: Histogram of the answers to survey question #7
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￿With how many analysts of question #5 do you exchange your opinion regarding fore-
casts?￿
opinions regarding forecasts with at least one other analyst. Note that this
question is very delicate. Analysts in this context de￿ned as sell-side analysts 9
are competitors. Hence, no one is interested in giving away his research ad-
vantage or to reveal his ￿ndings. Formally, ￿rms’ policy even obliges analysts
not to do so. However, the fact that more than a third admitted to exchange
their results shows that there is an informal component that weights stronger
than policies or than obvious principles. As stated in the introduction, such
behaviour can be bene￿cial, because an analyst who exchanges his opinion
does not only loose a research advantage. Rather, he learns about other an-
9Some respondents annotated that from the formulation of the questions it is not per-
ceptible whether the word analyst refers to sell-side or buy-side analysts. Buy-side analysts
are sell-side analysts’ clients. Hence, the discussion of forecast results between these two
types of analysts is natural and not worth of analysis. The fact that 95% of the answers to
question #7 are below or equal to ￿ve proves that the questions have been understood as
being indented, if one assumes that number of sell-side analysts’ clients is usually greater
than ￿ve. As a precaution, the two answers above 15 have been taken o￿.83
alysts’ views which helps him to validate the own results. This is especially
relevant for the determination of price targets where also assumptions and val-
uation methods can be discussed without loosing a speci￿c research advantage
regarding an earnings forecast for instance. Indeed, some respondents who
denied the exchange of forecast results, as question #7 was formulated, anno-
tated that they nonetheless exchange assumptions and details about valuation
techniques. This suggests the actual number of analysts’ reciprocal in￿uence
from the exchange of opinions to be higher. Another fact that supports this
tendency is that because of the question’s delicate nature maybe not all an-
swers re￿ect the actual situation.
The basic intention of the survey was to determine with whom an analyst
exchanges his opinion. In order to get an acceptable feed-back ratio, no an-
alyst has been asked for the names of analysts with whom he exchanges his
opinion. Instead, I tried to reduce the universe of analysts that might be po-
tential counterparts for the exchange of opinion. This can among others be
done by using analysts’ working locations. If for instance an analyst does not
exchange his opinion with analysts working abroad, then all foreign analysts
can be excluded as potential counterparts for the exchange of opinion. Survey
questions #8 and #9 have been used in order to relate the exchange of opinion
among analysts to their working locations. Figure 3.4 displays the portion of
analysts from the same country or city, respectively, with whom a respondent
exchanges his opinion. On average, 82% of the analysts who exchange their
opinions regarding forecast results work in the same country (median: 100%).
This result corroborates the statement in the introduction that geographical
proximity (￿rst hypothesis) and analysts’ reciprocal exchange of opinion (sec-
ond hypothesis) are strongly related. This ￿nding is not biased by the fact that
all analysts work in the same country as only 56% of the respondents work in
the country where most of the respondents work (Germany). 10 Regarding the
city level, on average only 44% of the analysts that exchange forecast results
10The second and third most respondents come from the UK (22%) and France (10%).84
Figure 3.4: Figure 3.4: Histogram of the normalised answers to survey
questions #8 and #9
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￿How many analysts of question #7 work in the same country/city as you?￿ The answers
have been divided by the number of analysts with whom a respondent exchanges his opinion
regarding forecasts (see survey question #7). The left chart shows for instance that 30
analysts only exchange their opinion with other domestic analysts. Analysts who answered
not to exchange their opinions with any other analyst have been excluded.
work in the same city (median: 50%). This number is consistent with the an-
swers of question #6 where only 10% of the respondents answered to use lunch
dates as a regular way of having contact with other analysts. However, in the
two cities where with 26% and 22% most of the respondents work (Frankfurt
and London), this number lies at 65% and 78% respectively.
With Question #11 asking for the number of actual counterparts for the ex-
change of opinion who formerly attended the same university like the respon-
dent, it was intended to get another criterion to reduce the universe of poten-
tial counterparts for the exchange of opinion. I considered this characteristic
because it has been used in other empirical studies in the context of the ex-
change of opinion (see e.g. Massa and Simonov (2005) and Cohen et al. (2009)).
However, it turned out not to be adequate, because on average only 1% of the
respondents that exchange forecast results attended the same university (me-
dian: 0%).85
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Analysis of heterogeneous in￿uence by using di￿er-
ent reference groups
Within the empirical analysis of this paper, I do not determine the absolute
magnitude of in￿uence or whether analysts in￿uence each other at all. This
has already done in several prior studies (see e.g. Graham (1999), Hong et al.
(2000), Welch (2000), Cooper et al. (2001), Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt et al.
(2006), Krishnan et al. (2006), Kim and Zapatero (2009), Naujoks et al. (2009)
and Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)). Instead, I aim to analyse the structure of
in￿uence, i.e. an anlyst’s individual weighting of other analysts’ forecasts.
Therefore, I divide the analysts of the database into two reference groups.
The composition of these groups varies with the hypotheses to be contrasted.
In order to test the ￿rst hypothesis, for instance, one group consists of all
analysts who work in the same country while the other group is composed of
analysts who work in other countries. The resulting basic regression is given
by
Pict = αP
(g1)
ct + βP
(g2)
ct + ict, (3.1)
where Pict denotes the price target that is published by analyst i regarding
stock c at time t. P
(g1)
ct and P
(g2)
ct represent the average price targets of the
two di￿erent reference groups. The error term is given by ict. As not all
analysts publish their price target on the same day, t has to be understood as
a time window. In case the in￿uence among analysts was homogeneous, then
the coe￿cients α and β should not di￿er signi￿cantly.
The variables Pict, P
(g1)
ct and P
(g2)
ct represent time series of price targets. These
series could turn out to be non-stationary like in the case of stock prices. In
this situation, it has to be veri￿ed whether ict is stationary, such that the86
time series in equation 3.1 co-integrate (Engle and Granger, 1987). Otherwise,
empirical outcomes have a high risk to be spurious.
3.3.2 Composition of the reference groups
The construction of the two reference groups in order to contrast the e￿ect
of geographical proximity is straight forward, because the working locations
of all analysts are known. The determination of the e￿ect of the exchange of
opinion is somehow more challenging. The ￿rst group g1 has to be formed by
analysts who exchange their opinions with analyst i, while the second group
g2 has to contain only analysts who don’t. As stated above, I do not certainly
know which analyst has to be assigned to which group. A solution consists in
randomly assigning the analysts to the two groups. Obviously, without fur-
ther information, the probability of placing an analyst in the correct group
equals 50%. This means that if one considers a particular analyst A on the
left hand side of equation 3.1 and assumes that there are three other analysts
B, C, D who cover the same company (i.e. on the right hand side of equation
3.1), then the probability for a correct overall assignment equals 0.53 = 12.5%.
However, exploiting the survey evidence, this probability can be remarkably
increased. If for instance, analyst A answered to exchange his opinion with
two analysts who cover the same company, then taking randomly two out of
the three remaining analysts B, C, D, from the perspective of analyst A, yields
a probability of 100% to place at least one of the other analysts correctly and
a probability of 33% to assign all analysts to the correct groups. The latter
probability also increases to 100%, if one of these three analysts B, C, D an-
swered not to exchange his opinion with any other analyst. Figure 3.5 displays
the di￿erent constellations of this example.
Using real data from the survey, it is of course not possible to place all ana-
lysts correctly. However, aiming to contrast the in￿uence that results from the
exchange of opinion, it is not necessary reconstruct analysts’ underlying com-
munication network with a probability of 100%. Hereafter, I use the following87
Figure 3.5: Figure 3.5: Examplary use of the survey data for a random group
assignment
Situation I Situation II Situation III
group g1 group g2 analyst i
A B C D
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B D C
C D B
B D C
C D B
D C B
C D B
C D B
group g1 group g2 analyst i group g1 group g2 analyst i
A B C D
A
A
B D C
C D B
A B C D
8 possibilities: 12.5% 3 possibilities: 33.3% 1 possibility: 100%
Illustrating the example in the text regarding a random group assignment for the exchange
of opinion, the ￿gure shows the possibilities that arise, if one considers a particular analyst
A on the left hand side of equation 3.1 and randomly assigns three other analysts B, C, D
to the two groups on the right hand side of equation 3.1. All four analysts shall cover the
same company. In the ￿rst situation, one does not have any further information. In the
second situation, one knows that analyst A exchanges his opinion with two other analysts
that cover the same company. In the third situation, one additionally knows that analyst D
does not exchange his opinion with any other analyst.
null hypothesis h0 (not to be confused with the hypotheses one to three of
this paper): A counterpart for the exchange of opinion has a higher in￿uence
compared to other analysts and the in￿uence stemming from di￿erent coun-
terparts for the exchange of opinions is equal. Now, if one randomly assigns
the analysts to groups g1 and g2 while considering the information from the
survey, then under h0 the di￿erence α − β in equation 3.1 should turn out to
be positive, if there are enough analysts who are assigned to the right groups.
From the perspective of a particular analyst, the condition for placing enough
analysts correctly under h0 can be expressed as follows:
n
k
>
k − n
N − k
⇔ n >
k2
N
, (3.2)88
where N denotes the number of analysts who cover the same company and
thus could be potential counterparts for the exchange of opinion from the
perspective of a particular analyst. The number of analysts with whom a
particular analyst actually exchanges his opinion is given by k. While N is
determined by the database of price targets, the number k results from the
answers of the survey (see survey question #7). 11 The number of analysts
Figure 3.6: Figure 3.6: Notation for analysts’ group assignment
group g1 group g2
k N-k
n
The ￿gure displays an example of a random group assignment for the exchange of opinion.
Filled circles represent analysts that are actual counterparts for the exchange of opinion
from the perspective of a particular analyst. All other analysts are symbolised by empty
circles. Hence, ￿lled circles in the ￿rst group and empty circles in the second group stand
for randomly correctly assigned analysts.
that are randomly correctly assigned to group g1 is represented by n. Figure
3.6 serves to clarify the notation.
Aiming to exploit further survey results (see survey questions #8 and #9),
from the perspective of a particular analyst, the k analysts of group g1 can
be separated into k1 analysts who work in the same city, k2 analysts who do
not work in the same city but in the same country and k3 analysts who do
not work in the same country. N1, N2 and N3 stand for the corresponding
numbers of potential counterparts for the exchange of opinions. The resulting
11Using the answers from the survey, it is assumed that if two analysts exchange their
opinions then they do so regarding all companies they have in common.89
informational gain can be explained as follows. If for instance an analyst
answered not to exchange his opinion with foreign analysts, then from his
perspective all foreign analysts can be excluded for a random assignment to
group g1. For each analyst i, the probability that condition 3.2 is ful￿lled, i.e.
that there are enough analysts who are randomly correctly placed in groups
g1 and g2, such that under h0 one obtains α > β in equation 3.1, is given by
Pi(α > β|h0) = P(n >
k2
N
) =
Pk
m=b k2
N c+1
Q3
j=1
 kj
mj
 Nj−kj
kj−mj

Q3
j=1
 Nj
kj
 (3.3)
s.t. k =
3 X
j=1
kj
N =
3 X
j=1
Nj
m =
3 X
j=1
mj, mj ≤ kj.
In the following, the Bernoulli variable Ii takes the value one with a probability
of Pi(α > β|h0), if for a particular analyst i inequality 3.2 is ful￿lled and is
zero otherwise with a probability of 1 − Pi(α > β|h0). The overall probability
that the sign of α − β can be correctly estimated under h0 is given by
P(α > β|h0) =
 
X
i=1
wiIi > r
!
, (3.4)
where r is the percentage of observations in equation 3.1 for which inequality
3.2 has to be ful￿lled in order to estimate the right sign of the di￿erence
α−β. For the calculation of P(α > β|h0), r is set equal to 50%, ensuring that
inequality 3.2 is ful￿lled for the majority of analysts. As not every analyst
published the same number of price targets, the weighting coe￿cient wi has
been introduced.
In order to get an idea about the probability Pi(α > β|h0) that inequality
3.2 is ful￿lled for a particular analyst, table 3.4 provides the average values
of N1, N2 and N3 as well as of k1, k2 and k3 for the cities where at least one90
Table 3.4: Table 3.4: Overview of the analysts who regularly exchange their
opinions on DAX30 companies with other analysts
country city same city same country other countries exchange exchange country level exchange
ex same city city level ex city level other countries
N1 N2 N3 k1 k2 k3
Germany D￿sseldorf 3.5 36.5 42.0 2.0 0.0 2.8
Frankfurt 14.7 14.3 50.0 2.3 0.8 3.7
Hamburg 0.3 34.0 39.0 0.0 2.5 0.3
Mainz 0.0 23.0 37.0 0.0 7.0 1.0
Munich 1.3 29.3 33.3 0.3 1.3 0.6
Stuttgart 0.0 26.5 32.0 0.0 2.2 0.3
France Paris 3.0 0.0 44.7 0.7 0.0 1.3
Switzerland Zurich 3.0 0.0 37.0 2.0 0.0 3.0
UK London 14.0 0.0 43.7 1.3 0.0 1.7
overall 7.8 17.9 43.3 1.3 1.1 2.1
The ￿rst three columns of the table provide the average numbers of analysts in the same
city N1, the rest of same country N2 and abroad N3 who are theoretically available for the
exchange of opinion because they cover the same company at the same time. The second
three columns show the average numbers of actual counterparts for the exchange of opinions
in the same city k1, the rest of same country k2 and abroad k3 as obtained by the answers
of the survey.
analyst participated in the survey. Remember that the numbers of all potential
counterparts for the exchange of opinion, de￿ned by the coverage of the same
company, come from the price target database, whereas the numbers of actual
counterparts for the exchange of opinion are obtained by the survey. Summing
up the numbers in the second three columns of table 3.4 yields the size of group
g1, i.e. the total number of analysts with whom a particular analyst exchanges
his opinion irrespective of the working location. The size of the group g2 is
determined by subtracting this number of actual counterparts for the exchange
of opinion from the number of all potential counterparts for the exchange of
opinion, which is obtained by summing up the ￿rst three columns in table 3.4.
On average, the size of group g1 equals k = k1+k2+k3 = 1.3+1.1+2.1 = 4.5,
while the mean size of group g2 turns out to be N −k = (7.8+17.9+43.3)−
(1.3 + 1.1 + 2.1) = 64.5. Hence, from the perspective of a particular analyst,
the size of group g2 is generally much greater than the size of group g1. As I91
always consider group averages, the in￿uence of a singular analyst in group g2
is therefore very small. This means that if a counterpart for the exchange of
opinion is wrongly placed in group g2, his impact is diluted. Hence, under h0,
the estimated in￿uence of group g1 still might be higher than the estimated
in￿uence of group g2, such that the di￿erence α−β in equation 3.1 turns out
to be positive, if there are enough other analysts correctly placed in group g1.
Due to the group sizes, it is even su￿cient from the perspective of most of the
analysts that group g1 only contains one properly assigned analyst, in order
to ful￿l condition 3.2.
The overall probability P(α > β|h0) for estimating the correct sign of α−β in
equation 3.1 under h0 equals 73.3%. This means that running 1,000 simulations
of a random group assignment while taking the information from the survey
into account, the sign of the di￿erence α−β in equation 3.1 is expected to be
estimated correctly in 733 cases under h0.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Geographical proximity
With this paper, I intend to shed light on the structure of the in￿uence among
analysts. In this context, I test the relevance of geographical proximity, the
impact of the exchange of opinion and the temporal change induced by the
economic crisis starting in 2008. Testing di￿erent con￿gurations of the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test, all price target time series turn out to be stationary.
Hence, there is no risk of obtaining spurious results.
I start the analysis on the country level (see table 3.5). Therefore, the con-
struction of the relevant peer groups is straight forward as analysts’ working
locations are known from the price target database, such that additional infor-
mation from the survey is not yet needed. From the perspective of a particular
analyst, all other analysts covering the same company are divided into those
who work in the same country (group g1) and those who work in a di￿erent92
Table 3.5: Table 3.5: Regression results for the structure of in￿uence on the
country level
Pict P
(g1)
ct P
(g2)
ct α β const α − β N R2
(I) all domestic foreign 0.5600*** 0.4148*** 1.0081*** 0.1452*** 12,186 0.8734
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.2117) (0.0213)
(II) non German domestic foreign 0.3130*** 0.6868*** 0.8089*** -0.3738*** 3,946 0.9130
(0.0194) (0.0203) (0.3134) (0.0343)
(III) only German domestic foreign 0.6453*** 0.3250*** 1.0027*** 0.3203*** 8,240 0.8556
(0.0160) (0.0155) (0.2729) (0.0271)
(IV) only German domestic foreign 0.5853*** 0.3777*** 1.2923*** 0.2077*** 6,446 0.8306
without three largest German ￿rms (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.3342) (0.0322)
(V) only German domestic foreign 0.6658*** 0.3040*** 0.9453*** 0.3617*** 8,673 0.8616
time window of 45 days (0.0165) (0.0160) (0.2591) (0.0280)
(VI) only German domestic foreign 0.6189*** 0.3554*** 0.9324*** 0.2635*** 7,192 0.8404
time window of 15 days (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.3088) (0.0277)
(VII) only German domestic foreign 0.4361*** 0.2846*** 0.3230*** 0.1515*** 8,240 0.1421
normalised price targets (0.0175) (0.0208) (0.0251) (0.0299)
(VIII) non German German non German 0.5096*** 0.4754*** 1.3713*** 0.0343 3,991 0.9131
(0.0170) (0.0166) (0.3008) (0.0289)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 3.1 on the country level. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains domestic analysts, while group g2
is build of foreign analysts. This composition of the groups changes in speci￿cation VIII
where group g1 contains German analysts and group g2 is constructed by all other analysts.
Speci￿cation I includes all analysts. For speci￿cation II and VIII only analysts who work
outside Germany are considered on the left hand side of equation 3.1. Speci￿cation III-VII
only include Germany based analysts on the left hand side of equation 3.1 (group g2 still
contains foreign, i.e. non German analysts). A detailed description of the speci￿cations is
provided in the text. The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.93
country (group g2). As time window, I consider the thirty days period before
the publication of the price target of a particular analyst. This time window
is so designed that an analyst can only be in￿uenced by analysts whose price
targets were observable prior his own publication. The length of thirty days
guarantees that there are enough analysts to be included with their price tar-
gets, while the latter however are not too old. Estimating the coe￿cients of
equation 3.1 yields a signi￿cant di￿erence of 0.1452 (speci￿cation I). This re-
sult, however, might be biased by the fact that most of the price targets are
published by Germany based analysts. Indeed, considering only analysts work-
ing outside Germany on the left hand side of equation 3.1 leads to a negative
di￿erence of -0.3738 (speci￿cation II). This implies that the di￿erence for Ger-
man analysts is actually higher than estimated by the ￿rst regression. In fact,
this di￿erence equals 0.3203 (speci￿cation III). This means that an individ-
ual German analyst increases his price target by 0.32 EUR more when other
German analysts on average increase their price target by 1 EUR compared
to the same increase of price targets by analysts working outside Germany. In
order to provide some robustness checks for this result, several out-of sample
regressions have been run. First, the three German ￿rms that provided most
of the price targets are excluded. This still leads to a signi￿cant di￿erence of
0.2077 (speci￿cation IV). Next, the time window has been varied. Considering
a time window of 45 as well as 15 days prior the publication of a particular
analyst’s price target yields signi￿cant di￿erences of 0.3617 and 0.2635, respec-
tively (speci￿cation V and VI). Finally, I aim to suppress the bias of potential
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, I normalised price targets by the market price
of the corresponding stock on the day prior the publication. The resulting
di￿erence is signi￿cant and equals 0.1515 (speci￿cation VII). This means that
an individual German analyst increases his price target by 0.15% more when
other German analysts increase their price target by 1% compared to the same
proportional increase of price targets by analysts working outside Germany.
After having provided empirical evidence that the intra-country correlation of
price targets only applies for Germany based analysts, one might assume that94
this correlation is not due to the common country but is caused by the fact
that the companies of the examined stocks are also headquartered in Germany.
Therefore, German analysts might have or might at least be assumed to have
a better set of information such that foreign analysts are more strongly in-
￿uenced by German analysts than by their domestic colleagues. In order to
analyse the in￿uence that is generated by German analysts from the perspec-
tive of an analyst working outside Germany, I built up a group of analysts
that work in Germany (group g1) and a group of all other analysts (group
g2). The di￿erence between the estimated coe￿cients equals 0.0343 and turns
out to be insigni￿cant (speci￿cation VIII). Hence, an analyst who works out-
side Germany is not more strongly in￿uenced by German analysts than by
all other analysts. Nevertheless, a German analyst still might have a better
set of information although this is not recognised by analysts working out-
side Germany. I contrast this alternative hypothesis by comparing the returns
an investor would have realised, if he had followed the implicit investment
recommendations provided by price targets. The returns are given by
rict =

pc,t+365 + dct,t+365
pct
− 1

sgn(Pict − pct), (3.5)
where pct is the market price of stock c at time t and pc,t+365 is the stock
price one year there after. The dividends that are paid during the period are
given by dct,t+365. If an analyst publishes a price target that is higher than
the current market price, then he considers the stock to be under valuated
and implicitly recommends buying the stock. However, an analyst would not
necessarily recommend buying a stock when his price target is only little higher
than the prevailing stock price. Therefore, I use several thresholds for my
analysis. These are 1%, 3% and 5%. By including dividends in equation 3.5,
rict represents a gross return. For the comparative analysis of German and
non German analysts I consider gross as well as net returns, i.e. returns that
are calculated by including and excluding dividend payments. The results are
displayed in table 3.6. It can be seen that returns that result from the buy
and sell recommendations of German analysts are slightly higher. However,95
Table 3.6: Table 3.6: Average performance of German and non German
analysts
Germany not Germany di￿erence
gross return. threshold 1% 6.98% 6.11% 0.87%
(53.65%) (51.75%)
net return. threshold 1% 5.46% 4.43% 1.03%
(53.79%) (51.78%)
gross return. threshold 3% 7.18% 6.36% 0.81%
(54.28%) (52.39%)
net return. threshold 3% 5.62% 4.66% 0.97%
(54.38%) (52.38%)
gross return. threshold 5% 7.46% 6.62% 0.84%
(54.33%) (53.06%)
net return. threshold 5% 5.81% 4.89% 0.93%
(54.35%) (53.07%)
The table shows average hypothetical returns that result from German and non German
analysts’ implicit recommendation provided by their price targets. The di￿erent methods
of calculation are explained in the text. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.96
Table 3.7: Table 3.7: Regression results for the structure of in￿uence on the
city level
Pict P
(g1)
ct P
(g2)
ct α β const α − β N R2
(IX) all same city other city 0.3245*** 0.6576*** 0.7394*** -0.3330*** 10,329 0.8741
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.2332) (0.0256)
(X) non German same city other city 0.3155*** 0.6839*** 0.8180*** -0.3685*** 3,918 0.9123
(0.0195) (0.0203) (0.3145) (0.0343)
(XI) only German same city other city 0.3012*** 0.6702*** 0.6959** -0.3691*** 6,411 0.8510
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.3228) (0.0365)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 3.1 on the city level. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts who work in the same city,
while group g2 is build of analysts who work in di￿erent cities. Speci￿cation (IX) includes
all analysts. For Speci￿cation (X) only analysts who work outside Germany are considered
on the left hand side of equation 3.1. Speci￿cation (XI) only includes Germany based
analysts on the left hand side of equation 3.1 (group g2 still contains analysts working in
foreign cities). The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
none of the di￿erences are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. Therefore, I can
conclude that analysts working in Germany do not have better knowledge
about DAX30 companies although they are also headquartered in Germany.
This ￿nding is in line with Bae et al. (2008), who show that local information
advantage vanishes for large companies that operate globally and have a good
disclosure policy.
Now turning to the city level, from the perspective of a particular analyst, all
other analysts covering the same company are divided into those who work in
the same city (group g1) and those who work in a di￿erent city (group g2).
The resulting di￿erence equals -0.3330 (speci￿cation IX). Hence, analysts are
more strongly in￿uenced by analysts who work in di￿erent cities compared
to those who work in the same city. This result remains unchanged if only
analysts working outside Germany or only German analysts are considered on
the right hand side of equation 3.1 (speci￿cation X and XI). All regression
results based on the city level are shown in table 3.7.97
3.4.2 Exchange of opinion
Up to now, I considered the in￿uence stemming from analysts’ price targets
that could actually have been observed. In the following, I like to determine
the relevance of the exchange of opinion among analysts. Therefore, I enlarge
the time window to ±30 days. Hence, an analyst is considered to be also in￿u-
enced by analysts who published their price targets later in time. The intuition
behind is that analysts who exchange their opinions can in￿uence each other
without having to observe the ￿nally published price target.
In chapter 3.2, I explained that I do not certainly know an analyst’s coun-
terparts for the exchange of opinion. However, the data of the survey can be
used to get a good guess, if one randomly assigns the analysts to the group
of analysts who exchange their opinions with analyst i (group g1) and the
group of those who don’t (group g2). The regression equation 3.1 can only
be estimated, if the group g1 from the perspective of a particular analyst i is
non empty. This comes because there has to be at least one other analyst who
could have in￿uence on analyst i by the exchange of opinion, if the resulting
impact shall be estimated. In order to ensure this, I dropped all observation
where analysts (on the left hand side of equation 3.1) answered not to exchange
their opinion with any other analyst or did not participate in the survey at
all. Therefore, there are analysts whose price targets appear on the right hand
side of equation 3.1, but don’t on the left hand side.
Under the null hypothesis h0 that an analyst is more strongly (with equal in-
tensity) in￿uenced by those analysts with whom he exchanges his opinion, the
probability for correctly estimating the sign of the di￿erence α−β in equation
3.1 equals 73.3%. This value results, if the probability Pi(α > β|h0) at the
level of a single analyst is weighted by all price targets he has published during
the period of analysis. However, an analyst might publish a price target in a
period of time when no other analyst of those who are randomly assigned to
group g1 published a price target. In this case, the observation also has to be
dropped for the regression 3.1, because group g1 would be empty. Hence, the98
Table 3.8: Table 3.8: Regression results for the relevance of the exchange of
opinion
α β const α − β N P(α > β|h0) frel (α − β > 0)
0.4496 0.5465 0.8265 -0.0969 679 75.3% 43.0%
(0.3687) (0.3570) (1.6738) (0.7250)
The table provides the mean results of the simulation with 1,000 point estimates of the basic
regression 3.1 that is used to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts with whom he exchanges his
opinion, while group g2 is build of other analysts. P(α > β|h0) is the average probability
that for a random assignment of the groups the sign of the di￿erence α−β can be correctly
estimated under the null hypothesis. frel (α − β > 0) is the relative frequency of simulation
runs where the di￿erence α −β turned out to be positive. Standard deviations of the point
estimates resulting from the simulation runs are provided in parentheses.
number of price targets published by this particular analyst is reduced. This in
turn changes the weighting coe￿cients wi in equation 3.4, which thus depend
on the random composition of group g1 and g2. Therefore, the probability for
estimating the correct sign of α−β under h0 varies slightly. Table 3.8 provides
the results of 1,000 simulations. It can be seen that the mean probability for
a proper assignment equals 75.3%, which is slightly higher than using a na￿ve
weighting with all price targets published by an individual analyst. The av-
erage di￿erence α − β is negative and the point estimate of this di￿erence is
positive in only 43.0% of the cases. Given the fact that under h0, one would
expect α−β to be greater than zero in 75.3% of the cases, h0 has to be rejected.
Thus, I have to conclude that the exchange of opinion has no or at least less
relevance than observation.99
3.4.3 Social in￿uence in conjunction with the prevailing
￿nancial market environment
All afore presented results are obtained by using the whole database ranging
from the beginning of 2005 to mid 2010. This is a time period where ￿nancial
markets were subject to remarkable ￿uctuations. There was a bull market
until the beginning of 2007 when the U.S. subprime crisis began to develop to
a global ￿nancial crisis. The consequences for non ￿nancial companies arose
with the delay of one year, when the ￿nancial crisis became an economic crisis.
Most of the companies in the DAX30 are non ￿nancial companies, such that it
is of interest to examine changes in analysts’ behaviour before and during the
economic crisis. The beginning is marked by the collapse of the investment
bank Lehman brothers on September 15th 2008. This date is quite exactly
in the middle of the analysed period and thus allows separating the whole
database into two sets of data with similar number of observations. In the
following, I use these two temporal subsets in order to repeat the analyses on
the country and city level as well as regarding the exchange of opinion.
The results referring to the e￿ect of geographical proximity are shown in table
3.9. On the country level, I only consider German analysts, as prior results
showed that the relevance of the country only applies for analysts who work
in Germany. It can be seen that the di￿erence α − β is considerably greater
before the economic crisis than during it (speci￿cations XII and XIII). Before
the crisis, a German analyst increased his price target by 0.51 EUR more,
when other German analysts on average increased their price target by 1 EUR
compared to the same increase of the price target by other analysts. This
di￿erence is 0.34 EUR higher than during the crisis. On the city level, α − β
is negative before as well as during the crisis (speci￿cations XIV and XV).
However, this di￿erence is slightly greater, i.e. less negative before the crisis.
Table 3.10 shows the temporal di￿erences for the exchange of opinion. During
the economic crisis the mean di￿erence α − β is negative and only 33.9% of
the simulation runs yielded a positive di￿erence α − β. This is in line with100
Table 3.9: Table 3.9: Regression results for the temporal change on the
country and the city level
Pict P
(g1)
ct P
(g2)
ct α β const α − β N R2
(XII) only German domestic foreign 0.7414*** 0.2354*** 1.0673*** 0.5060*** 2,845 0.9372
before econmic crisis (0.0198) (0.0186) (0.3542) (0.0330)
(XIII) only German domestic foreign 0.5646*** 0.4000*** 0.9497** 0.1647*** 5,328 0.7665
during econmic crisis (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.3980) (0.0389)
(XIV) all same city other city 0.3498*** 0.6300*** 1.0152*** -0.2802*** 4,102 0.9376
before econmic crisis (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.2965) (0.0312)
(XV) all same city other city 0.3189*** 0.6658*** 0.5414 -0.3469*** 6,144 0.7874
during econmic crisis (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.3553) (0.0382)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 3.1 on the country and the city level.
In speci￿cation XII and XIII, only German analysts are considered on the left hand side
of equation 3.1. From the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains domestic
analysts, while group g2 is build of foreign analysts. Speci￿cations XIV and XV are based
on all analysts. From the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts who
work in the same city while group g2 is build of analysts who work in di￿erent cities. The
dataset is divided into two subsets with price targets being published before (speci￿cations
XII and XIV) and during the economic crisis (speci￿cations XIII and XV). The signi￿cance
of coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.101
Table 3.10: Table 3.10: Regression results for the temporal change of relevance
of exchange of opinion
α β const α − β N P(α > β|h0) frel (α − β > 0)
before economic crisis 0.5131 0.4173 4.2817 0.0958 262 63.4% 64.8%
(0.1701) (0.1737) (1.7417) (0.3425)
during economic crisis 0.4001 0.7015 -3.4232 -0.3014 415 78.7% 33.9%
(0.8471) (0.8189) (2.4488) (1.6647)
The table provides the mean results of the simulation with 1,000 point estimates of the
basic regression 3.1 that is used to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion.
From the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts with whom he
exchanges his opinion, while group g2 is build of other analysts. The dataset is divided
into two subsets with price targets being published before and during the economic crisis.
P(α > β|h0) is the average probability that for a random assignment of the groups the sign of
the di￿erence α − β can be correctly estimated under the null hypothesis. frel (α − β > 0)
is the relative frequency of simulation runs where the di￿erence α − β turned out to be
positive. Standard deviations of the point estimates resulting from the simulation runs are
provided in parentheses.102
the previously obtained results by using the whole dataset. However, looking
at the period before the economic crisis, α − β turns out to be positive. The
corresponding probability for correctly estimating the sign of α − β under h0
equals 63.4%. The relative frequency of simulations runs where α is greater
than β turns out to be 64.8%. This indicates that the in￿uence from the ex-
change of opinion plays a considerable role for price targets published before
the economic crisis.
3.5 Alternative explanation
The afore-presented results corroborate the hypothesis of local proximity for
German analysts and the hypothesis that analysts are more strongly in￿uenced
by their counterparts for the exchange of opinion (at least before the economic
crisis). However, there might be an alternative explanation for these ￿ndings.
An often cited caveat in the literature of social interaction (see e.g. Manski
(1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Mo￿tt (2001) and Blume et al. (2010))
is that individuals only appear to be in￿uenced by peer group members. In
truth, their actions are correlated, because peer group members have similar
background characteristics that induce them to act analogously. For the ￿rst
hypothesis this would mean that price targets of German analysts are only
correlated, because all German analysts have for instance the same education
and therefore use the same method for the evaluation of the market environ-
ment. For the second hypothesis, this would imply that analysts exchange
their opinions with only those analysts who have a similar way of thinking
about investment opportunities, such that price targets are correlated without
any actual in￿uence taking place. There are several aspects that can be used
to argue against these alternative explanations. First of all, ￿nancial education
nowadays follows international standards. There are even uniform certi￿cates103
like the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 12. Therefore, it is not reasonable
to assume that German analysts use a di￿erent tool box compared to their
colleagues working outside Germany. Moreover, the structure of in￿uence has
been put in a temporal context. Hence, even if one does not trust the ab-
solute results, there is a signi￿cant di￿erence of behaviour before and during
the economic crisis. This especially applies for the in￿uence resulting from the
exchange of opinion. If one still does not want to believe in the explanations of
the structural patterns of in￿uence, then there is at least a clear indicator that
the in￿uence among analysts is not homogenous as many authors assumed in
their empirical studies.
3.6 Conclusion
The results can be summarised as follows. German DAX30 analysts are more
sensitive to price targets of other Germany based analysts than to price targets
published by analysts who work in other countries. This e￿ect is not due to
the fact that DAX30 companies are also headquartered in Germany. These
￿nding are consistent with the hypothesis of local familiarity. However, on the
city level no empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis could be provided.
Comparing the in￿uence of pure observational learning with the in￿uence that
results from the exchange of opinion, I cannot ￿nd relevance of the latter while
considering the whole period from 2005 to 2010. However, dividing the dataset
into two subsets with price targets before and during the economic crisis start-
ing in 2008 yields that before the crisis price targets of analysts who exchange
their opinions systematically di￿er from those who don’t. This tendency also
applies for the analysis on the country level. Before the economic crisis, a Ger-
man analyst is considerable more responsive to price targets of other German
analysts than during the crisis.
Putting the results into perspective, one can draw the following conclusion.
12See www.cfainstitute.org for more information.104
Before the economic crisis, analysts indented to di￿erentiate from their peers.
They tried to use research advantages provided by familiar analysts or those
analysts with whom they regularly exchange their opinions. During the crisis
in a time of great uncertainty, analysts were afraid of failing by providing es-
timates that were too far away from other analysts’ results. Therefore, they
rather aligned their price targets with the consensus such that the geographical
in￿uence and the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion were not or at least
less relevant.
On balance, I showed that the in￿uence among analysts is dynamic and not ho-
mogenous. Therefore, it is reasonable to use an adequate structure of in￿uence
for further research of analysts’ herding behaviour.105
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of Political Economy 103 (1), 1￿25.4 Fluctuations of Social In￿uence:
Evidence from the Behaviour of
Mutual Fund Managers during
the Economic Crisis 2008/09
In this paper, I analyse the reciprocal social in￿uence on investment
decisions within an international group of roughly 2,000 mutual fund man-
agers who invested in companies in the DAX30. Using a robust estimation
procedure, I provide empirical evidence that the average fund manager puts
0.69% more portfolio weight on a particular stock, if his peers on average as-
sign a weight to the corresponding position which is 1% higher compared to
other stocks in the portfolio. The dynamics of this in￿uence on the choice of
portfolio weights suggest that fund managers adjust their behaviour accord-
ing to the prevailing market situation and are more strongly in￿uenced by
others in times of an economic downturn. Analysing the working locations
of the fund managers, I conclude that more than 90% of the magnitude of
in￿uence stems from the social learning. While this form of in￿uence varies
much over time, the magnitude of in￿uence resulting from the exchange of
opinion is more or less constant.
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4.1 Introduction
As of September 30th 2011, mutual funds worldwide had $ 9,043 billion of eq-
uity assets under management.1 This corresponds to one third of the global
investable equity opportunity set. 2 Hence, mutual fund managers’ overall in-
vestment behaviour might have a considerable impact on the dynamics of stock
prices, as similar investment decisions might drive prices into a speci￿c direc-
tion. In this context, it is important to point out how analogous decisions
arise. Mutual fund managers are institutional investors with similar invest-
ment strategies, such that it is likely that they independently make the same
decisions. However, they might also in￿uence each other such that subse-
quently investment decisions are aligned.
There is a large body of ￿nancial literature that provides empirical evidence
in favour of the latter explanation, i.e. social in￿uence among mutual fund
managers (see e.g. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2008) for a recent survey). Social
in￿uence exclusively refers to the situation where fund managers directly in-
￿uence each other. This is opposed to indirect in￿uence that for instance
arises via market price mechanisms. The empirical literature on social in-
￿uence among mutual fund managers can be divided into two main strands
depending on how fund managers learn about other fund managers’ investment
decisions. Observational in￿uence, also known as social learning, is generally
stated by the strand of literature that deals with herding behaviour (see e.g.
Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), Walter and Weber (2006), Oehler
and Wendt (2009) and Pomorski (2009)). The second important strand is con-
cerned with fund managers’ interpersonal communication and the resulting
1See statistics of the Investment Company Institute on www.ici.org/research/stats/
worldwide/ww_09_11.
2As of November 30th 2011, MSCI reports a market capitalisation of $ 30,057 billion
for the MSCI ACWI All Cap Index that covers approximately 98% of the global equity
investment opportunity set. Index fact sheets are available on www.msci.com/resources/.111
exchange of opinion, also known as word-of-mouth e￿ect 3 (see e.g. Shiller and
Pound (1989), Hong et al. (2005) and Pareek (2011)).
With this paper, I contribute to both strands of literature by empirically de-
termining the whole magnitude of social in￿uence among fund managers and
dividing it into observational in￿uence and in￿uence from the exchange of
opinion afterwards. Irrespective of the way the in￿uence takes place, I allow
it to be heterogeneous among fund managers. This means I do not assume
that a single fund manager is equally in￿uenced by all other fund managers.
As a major contribution, I relate both observational in￿uence as well as the
in￿uence from the exchange of opinion to the prevailing market environment,
i.e. to the state of the stock market (upturn or downturn).
In order to organise the empirical analysis, I use three hypotheses. With my
￿rst hypothesis, I state that social in￿uence among fund managers generally
represents a considerable e￿ect. By the second hypothesis, I postulate that the
magnitude of this in￿uence varies over time according to the prevailing mar-
ket environment and is lower (higher) during an economic upturn (downturn).
Looking at the di￿erent kinds of in￿uence, my third hypothesis is that only
the magnitude of observational in￿uence varies as a function of the prevailing
market situation, while the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion stays con-
stant. The theoretical foundations for the three hypotheses are outlined later
in this paper (see chapter 4.3).
For the empirical strategy, I borrow from the literature on social interaction
(see e.g. Manski (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Mo￿tt (2001), BramoullØ
et al. (2009), Blume et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2010)). A fund manager’s
action (and therefore the dependent variable within the empirical analysis)
is represented by the portfolio weight he assigns to a particular stock on a
particular reporting date. Hence, I analyse how fund managers choose the
distribution of their portfolio weights on a speci￿c date and how they get
in￿uenced by contemporaneous portfolio allocations of other fund managers.
3I use the term ￿exchange of opinion￿ in order to emphasise that information is not only
transmitted, but also discussed.112
The choice of the dependent variable is motivated by the fact that the portfolio
composition represents the relevant subset of the entirety of a fund manager’s
current opinions. The advantage of using portfolio weights is their relative
nature. They always sum up to 100% and thus are not a￿ected by the pre-
vailing market environment that could for instance lead to market-wide cash
in or out￿ows to or from the equity asset class. This is a crucial aspect for
the veri￿cation of my second hypothesis that states a relationship between the
magnitude of social in￿uence and the prevailing market environment. Unlike
quite all empirical studies before, fund managers’ trades or stock picking ac-
tivities are not considered as dependent variable within the empirical analysis.
The reason is given by the fact that both would have to be inferred by portfolio
changes. This is problematic, as portfolio holdings generally and therefore also
in the dataset of this paper are only available on a quarterly or semi-annually
basis, such that most round trip trades cannot be captured and the date on
which the trade actually took place also remains uncertain. Elton et al. (2010)
has shown that this fact strongly biases empirical results.
In order to be able to estimate the overall magnitude of social in￿uence with-
out the assumption of homogeneous in￿uence, one has to know the topology
of the underlying in￿uential network. The topology provides the information
by whom a single fund manager might or might not be in￿uenced. I do not
know the topology of the underlying network a priori, but unlike many authors
before, I do neither presume a speci￿c structure. Instead, I determine it en-
dogenously. Therefore, I empirically analyse every possible single link between
two fund managers.
After having determined the underlying in￿uential network, the overall average
magnitude of in￿uence can be estimated. Thereafter, I separate observational
in￿uence and in￿uence from the exchange of opinion by the working locations
of the fund managers. Based on Hong et al. (2005), an intra-city link between
two fund managers is de￿ned as in￿uence through the exchange of opinion,
while all inter-city links are considered to be observational in￿uence. This can
be justi￿ed as follows. Fund managers working in the same city can regularly113
meet each other, e.g. for lunch, and thereby are able to maintain a social
relationship, which facilitates an informal exchange of opinion. Fund man-
agers working in di￿erent cities of course could also exchange their opinions
via telephone or email, however, it is rather unlikely that major informal in-
formation travels via this channel. It is certainly more reasonable to assume
that most of the fund managers working in di￿erent cities don’t even know
each other personally and therefore only observe each other. Observational
in￿uence in this context cannot arise by regarding other fund managers’ quar-
terly or semi-annually reports, which although published contemporaneously
refer to a preceding period. Hence, observational in￿uence is rather based on
the expectation how other fund managers act, given their portfolio decisions in
previous periods. Nevertheless, observational in￿uence also results from pub-
lic interviews and statements of other fund managers as well as the general
market mood, which is measured by diverse investors’ opinions indices.
My dataset consists of portfolio holdings of roughly 2,000 equity mutual funds
that had invested at least $ 10 million in companies in the DAX30 index as of
December 31st 2010. For these funds, I retrieved all available portfolio hold-
ings in the period from 2002 to 2010. This time period o￿ers the possibility to
analyse di￿erent market environments, namely the economic upturn from 2002
to 2006 as well as the ￿nancial and economic crisis starting in 2007. Unlike
almost all empirical studies in this domain before, my dataset contains inter-
national investors such that the analysis of in￿uence is not limited by country
borders. This is an important aspect, because today’s media make global in-
￿uence possible. A further advantage of considering funds that invest into
companies in the DAX30 is that I obtained a quite homogenous group of fund
managers whose behaviour can be related to price dynamics of the main stock
index of Germany which is one of the most important economies in the world.
Note however that although I select fund managers according to a minimum
investment in DAX30 stocks, I analyse the social in￿uence on the investment
decisions regarding all stocks in a fund manager’s portfolio.
One drawback of the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992)114
is that one cannot directly distinguish between true and spurious in￿uence.
I intend to overcome this by controlling for several factors that are decisive
for portfolio selection. These control variables comprise the average historic
return, the volatility, as well as the analysts’ consensus price target, earnings
forecast and price earnings ratio of every particular stock a fund manager holds
in his portfolio. I furthermore account for the index weight of a single stock, if
it is included in one of the major global indexes. Finally, I also control for local
preferences. The database of portfolio holdings has been enriched by all these
control variables and therefore is unique. In total, 6 million portfolio weights
(of di￿erent fund managers regarding di￿erent stocks on di￿erent dates) have
been matched with stock speci￿c data of about 17,000 companies whose stocks
are held by at least one fund manager at at least one point of time.
Results show that an average fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight
on a particular stock, if his peers on average assign a weight to the correspond-
ing position which is 1% higher compared to other stocks in the portfolio. The
magnitude of this social in￿uence reaches its maximum during the economic
crisis 2008/09, which suggests that fund managers are more strongly in￿uenced
by others in times of an economic downturn. More than 90% of the magnitude
of in￿uence stems from purely observing and imitating other fund managers.
While the magnitude of this observational in￿uence varies much over time, the
magnitude of in￿uence resulting from the exchange of opinion stays more or
less constant.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In chapter 4.2, I give
a brief overview of the empirical literature on social in￿uence among mutual
fund managers. I use theoretical foundations about fund managers’ behaviour
in order to derive three testable hypotheses in chapter 4.3. In chapter 4.4,
I present the empirical model and introduce a robust estimation procedure.
Chapter 4.5 serves to present the dataset used for the empirical analysis in
chapter 4.6. Chapter 4.7 sets out the checks for robustness which have been
undertaken. Chapter 4.8 concludes.115
4.2 Literature review
There are two main strands of the literature on social in￿uence among mutual
fund managers, which can be distinguished by the way a fund manager learns
about other fund managers’ behaviour. Observational in￿uence is analysed by
the strand of literature that deals with herding behaviour. A pioneer work in
this ￿eld has been presented by Lakonishok et al. (1992). With their empirical
measure, which has been applied in many studies since then, 4 they provide
weak empirical evidence for herding behaviour among US pension fund man-
agers. In a comprehensive study of a 20 years period, Wermers (1999) ￿nds
that mutual fund managers exhibit a slightly greater tendency to herd than
pension fund managers. For the German market, Walter and Weber (2006)
also detect herding behaviour among fund managers. However, they show that
a large portion of this behaviour is unintentional due to changes in benchmark
index compositions. Hence, identi￿ed herding patterns are rather spurious
caused by correlated signals. Oehler and Wendt (2009) ￿nd that German fund
managers show herding behaviour when they face market-wide cash in￿ows
or cash out￿ows. Pomorski (2009) deviates from the classical herding litera-
ture that assumes a homogeneous reciprocal in￿uence of all participants in the
market. He analyses how mutual fund managers with outstanding past per-
formance in￿uence other fund managers and provides evidence that in￿uence
on fund managers that performed poorly in the past is greater than on fund
managers with moderate past performance.
The second important strand of empirical literature on fund managers’ social
in￿uence deals with the in￿uence by the exchange of opinion. First evidence in
this domain has been provided by the survey data of Shiller and Pound (1989)
indicating that the word-of-mouth e￿ect among institutional investors plays a
considerable role. The empirical survey of Arnswald (2001) also reveals the
existence of the exchange of opinion among German mutual fund managers. A
4See Frey et al. (2006) for a brief survey of studies that used the measure of Lakonishok
et al. (1992).116
milestone is represented by the work of Hong et al. (2005) who provide empir-
ical evidence that the investment decisions of fund managers in the same city
are more similar than of those working in other cities. This still holds true after
controlling for the city speci￿c e￿ect of local preferences, such that the authors
conclude that fund managers exchange their opinions within a city based net-
work and adjust their investment decisions accordingly. Pareek (2011) relaxes
the assumption of city based homogeneous networks by assuming that fund
managers holding a large portion of a speci￿c stock maintain an informational
network link irrespective of their working location. This assumption is justi￿ed
by correlated trading behaviour that cannot be explained by style investing or
local preferences.
4.3 Hypotheses
In order to organise the empirical analysis, I set up three hypotheses based on
theoretical foundations about fund managers’ behaviour. My ￿rst hypothesis
is that social in￿uence among fund managers represents a noteworthy e￿ect.
The theoretical literature about the behaviour of mutual fund managers o￿ers
a wide range of explanations in favour of this hypothesis. 5 In his famous book
￿Irrational exuberance￿, Shiller states that fund managers’ actions are driven by
human greed and fear (see Shiller (2000)). However, there also exist several ra-
tional foundations. From the perspective of a single fund manager, other fund
managers might have or at least be assumed to have a better set of informa-
tion, which is revealed by the observation of their investment decisions ( Welch,
1992, Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995, Avery and Zemsky, 1998, Bala and
Goyal, 1998, Bikhchandani et al., 1998). Similarly, other fund managers might
be perceived to have a better ability to process available pieces of information,
5See e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for a survey
of theoretical and empirical research on herd behaviour on ￿nancial markets or Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2008) for a more recent survey about general social in￿uence on ￿nancial markets.117
such that observing and copying their decisions is bene￿cial ( Banerjee, 1992,
Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Moreover, imitating fund managers with a high
reputation has less severe consequences in the case of a failure ( Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990, Dasgupta and Prat, 2008). Furthermore, fund managers are
remunerated according to their relative performance within a certain period
of time which usually equals one year. If they already outperformed other
fund managers in the ￿rst part of this period, they have an incentive to copy
investment behaviour of other fund managers such that relative performance
is ￿xed on the prevailing level (Maug and Naik, 1996). Eren and Ozsoylev
(2006), Stein (2008) and Gray (2010) among others give a rationale for the
exchange of opinion among participants in ￿nancial markets. Although they
are competitors, fund managers can pro￿t by sharing their methods of infor-
mation analysis that are then reciprocally enriched by the opinion and views
of the counterpart.
With my second hypothesis, I put the magnitude of fund managers’ social
in￿uence as well as the number of fund managers by whom a single fund man-
ager is in￿uenced into a perspective. I state that they both vary over time
according to the prevailing market environment and are lower (higher) during
an economic upturn (downturn). The theoretical foundation for this hypothe-
sis is as follows. In a bull market fund managers try to distinguish themselves
from their competitors in order to ￿stand out of the crowd￿ and to get a higher
remuneration (Zwiebel, 1995). In times of a bear market, fund managers fear
the loss of reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and compensation (Maug
and Naik, 1996), such that they are more strongly in￿uenced by other fund
managers.
Looking at the di￿erent kinds of in￿uence, my third hypothesis is that only the
magnitude of observational in￿uence varies as a function of the prevailing mar-
ket situation, while the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion stays constant.
This can be justi￿ed by the fact that the number of social contacts does not
alter with the state of the market. However, afore cited aspects of reputation
and remuneration induce fund managers to align their decisions with a greater118
(smaller) number of other competitors who are not personally known to the
fund manager during an economic downturn (upturn).
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Estimation of the magnitude of social in￿uence
For the empirical analysis, I make use of the standard linear model to identify
social interactions based on network structures (e.g. BramoullØ et al. (2009)
and Lee et al. (2010)):6
wict = δt
X
j6=i
γijtwjct + xictβt + ict, (4.1)
where wict is the portfolio weight fund manager i puts on the stock of company
c at time t. The row vector xict contains exogenous control variables that are
decisive for the portfolio decision. The coe￿cient δt captures the magnitude
of average contemporaneous in￿uence that fund managers have on each other.
The in￿uence of a single fund manager j on fund manager i is weighted by
γijt ≥ 0.7 The weighting coe￿cients are normalised, such that
X
j6=i
γijt =
(
1 if fund manager i is inﬂuenced by at least one other fund manager
0 otherwise
. (4.2)
This ensures that δt captures the total magnitude of social in￿uence. As it is
usual in the social interaction literature, I consider strategic complementari-
ties, i.e. δt ≥ 0. This is the only assumption imposed on the coe￿cients of
6Contrary to the social interaction literature, I do not consider contextual e￿ects, i.e.
the in￿uence of an individual’s characteristics on the outcome of an other individual, as
it is unlikely that a mutual fund manager’s decisions are in￿uenced by the background of
another fund manager.
7More generally than in the social interaction literature, I do not assume that a fund
manager is equally in￿uenced by other fund managers. This means, the values of γijt do
not have to be equal for ￿xed i and t.119
the model and can be justi￿ed as follows. Consider two fund managers, where
one acts as a net buyer while the other is a net seller. Their portfolio weights
are thus negatively related, which could be expressed by a negative value of δt.
This relationship, however, does not represent a form of social in￿uence the
fund managers have on each other.
Regarding the error term of the model, I allow ict to be heteroskedastic, which
might come up by the exogenous variables xict but is also due to the bounded-
ness of the dependent variable wict between zero and one. Moreover, I assume
that the values of ict are correlated for ￿xed i and t, because by de￿nition
portfolio weights of one fund manager on a given reporting date have to sum
up to one. However, unlike in other social interaction settings (e.g. Lee et al.
(2010)), I do not assume that ict is correlated across di￿erent fund managers,
i.e. for varying i. This is justi￿ed by the fact that the group of analysed fund
managers can be considered to be homogeneous enough, such that the bias
induced by individual (unobserved) characteristics can be neglected.
For notational convenience, Equation 4.1 can be rewritten in a matrix form
wt = δtΓtwt + Xtβt + t. (4.3)
If Γt is known, then identi￿cation of the coe￿cients δt and βt is possible.
However, they cannot be consistently estimated by OLS, because from the
reduced form of Equation 4.3
wt = (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t). (4.4)
it follows that
Cov(Γtwt,t) = Cov(Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t),t) = σ
2
t tr(Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1).
(4.5)
Hence, the regressor Γtwt is correlated with the error term. The problem
can be illustrated as follows. Regressing wict on wjct yields the in￿uence fund
manager j has on fund manager i plus the in￿uence fund manager i has on120
fund manager j. Hence, the estimates of the in￿uence are upwardly biased. 8 In
order to overcome this problem, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) proposed a three
step procedure that has been re￿ned by Lee (2003). As stated above, I do not
assume that the error term is correlated across fund managers. In this case,
the three step procedure reduces to a two step procedure and I proceed like in
BramoullØ et al. (2009). In the ￿rst step, Equation 4.3 is estimated by a 2SLS
estimator using the instruments Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]. In the appendix, I show that
these instruments can be used, if Xt is uncorrelated with the error term and
if the spectral radius of δtΓt is smaller than one. While the ￿rst condition is
assumed to be generally ful￿lled, the second will have to be veri￿ed after having
obtained the results. The resulting estimates of the coe￿cients λt = [δt,βt
0]0
are given by
ˆ λt = (Q
0Z(Z
0Z)
−1Z
0Q)
−1Q
0Z(Z
0Z)
−1Z
0wt, (4.6)
with Q = [Γtwt,Xt]. The second step also consists of a 2SLS estimator. This
time the instruments ˜ Z = [Γtˆ wt,Xt] are used, where ˆ wt is the consistent
estimate of portfolio weights from the ￿rst step and results by plugging in ˆ δt
and ˆ βt into Equation 4.4. Since the 2SLS estimator of the second step is just
identi￿ed, the estimates of the coe￿cients λt from the second step are given
by
ˆ ˆ λt = (˜ Z
0Q)
−1˜ Z
0ˆ wt. (4.7)
In order to account for the assumed heteroskedasticity and within portfolio
correlated error term (clustered errors), the variance of the coe￿cients is esti-
mated by
V (ˆ ˆ λt) = (˜ Z
0Q)
−1˜ Z
0ˆ Ω˜ Z(Q
0˜ Z)
−1, (4.8)
with the block matrix ˆ Ω that contains the estimates of the error variance and
the within portfolio correlation obtained by the second step.
8Lee (2002) has shown that this bias vanishes, if the overall in￿uence of an individual
is very small. This applies if the matrix Γt is dense. My results however suggest that
the in￿uential network of fund managers is sparse, such that the in￿uence of a single fund
manager indeed cannot be ignored.121
4.4.2 Determination of the underlying in￿uential network
As stated above, identi￿cation of δt and βt is possible if Γt is known. If Γt is
not given, it is still possible to make assumptions about its structure. Hong
et al. (2005) for instance assume that γijt is only di￿erent from zero if fund
manager i and j work in the same city. This is reasonable, because they are
only interested in word-of-mouth e￿ects that are more strongly expressed, if
fund managers work near by and can regularly meet each other. Pomorski
(2009) is more concerned with the in￿uence that results from observing fund
managers with high past performance. He assumes that γijt only takes values
di￿erent from zero if fund manager i showed poor past performance while
fund manager j performed well. With my paper, I intend to capture both the
in￿uence from the exchange of opinions as well as from observational learning.
For this reason, I do not impose any assumptions on the structure of Γt,
but determine it endogenously. Therefore, I estimate Equation 4.3 for every
possible combination9 of two fund managers i and j by setting
γijt =
(
1 if i = i∗ and j = j∗
0 otherwise
, (4.9)
where fund managers i∗ and j∗ are those fund managers who are under consid-
eration for the estimation of a particular combination. The in￿uence of fund
manager j∗ on fund manager i∗ is then given by δt. As stated above, Equation
4.3 cannot be consistently estimated by OLS, because the estimates of the
in￿uence from fund manager j∗ on fund manager i∗ also contain the in￿uence
in the opposite direction. The problem does not even vanish if in￿uence is
unidirectional. This is due to the fact that imposing constraint 4.9 introduces
an omitted variable problem, because the in￿uence of fund managers j 6= j∗
9In order to ensure enough degrees of freedom for the empirical analysis, I require two
fund managers to hold at least 30 stocks in common on a particular reporting date, such that
a social in￿uence might be considered. Otherwise, γijt is set to zero. This is a reasonable
approach, because the distribution of a fund manager’s portfolio weights cannot be in￿uenced
by other fund managers who hold completely di￿erent portfolios.122
is neglected. A solution consists in also applying the procedure of Kelejian
and Prucha (1998) and Lee (2003). However, the second step is not feasible,
because one would have to use the estimated weights ˆ wt that can only be
obtained if the in￿uence of all fund managers on a particular fund manager
is considered. Nevertheless, the ￿rst step can be conducted and although Lee
(2003) stated that the estimates of the ￿rst step 10 are not optimal, they are
still consistent. With the estimates of the ￿rst step, the matrix Γt is then
constructed as follows. If fund manager j∗ does not have a positive in￿uence
on investor i∗ on a 5% level signi￿cance, then γi∗j∗t is set equal to zero. Oth-
erwise, the magnitude of in￿uence is normalised through the division by the
summed in￿uence of all other fund managers j 6= j∗ on fund manager i∗ and
is assigned to γi∗j∗t.
4.4.3 Dealing with the problem of ￿zero weights￿
One remaining important question is how to deal with ￿zero weights￿. Portfolio
weights of stocks that are not held by a fund manager are implicitly equal
to zero. Considering every stock in the world, most of the elements of the
vector wt would be zero. This leads to two problems. First, it has to be
accounted for a censored dependent variable. This could either be done by
applying a likelihood technique or for instance by using the estimator proposed
by HonorØ and Leth-Petersen (2007) that does not rely on any assumption
regarding the error distribution. While the ￿rst problem thus is solvable,
there is another which is more crucial, because it induces the risk of false
inference regarding fund managers’ reciprocal in￿uence. It arises from the fact
that fund managers will have a lot of zero weights in common. This could
erroneously be interpreted as empirical evidence for strong social in￿uence
10Actually, Lee (2003) showed that the estimators of the third step in the three step
procedure proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) are not optimal. However, assuming
that the error term is not correlated across fund managers, the ￿rst and the third step in
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) are equal.123
that prevents fund managers from holding particular stocks, while in truth
these fund managers might just be restricted by their investment policies not
to buy these stocks. Hong et al. (2005) try to solve this problem by restricting
the ￿universe￿ of potential investment opportunities to the stocks of the 2,000
largest companies. This reduces the problem. But the risk of false inference
is still high, if fund managers tend to hold stocks of small companies, which
leads to a lot of zero weights regarding the stocks of the larger companies.
I confront this problem by only analysing non zero portfolio weights on the
left hand side of Equation 4.3. Hence, if a particular stock is not held by a
particular fund manager on a speci￿c date, then the theoretical observation
of the resulting zero portfolio weight is dropped. This has to be kept in mind
for the interpretation of the results, because it means that the magnitude of
in￿uence only represents the in￿uence conditional on holding the stock and
putting a speci￿c weight on it. The in￿uence for not holding a particular
stock is not captured. This might restrict the generality of my conclusions.
Nevertheless, it ensures robust results, because the magnitude of in￿uence is
rather underestimated. Note that on the right hand side of Equation 4.3, the
resulting vector of Γtwt still may contain zeros, if a fund manager holds a
stock that is not held by any other fund manager on a speci￿c reporting date.
This can be illustrated by having a closer look at the structure of Γt, which is
given by
Γt =


   

0C1t×C1t γ12tMC1t×C2t ... γ1NtMC1t×CNt
γ21tMC2t×C1t 0C2t×C2t ... γ2NtMC2t×CNt
. . .
. . . ... . . .
γN1tMCNt×C1t γN2tMCNt×C2t ... 0CNt×CNt

    

, (4.10)
where 0Cit×Cit is a Cit × Cit matrix of zeros and Cit stands for the number of
stocks fund manager i holds at time t. MCit×Cjt is a Cit × Cjt matrix that is
in principle an identity matrix but the cth column is missing if fund manager
i holds the stock of company c and fund manager j does not. Considering two
fund managers, where one holds stock 1 and stock 2 and the other only holds124
stock 1, the vector of portfolio weights on the left hand side of Equation 4.3 is
given by
wt =

 

w11t
w12t
w21t

 
. (4.11)
On the right hand side, the matrix Γt has the structure
Γt =

 

0 0 γ12t
0 0 0
γ21t 0 0

 
, (4.12)
such that the product
Γtwt =




γ12tw21t
0
γ21tw11t



 (4.13)
contains zeros.
4.5 Data
4.5.1 Construction of the variables
The data regarding portfolio compositions of mutual funds has been obtained
from the Thomson Reuters ownership database. I selected only funds that
had invested at least $ 10 million in companies in the DAX30 as of December
31st 2010. For these funds all obtainable sets of portfolios compositions (not
only stockholdings of DAX30 companies) have been taken in the period from
2002 to 2010. They were available either on a quarterly or on a semi-annually
basis. Moreover, I also retrieved information about the particular fund and
the corresponding fund manager. This set of information contains the orien-
tation (active/passive) of the fund as well as the working location of the fund
manager. The ￿nal database contains 1,943 funds with 5,809,739 portfolio125
weights.11 On December 31st 2010, the total money invested by these funds
in companies in the DAX30 amounts to approximately one third of the total
DAX30 market capitalisation.
In order to properly disentangle the reciprocal in￿uence of fund managers, it
is important to ￿nd strong exogenous variables that explain their investment
behaviour (matrix Xt in Equation 4.3). Otherwise, spurious correlation might
be interpreted as intentional in￿uence. In his survey about the investment
behaviour of fund managers, Arnswald (2001) detects that investment deci-
sions regarding a particular stock are primarily based on fundamental values,
past stock returns and a general portfolio optimisation. In order to capture
these components, I enriched the database of portfolio weights by market data
obtained from Bloomberg. For 16,732 companies out of those that are held
by at least one fund manager on at least one reporting date, stock prices and
analysts’ consensus price targets as well as the mean value of the consensus
earnings forecasts referring to the three ￿scal years following a particular re-
porting date have been obtained. Moreover, the corresponding P/E ratio has
been retrieved. Comparability is ensured by converting all quotes into euro
with the prevailing exchange rates. This market data has then been matched
with the portfolio data in the following way. For every publication date of
portfolio weights in the database, the three months’ average and volatility of
daily stock returns in the preceding quarter have been calculated for all 16,732
companies and assigned to the portfolio weights that fund managers chose for
these companies. The same assignment has been done for price targets, av-
eraged earnings forecasts and P/E ratios on a given reporting date. The two
former have both been normalised through the division by the stock price, such
that these variables represent forecasted returns.
Portfolio decisions depend on fund managers’ utility functions as well as their
restrictions regarding the investment universe. A manager of a growth fund for
11In order to put these numbers into a perspective, note that in a comparable context e.g.
Hong et al. (2005) used data of 1,635 funds during a two-year period, which leads to less
than a quarter of the number of observations used in this paper.126
instance accepts a higher risk than a manager of a value fund does. Therefore,
an investment opportunity with a moderate risk and an expected return of 3%
might be attractive for the latter, while it most probably is not for the former.
This is an important issue that has to be considered, if market data shall be em-
ployed as control variables. In order to account for the individual portfolio situ-
ation of a fund manager, I relate the market data of a given stock to the market
data of all other stocks in his portfolio on a speci￿c reporting date. There-
fore, I took the di￿erence between a stock related variable and its weighted
average using portfolio weights of all other stocks that a particular fund man-
ager holds on a given reporting date. The resulting variables are DIFF_RET,
DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN, DIFF_P/E and denote the di￿er-
ence of average daily stock returns, of the volatility of daily stock returns,
of normalised price targets, of normalised earnings forecasts and of the price
earnings ratio, respectively. In order to illustrate this data preparation, con-
sider an exemplary portfolio with four stocks that are weighted with 50%, 25%,
12.5% and 12.5%, respectively. The past returns of these stocks are assumed
to equal 3%, 1%, 2% and 5%, respectively. Now, the value of DIFF_RET
for the ￿rst stock is calculated by 3% − 0.25·1%+0.125·2%+0.125·5%
0.5 = 0.75%. This
means, from the perspective of this exemplary fund manager, the ￿rst stock
has a higher-than-average return. Therefore, it might appear to be attractive,
which could explain a higher-than-average portfolio weight. The calculation
of DIFF_RET for the remaining three stocks is analogous.
Turning back to the main determinants of investment decisions based on the
survey evidence of Arnswald (2001), DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN and DIFF_P/E
account for stocks’ fundamental values. Past stock returns are captured by
DIFF_RET and portfolio optimisation is taken into account by both DIFF_RET
and DIFF_VOLA.
Walter and Weber (2006) stated that a large portion of similar behaviour
among mutual fund managers can be explained by variations of underlying
benchmark indices. Hence, a variable that captures this e￿ect is needed.
Therefore, the underlying benchmark of every fund manager has to be known.127
Among all 1,943 fund managers in the database, there are 277 who have a
passive orientation. This means these fund managers choose portfolio weights
such that they just replicate a particular index. Hence, by de￿nition they can-
not be in￿uenced by other fund managers and are excluded for the empirical
analysis. However, their portfolio weights can be used as benchmark weights
for the remaining 1,666 active portfolio managers. Therefore, I regressed the
weights of every active fund manager on the weights of every passive fund
manager. If the coe￿cient of this bivariate regression turned out to be posi-
tive and signi￿cant at a 5% level, I concluded that the weights of the passive
fund manager serve as a benchmark for the active fund manager. If there
are several passive fund managers who replicate the same index or if an index
is included in another index, the active fund manager’s portfolio weights are
likely to be signi￿cantly correlated with the portfolio weights of more than one
passive fund manager. In this case, I used all relevant benchmark portfolio
weights regarding a particular stock and took the weighted average according
to the magnitude of the bivariate regression coe￿cients. The resulting variable
is denoted BENCHMARK.
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) provided empirical evidence that fund managers
are more likely to invest in the stocks of companies that are located nearby.
In order to account for this e￿ect, I retrieved information about the location
of the headquarters for the afore mentioned 16,732 companies from Thomson
Reuters. Thereof, I created two dummy variables. CITY takes the value one
if a fund manager works in the city where the headquarters of the company,
he invested in, is located. COUNTRY equals one if the headquarter is not
located in the same city but in the same country.
4.5.2 Descriptive analysis
In order to illustrate how the group of the analysed 1,666 active fund managers
is composed, table 4.1 gives an overview of the families the funds belong to.
This list is restricted to fund families with at least 10 funds in the database.128
Table 4.2 shows the working locations of the managers of the analysed funds
by country and city. Note that the list of cities only contains those cities where
at least 10 fund managers work. Removing the portfolios weights of the pas-
sive fund managers reduces the dataset to 4,399,889 observations. Table 4.3
provides summary statistics for the corresponding variable PORT_WEIGHT
and all other afore mentioned variables. Please note that market data has been
corrected by outliers (upper and lower 1% percentiles). The mean portfolio
weight equals 0.64%. This means that on average a fund manager holds 156
stocks on a particular reporting date. Table 4.4 shows how the numbers of
funds and available portfolio weights are distributed over the period from 2002
to 2010. The average number of analysed funds per half-year equals 1,164.
This means that not all 1,666 fund managers can be examined at the same
time. Particularly, the number of fund managers that are observed in the sec-
ond half-year of 2010 is considerably lower than in the ￿rst half-year of 2010.
This is due to the fact that the data has been retrieved at the beginning of
2011, when not all funds had already reported their portfolio weights for the
end of 2010. The empirical results, however, are not a￿ected by this varia-
tion, because the magnitude of social in￿uence is determined separately for
every half-year and because it can be assumed that errors induced by missing
funds are not systematic. In table 4.5 the cross correlations of all variables are
given. As one would expect, PORT_WEIGHT is positively correlated with
DIFF_RET, DIFF_EARN, BENCHMARK, CITY and COUNTRY whereas
PORT_WEIGHT and DIFF_VOLA are negatively correlated. This suggests
that a fund manager puts more weight on stocks with higher average daily
returns, with higher analysts’ earnings forecasts, with a higher weight in the
relevant benchmark portfolio and on those stocks where he works near the
headquarter the issuing company. Less weight is assigned to stocks with a
higher return volatility. Surprisingly, PORT_WEIGHT is negatively corre-
lated with DIFF_PT, which indicates that a high return implied by analysts’
price targets leads to a lower portfolio weight of a particular stock. The price
earnings ratio does not seem to be decisive for fund managers’ portfolio se-129
Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Overview of the fund families of the analysed active
funds
Fund Family Frequency relative Frequency
Allianz Global Investors Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH 82 4.9%
MFS Investment Management 42 2.5%
DWS Investment GmbH 41 2.5%
Union Investment Group 39 2.3%
Fidelity Management & Research 38 2.3%
Deutsche Asset Management Investmentgesellschaft mbH 29 1.7%
AllianceBernstein L.P. 28 1.7%
Fidelity International Limited 28 1.7%
Deka Investment GmbH 27 1.6%
ING Investment Management (Netherlands) 26 1.6%
Amundi Asset Management 23 1.4%
Templeton Investment Counsel, LLC 22 1.3%
JPMorgan Asset Management U.K. Limited 21 1.3%
Wellington Management Company, LLP 20 1.2%
UBS Global Asset Management (Switzerland) 19 1.1%
Swedbank Robur AB 18 1.1%
Newton Investment Management Ltd. 18 1.1%
BNP Paribas Asset Management S.A.S. 16 1.0%
Aberdeen Asset Management (Edinburgh) 15 0.9%
Schroder Investment Management Ltd. (SIM) 15 0.9%
Invesco Advisers, Inc. 14 0.8%
La Banque Postale Asset Management 14 0.8%
AllianceBernstein Ltd. (Value) 13 0.8%
Henderson Global Investors Ltd. 13 0.8%
M & G Investment Management Ltd. 12 0.7%
OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 12 0.7%
Franklin Mutual Advisers, LLC 12 0.7%
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd. 11 0.7%
Danske Capital 11 0.7%
Dexia Asset Management Belgium S.A. 11 0.7%
Aviva Investors France S.A. 10 0.6%
Natixis Asset Management 10 0.6%
The list of fund families is restricted to those with at least 10 funds in the database.130
Table 4.2:
Table 4.2: Overview of the working locations of the analysed active
funds
Country Frequency rel. Frequency City Frequency rel. Frequency
United States 448 26.9% London 261 15.7%
Germany 332 19.9% Frankfurt 255 15.3%
United Kingdom 306 18.4% Boston 136 8.2%
France 147 8.8% Paris 134 8.0%
Switzerland 65 3.9% New York 107 6.4%
Sweden 49 2.9% Stockholm 48 2.9%
Canada 43 2.6% Zurich 43 2.6%
Netherlands 40 2.4% Edinburgh 41 2.5%
Belgium 37 2.2% Brussels 36 2.2%
Italy 37 2.2% Milan 33 2.0%
Luxembourg 29 1.7% Toronto 32 1.9%
Denmark 27 1.6% Luxembourg 28 1.7%
Ireland 22 1.3% The Hague 26 1.6%
Japan 16 1.0% Copenhagen 23 1.4%
Spain 16 1.0% Dublin 22 1.3%
Bahamas 12 0.7% Cologne 22 1.3%
Norway 9 0.5% Chicago 22 1.3%
Austria 8 0.5% Denver 16 1.0%
Australia 4 0.2% Tokyo 16 1.0%
Portugal 4 0.2% Geneva 12 0.7%
Finland 3 0.2% Madrid 12 0.7%
South Africa 2 0.1% Los Angeles 12 0.7%
Liechtenstein 2 0.1% Short Hills 12 0.7%
n.a. 2 0.1% Nassau 12 0.7%
Singapore 2 0.1% Puteaux 11 0.7%
Hong Kong 1 0.1% Fort Lauderdale 11 0.7%
Greece 1 0.1% San Francisco 10 0.6%
Taiwan 1 0.1% Munich 10 0.6%
Bermuda 1 0.1%
1,666 100%
The list of cities is restricted to those where at least 10 active fund managers work.131
Table 4.3:
Table 4.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PORT_WEIGHT 0.006396 0.012125 0.000000 1.000000 4,399,889
DIFF_RET -0.000364 0.002410 -0.012611 0.007152 3,679,430
DIFF_VOLA 0.000477 0.000790 -0.005347 0.006336 3,679,431
DIFF_PT -0.018298 0.194100 -0.854410 1.337569 3,109,250
DIFF_EARN -0.003905 0.035997 -0.152663 0.185215 2,801,973
DIFF_P/E -0.130618 11.708073 -64.667999 75.106094 2,786,845
BENCHMARK 0.000240 0.001264 0.000000 0.159050 3,724,983
CITY 0.028229 0.165625 0.000000 1.000000 3,796,512
COUNTRY 0.157178 0.363968 0.000000 1.000000 4,399,889
The portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a speci￿c stock at a particular point
time is given by PORT_WEIGHT. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN,
DIFF_P/E denote the three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds.132
Table 4.4:
Table 4.4: Temporal distribution of the number of funds and
portfolio weights
N K
2002/I 122,120 851
2002/II 139,790 949
2003/I 144,382 965
2003/II 160,395 1,029
2004/I 167,069 1,007
2004/II 203,472 1,102
2005/I 211,041 1,084
2005/II 242,202 1,169
2006/I 248,259 1,201
2006/II 272,548 1,263
2007/I 274,041 1,261
2007/II 301,352 1,398
2008/I 332,090 1,401
2008/II 323,982 1,427
2009/I 342,310 1,461
2009/II 383,330 1,482
2010/I 311,922 1,082
2010/II 219,584 824
sum / mean 4,399,889 1,164
N is the number of available portfolio weights per half-year that are provided by K fund
managers.133
Table 4.5:
Table 4.5: Matrix of Cross Correlations
Variables PORT_WEIGHT DIFF_RET DIFF_VOLA DIFF_PT DIFF_EARN DIFF_P/E BENCHMARK CITY
DIFF_RET 0.058
(0.000)
DIFF_VOLA -0.082 0.079
(0.000) (0.000)
DIFF_PT -0.018 -0.219 0.191
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIFF_EARN 0.043 -0.114 0.130 0.305
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIFF_P/E -0.001 0.058 -0.043 -0.127 -0.316
(0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BENCHMARK 0.233 0.009 -0.051 -0.010 0.034 -0.022
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CITY 0.075 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.022 -0.000 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.734) (0.000)
COUNTRY 0.037 -0.007 0.004 0.047 -0.030 -0.021 0.026 -0.080
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a speci￿c stock at a particular point
time is given by PORT_WEIGHT. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN,
DIFF_P/E denote the three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds. The table contains the
correlation coe￿cients. P-values are reported in parenthesis.134
lections as the corresponding correlation coe￿cient is almost zero and not
signi￿cant on a 10% level.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Determination of the underlying in￿uential network
In the following, I test the three hypotheses of the paper. Therefore, I deter-
mine the magnitude of social in￿uence among fund managers, divide it into
observational in￿uence and in￿uence from the exchange of opinion and relate
it to the prevailing market environment. First, I select the variables that are
relevant for the portfolio selection. The correlation coe￿cients provided in
the preceding chapter all showed the expected sign, except for DIFF_PT and
DIFF_P/E. In order to capture correctly the fundamental component, di￿er-
ent speci￿cations with the three fundamental variables are tested within an
OLS panel regression with fund manager ￿xed e￿ects. The results are shown
in table 4.6. It can be seen that DIFF_EARN has the highest relevance, such
that I use the variables of the third speci￿cation for the analysis of in￿uence.
I estimate the coe￿cients of Equation 4.3 for every half-year from 2005 to
2010. The years from 2002 to 2004 are skipped, because the number of avail-
able earnings forecasts in the database is too low. 12 For every half-year, I
further remove all funds where less than 30 portfolios weights have been avail-
able. This ensures enough degrees of freedom for the empirical analysis. As
described in chapter 4.4, the matrix Γt is determined by pair-wise regres-
sions. Therefore, PORT_WEIGHT is used for wt and the columns of the
matrix Xt consist of the variables DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_EARN,
BENCHMARK, CITY, COUNTRY as well as of a row vector of ones in order
to introduce a constant term. Remember that the matrix of instruments is
given by Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]. If however, some variables are identical for the two
12Removing the variable DIFF_EARN and including the years 2002 to 2004 qualitatively
leads to the same results.135
Table 4.6:
Table 4.6: OLS panel regression with fund manager ￿xed e￿ects
Speci￿cation I Speci￿cation II Speci￿cation III Speci￿cation IV
DIFF_RET 0.14133∗∗∗ 0.12958∗∗∗ 0.15040∗∗∗ 0.13368∗∗∗
(0.00204) (0.00193) (0.00187) (0.00187)
DIFF_VOLA −0.67585∗∗∗ −0.65888∗∗∗ −0.70066∗∗∗ −0.64053∗∗∗
(0.00647) (0.00606) (0.00597) (0.00583)
DIFF_PT −0.00081∗∗∗ −0.00005∗
(0.00003) (0.00002)
DIFF_EARN 0.01112∗∗∗ 0.01130∗∗∗
(0.00015) (0.00013)
DIFF_P/E −0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
BENCHMARK 1.20364∗∗∗ 1.08347∗∗∗ 1.21971∗∗∗ 1.23161∗∗∗
(0.00496) (0.00401) (0.00482) (0.00486)
CITY 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
COUNTRY 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ 0.00122∗∗∗ 0.00114∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
CONST 0.00556∗∗∗ 0.00553∗∗∗ 0.00552∗∗∗ 0.00545∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
N 2,160,103 2,536,435 2,331,492 2,312,400
The dependent variable is given by the portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a
speci￿c stock at a particular point. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_PT, DIFF_EARN,
DIFF_P/E denote the three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds. The table contains
the regression coe￿cients βt that result from the estimation of equation 4.3 with δt = 0 by
an OLS panel regression with ￿xed e￿ects on the fund manager level. The signi￿cance of
coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding
standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.136
fund managers under consideration, then the columns of Z will be collinear.
This can be demonstrated by the constant term that by de￿nition always is a
column vector of ones. The matrix of instruments can be written as
Z = [Γt[X
(1−6)
t ,c],[X
(1−6)
t ,c]], (4.14)
with c being a column vector of ones. The matrix X
(1−6)
t contains the six
variables (DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_EARN, BENCHMARK, CITY,
COUNTRY) as explained above. Now, Equation 4.14 can be reformulated as
Z = [ΓtX
(1−6)
t ,Γtc,X
(1−6)
t ,c]. (4.15)
The rows of Γt are normalised, such that the single row elements sum up to
one. This yields Γtc = c. Hence, the 7th and the 14th column of matrix Z are
identical and thus collinear. This problem of colinearity might also occur for
the variables BENCHMARK, CITY or COUNTRY, if fund managers have the
same benchmark or work in the same city or country, respectively. In order to
rule out the potential problem, I use the instruments Z = [ΓtX
(1−3)
t ,Xt], where
the matrix X
(1−3)
t only consists of the variables DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA and
DIFF_EARN that are guaranteed to be individual for every fund manager as
they depend on the speci￿c portfolio compositions. Regarding the timing of
possible in￿uence, I assume that fund managers can only be in￿uenced by
other fund managers if they publish their portfolio weights within the same
month. Moreover, I require them to hold at that time at least 30 stocks in
common, because the distribution of a fund manager’s portfolio weights cannot
be in￿uenced by other fund managers who hold completely di￿erent portfolios.
Furthermore, I do not examine the reciprocal in￿uence of funds that belong to
the same fund family, as this does not represent a form of external in￿uence.
The overall average density of the resulting network equals 0.65%. On average,
59% of the links connect fund managers within the same world region (e.g.
Europe, North America, etc.). 22% of the links represent relationships between
fund managers working in the same country, while 8% of the links are due to
intra-city connections.137
4.6.2 Estimation of the magnitude of social in￿uence
After having obtained the matrix Γt, the two step procedure outlined in chap-
ter 4.4 can be applied in order to estimate the coe￿cients δt and βt for every
half-year. The vector wt and the matrix Xt are de￿ned as explained above for
the determination of Γt. This time however, I use Z = [ΓtX
(1−6)
t ,Xt] as the set
of instruments, where X
(1−6)
t contains the same column as Xt except the vector
of ones. This choice is justi￿ed by the fact that not all fund managers neither
have the same benchmark, nor work in the same city or country, respectively,
such that only the column vector of ones could generate a collinearity. The
estimation results are shown in table 4.7. It can be seen that all values of δt are
lower than one. As the matrix Γt is row normalised by Equation 4.2, i.e. the
single row elements sum up to one, the spectral radius of δtΓt is also always
lower than one. Hence, the instruments used for the estimation procedure are
valid (see appendix).
The average estimate of the coe￿cient δt equals 0.6878. This means that if
a portfolio position is 1% higher weighted by the relevant fund managers of
the underlying in￿uential network, then a particular fund manager also puts
0.69% more weight on the relevant stock compared to other stocks in his portfo-
lio. The magnitude of social in￿uence might appear to be higher than results
of other empirical studies suggest. Hong et al. (2005) for instance obtain a
value of 0.13. Wermers (1999) ￿nds that if 100 fund managers trade a par-
ticular stock in a quarter, then approximately 3 more funds would trade on
the same side of the market in that stock than would be expected if stocks
were choosing randomly. However, afore cited authors analyse fund managers’
trades and stock picking behaviour and therefore examine changes of portfolio
weights that occur during one quarter, while my study aims to shed light on
the distribution of portfolio weights on a speci￿c date. Moreover, Hong et al.
(2005) only determine the magnitude of social in￿uence that arises from the
exchange of opinion, while I also consider observational in￿uence.
Among the variables that are decisive for the portfolio selection, BENCH-138
Table 4.7: Table 4.7: Estimation results for the magnitude of social in￿uence
δt DIFF_RET DIFF_VOLA DIFF_EARN BENCHMARK CITY COUNTRY CONST N/K
2005/I 0.6804∗∗∗ 0.1973∗∗∗ −2.9388∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.9845∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 30,965
(0.0206) (0.0250) (0.1539) (0.0011) (0.0760) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) 415
2005/II 0.7809∗∗∗ 0.1567∗∗∗ −0.9084∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 1.1204∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 132,884
(0.0226) (0.0119) (0.1333) (0.0010) (0.1502) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 901
2006/I 0.6645∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ −1.1161∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 2.0421∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 140,871
(0.0170) (0.0140) (0.0841) (0.0008) (0.1782) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 895
2006/II 0.6516∗∗∗ 0.1056∗∗∗ −0.8132∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 1.1843∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 169,451
(0.0106) (0.0077) (0.0647) (0.0009) (0.1183) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 967
2007/I 0.6867∗∗∗ 0.1735∗∗∗ −1.8908∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 1.1092∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 179,348
(0.0143) (0.0104) (0.0785) (0.0009) (0.2454) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 961
2007/II 0.6606∗∗∗ 0.2970∗∗∗ −1.1007∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.3769∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 207,838
(0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0327) (0.0007) (0.0649) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 1,116
2008/I 0.6654∗∗∗ 0.1564∗∗∗ −1.0590∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 1.2108∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 249,314
(0.0087) (0.0043) (0.0169) (0.0003) (0.0545) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,237
2008/II 0.7693∗∗∗ 0.2170∗∗∗ −0.3005∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 1.2342∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 234,275
(0.0100) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0003) (0.0659) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,262
2009/I 0.7095∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ −0.6326∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 2.3453∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 255,197
(0.0092) (0.0039) (0.0118) (0.0002) (0.1217) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,369
2009/II 0.7247∗∗∗ 0.1393∗∗∗ −1.0176∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.7959∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 303,547
(0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0174) (0.0002) (0.0471) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1,411
2010/I 0.5917∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ −0.9350∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 1.0187∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 247,488
(0.0099) (0.0043) (0.0180) (0.0003) (0.0579) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 957
2010/II 0.6571∗∗∗ 0.1344∗∗∗ −1.2916∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 1.3203∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 172,590
(0.0173) (0.0058) (0.0309) (0.0003) (0.0787) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 698
mean 0.6878 0.1466 -1.1668 0.0091 1.2282 0.0024 0.0011 0.0050 193,647
The dependent variable is given by the portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a
speci￿c stock at a particular point. DIFF_RET, DIFF_VOLA, DIFF_EARN, denote the
three months’ average daily stock return, the three months’ volatility of daily stock returns
and the normalised three years average earnings, respectively, minus the corresponding port-
folio speci￿c weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speci￿c
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city as the company whose stock he
holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same city
but in the same country as the company whose stock he holds. N represents the number of
observation and K the number of fund managers used in the empirical analysis. The table
contains the regression coe￿cients δt and βt of equation 4.3 that are obtained by the two
step estimation as explained in the text. The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated by stars
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding standard deviations are reported
in parenthesis.MARK has a considerable e￿ect. The corresponding average coe￿cient of
1.2282 is greater than one, which thus suggests that portfolio managers gen-
erally hold fewer stocks than are included in all relevant indices. Therefore,
variations in the benchmark portfolio translate into higher variations in an
individual portfolio. Moreover, on average, an increase of DIFF_RET and
DIFF_EARN and a decrease of DIFF_VOLA each by one standard deviation
leads to an increase in portfolio weights by 0.04%, 0.03% and 0.09%, respec-
tively. Interestingly, the regression coe￿cients for DIFF_VOLA are consid-
erable smaller in the second half-year of 2008 and the ￿rst half-year of 2009,
which results from the high volatility most of the stocks experienced during
that period of time. Fund managers tend to put 0.02% more portfolio weight
on stocks, if they work in the city where the headquarters of the issuing com-
pany is located. 0.01% more portfolio weight is chosen, if not the city but at
least the country is equal. The resulting variations appear to be low. However,
remember that the average portfolio weight equals 0.64%. The afore presented
results show that after controlling for the key determinants of the portfolio
selection, the e￿ect of social in￿uence among fund managers is statistically
and economically signi￿cant. This corroborates my ￿rst hypothesis.
4.6.3 Fluctuations of social in￿uence
Table 4.8 shows the evolution of the network density over time. The network
density is de￿ned by the number of all network links given by Γt divided by
the number of all possible network links. The number of all possible links is
given by K(K−1), where K is the number of fund managers that are analysed
in a particular half-year. Following Hong et al. (2005), I de￿ne the in￿uence
between fund managers that work in the same city as in￿uence from the ex-
change of opinion. Table 4.8 also provides the fraction of the total density that
is due to links that connect fund managers in the same city. The relevance of
the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion can be expressed more precisely, if
every intra-city link is weighted with the corresponding coe￿cient γijt. The140
Table 4.8:
Table 4.8: Network dynamics
num all links
num all possible links
num unweighted city links
num all links
num weighted city links
num all links
2005/I 0.58% 7.7% 10.75%
2005/II 0.60% 10.9% 11.28%
2006/I 0.53% 9.2% 9.38%
2006/II 0.59% 9.5% 9.15%
2007/I 0.59% 8.3% 8.42%
2007/II 0.55% 9.2% 9.45%
2008/I 0.62% 7.9% 8.49%
2008/II 0.64% 9.8% 7.16%
2009/I 0.85% 7.2% 7.64%
2009/II 0.92% 7.0% 7.94%
2010/I 0.76% 7.6% 7.30%
2010/II 0.53% 7.7% 6.50%
mean 0.65% 8.49% 8.62%
The ￿rst column displays the total network density. The second column shows the portion
of network density that is generated by intra-city links. The third column also contains the
portion of network density resulting from intra-city links, however, every link is weighted
with the corresponding coe￿cient γijt.
resulting weighted fraction of the total density is also displayed in table 4.8.
The mean network density equals 0.65%. This means the underlying in￿uential
network is very sparse. On average, a particular fund manager is in￿uenced
by 6.6 other fund managers. The mean portion of weighted and unweighted
network links that connect fund managers within the same city are quite sim-
ilar and equal 8.49% and 8.62%, respectively. Hence, 8.49% of the average
network density is due the intra-city links and 8.62% of the average magnitude
of social in￿uence results from intra-city in￿uence. The latter means that, on
average, a fund manager increases the portfolio weight of a particular stock
by 0.06%, if the fund managers with whom he exchanges his opinion increase141
the corresponding portfolio weight by 1%. It can be stated that the portion
of intra-city in￿uence decreases slightly over time, which could be due to the
e￿ect of increasing globalisation.
In order to test the second and third hypothesis, the magnitude of social in-
￿uence and the density of the underlying in￿uential network are related to the
prevailing market environment represented by the dynamics of the DAX30.
Figure 4.1(a) shows the magnitude of in￿uence as well as the network density.
Figure 4.1(b) displays the magnitude of in￿uence that is due to fund managers
working in the same city as well as the network density resulting from links
between those fund managers. In ￿gure 4.1(c) the price level of the DAX30
and the volatility of daily returns for every half-year during the period of anal-
ysis are shown. One can see that the magnitude of in￿uence has been at a
stable level of about 0.67 since 2006. A sudden increase can be observed at
the beginning of the recent economic crisis in the second half-year of 2008,
where the level of the DAX30 was low and the volatility of stock returns was
high. As the bottom line of the DAX30 level was reached and returns began
to get positive again, the magnitude of in￿uence decreased to below the level
experienced before the crisis and returned to this level in the second half-year
of 2010. Surprisingly, there is a singular peak in the magnitude of in￿uence in
the second half-year of 2005 that does not correspond to a speci￿c evolution
of the DAX30. The density of the underlying in￿uential network remained
stable on the level of about 0.59% between 2005 and 2008. It began to grow
signi￿cantly in the ￿rst half-year of 2009 and returned to the pre-crisis level in
the second half-year of 2010.
The temporal variations of the magnitude of social in￿uence provide empirical
evidence in favour of my second hypothesis. During the period until the begin-
ning of the economic crisis in 2008 as well as in 2010, social in￿uence among
fund managers was considerably lower than during the crisis. This suggests
that fund managers try to di￿erentiate from their competitors during an eco-
nomic upturn in order to get a superior remuneration. During an economic
turndown, however, they fear the loss of reputation and consequently of re-142
Figure 4.1: Figure 4.1: DAX30 related ￿uctuation of social in￿uence
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muneration, such that they are more prone to align their portfolio decisions
with other fund managers. This theory is also supported by the evolution of
the network density. At the beginning of the crisis, fund managers were only
in￿uenced by those fund managers by whom they had also been (less strongly)
in￿uenced before. During the crisis, the number of fund managers by whom a
particular fund manager was in￿uenced increased notably. This led to a mar-
ket wide alignment of portfolio weights, which could be based on afore cited
e￿ects of reputation and remuneration.
Now, turning to the third hypothesis, I intend to shed light on the temporal
￿uctuation of the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion, de￿ned as social
in￿uence among fund managers that work in the same city. It can be stated
that the magnitude of in￿uence as well as the network density is more or less
constant over time. This means that the increase of in￿uence and the enlarge-
ment of the in￿uential network during the crisis are not due to an increase of
in￿uence from the exchange of opinion. This is in line with the argumentation
that interaction with social contacts does not vary with the prevailing mar-
ket environment, such that variations are due to ￿uctuations of observational
in￿uence most probably for motives of reputation and remuneration.
4.7 Robustness checks
In order to rule out the possibility that the results presented in the previous
chapter are driven by factors that are not related to the presented explanations,
I provide some robustness checks. A key factor that potentially could lead to
biased results is that the underlying social network is determined endogenously.
Thereby, only the in￿uence from those fund managers with correlated portfolio
weights is considered. Moreover, this in￿uence is a priori weighted with the
corresponding coe￿cients from the pair-wise regressions. As a ￿rst robustness
check, I repeated the empirical analysis with an exogenous network, i.e. a
given presumed network which is not just determined within the empirical
analysis. Therefore, I assumed that a fund manager can be in￿uenced by any144
Table 4.9:
Table 4.9: Robustness checks: Temporal mean values of the
magnitude of social in￿uence δt for di￿erent speci￿cations
whole period bear market bull market di￿erence
(I) min. 30 com. st. (standard) 0.6859 0.7376 0.6687 0.0689
(II) min. 30 com. st., exog. netw. 0.9346 0.9743 0.9214 0.0529
(III) min. 15 com. st., endog. netw. 0.7867 0.8423 0.7681 0.0742
(IV) min. 100 com. st., endog. netw. 0.5157 0.5446 0.5060 0.0385
Speci￿cation I represents the standard model used for the empirical analysis of this paper.
Speci￿cation II is based on an exogenous network as explained in the text. Speci￿cations III
and IV are used to vary the minimum number of stocks two fund managers have to hold in
common, such that they could potentially in￿uence each other. The corresponding minimum
numbers are 15 and 100. In the ￿rst column, the overall temporal mean values of regression
coe￿cients δt measuring the magnitude of social in￿uence are displayed. The second and
the third columns show the corresponding temporal mean values for the bearish market en-
vironment (2008/II, 2009/I, 2009/II) and the bullish market environment (remaining period
of analysis). In the last column, the di￿erences of average social in￿uence between the two
di￿erent market environments are presented.
other fund manager with whom he holds at least 30 stocks in common. I kept
the restriction regarding the minimum number of common stocks, because
fund managers can only (intentionally) align their portfolios, if they have a
minimum intersection of stocks. In order to illustrate this fact, consider two
fund managers that only share one common stock. The weight of this stock
depends on the weights of all other stocks in the respective portfolios, such that
a correlation of these single stock’s weights could only be spurious. In order
to overcome the potential bias that could result by weighting the in￿uence of
fund managers di￿erently, I chose equal weights for every fund manager. The
results can be seen in table 4.9 (speci￿cation II). The overall average coe￿cient
of social in￿uence equals 0.9346. This is by far higher than the magnitude of
social in￿uence obtained by the standard model in the previous chapter and
indicates that my results are not upwardly biased through the usage of an
endogenous network. Having a closer look at the dynamics of social in￿uence,145
I compared the mean value of the coe￿cients obtained for the second half-
year of 2008 and both half-years of 2009 (bearish market environment) with
the temporal average of the coe￿cients obtained for the remaining period of
analysis (bullish market environment). The di￿erence equals 0.0529 and is
only slighter lower than the di￿erence found by applying the standard model
amounting to 0.0689 (see speci￿cation I in table 4.9). Hence, even if one does
not trust the absolute values of social in￿uence, temporal variations attest a
relative di￿erence between the periods of bull and bear markets.
In order to provide further robustness checks, I varied the minimum number
of stocks that two fund managers have to hold in common, such that they
could potentially in￿uence each other. First, I reduced this number to 15.
Thereafter, I augmented it to 100. The results are also shown in table 4.9
(speci￿cations III and IV). The di￿erence of social in￿uence between the two
market environments equals 0.0742, if 15 common stocks are requested and
amounts to 0.0385, if the threshold is set to 100. Hence, speci￿cation III leads
to a higher di￿erence of social in￿uence compared the standard model, while
speci￿cation IV yields a lower di￿erence. This is in line with the explanations
provided in the proceeding chapter. The number of minimum common stocks
controls the number of fund managers by whom a particular fund manager is
assumed to be potentially in￿uenced. The more fund managers are considered
to in￿uence a particular fund manager, the higher is the measured magnitude
of in￿uence in case of a market wide portfolio alignment. Hence, the di￿erence
of social in￿uence between the two states of the economy which resulted to
be higher for a smaller threshold can be interpreted as evidence in favour of a
market wide portfolio alignment during an economic downturn.
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed the social in￿uence on portfolio decisions that fund
managers investing in DAX30 companies have on each other. I ￿rst determined
the underlying in￿uential network by examining every possible link between146
two fund managers. The constructed network resulted to be very sparse. Using
a two step estimation procedure, I then estimated the magnitude of in￿uence.
On average, a fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight on a particu-
lar stock, if the fund managers in his reference group assign a weight to the
corresponding position which is 1% higher compared to other stocks in the
portfolio. Looking at intra-city in￿uence, I found that 8.62% of the total in-
￿uence is based on the exchange of opinion.
Relating the in￿uence among fund managers to the dynamics of the DAX30, I
concluded that fund managers adapt their behaviour to the prevailing market
situation. In times of a bull market, fund managers rather try to di￿erentiate
themselves from their competitors. During a bear market, they are more prone
to align their portfolio weights with the others. These behavioural patterns are
most probably due to reputational reasons and e￿ects of remuneration. This
is in line with the fact that the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion, de￿ned
as intra-city in￿uence, does not alter with the prevailing market environment.
The empirical ￿ndings of this paper regarding the behaviour of fund managers
can be taken into account while creating remuneration schemes in order to
avoid negative outcomes that might result from a herding behaviour during a
market downturn.147
Appendix
In this appendix, it shall be shown that the instruments Z = [ΓtXt,Xt] can
be used to estimate Equation 4.3 by a 2SLS estimator, if Xt is uncorrelated
with the error term and if the spectral radius of δtΓt is smaller than one.
The endogenous regressor Γtwt can be expressed by the reduced form Equation
4.4 in the following way
Γtwt = Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t). (4.16)
If the spectral radius of δtΓt is lower than one, the Neumann expansion can
be used and leads to
Γtwt = Γt
 
I + δtΓt + δ
2
tΓt
2 + ...

(Xtβt + t). (4.17)
If Xt is not correlated with t, it thereof follows that ΓtXt is a valid instrument
for Γtwt, because it is correlated with Γtwt, but does not have a direct impact
on wt, as it does not appear in Equation 4.3.148
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